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In 1898, the United States forced Spain to release the colonies of Cuba, Puerto Rico, 
Guam, and the Philippine Islands.  Over the next 20 years, the United States Senate 
debated whether to keep, how to govern, and finally how to set some of those territories 
free while making others permanent possessions of the republic.  These debates reveal a 
legislature, and by extension a nation, reevaluating its basic principles and changing place 
in the world. 
A review of international relations and domestic politics preceding the Spanish-
American War establishes a pattern of legislative deference.  Examination of pivotal 
debates spanning the post-war American imperial period shows how the Senate broke 
that pattern by seeking an expanded foreign policy role.  Each inquiry highlights the 
effects of partisanship and domestic politics on ostensibly international matters. It is well 
known that the Senate failed to assert its foreign policy authority over the executive.  Yet 
its efforts to do so casts light on the politics of the period, on how decisions about the 
acquisition and fate of America’s colonies were justified, and on how deeply contested 
these issue actually were.  After extensive debate, the Senate deliberately chose 
imperialism.  This paper explains how and why it did so. 
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 1 
I. THE ROAD TO EMPIRE 
Throughout the first century of its existence, the United States followed and 
perfected the plan that had animated settlement of its original colonies, expanding to the 
south and west to increase both opportunity for the people and the majesty of the state.  
The pattern was flexible in application but unitary in design and soon settled into a 
familiar rhythm: explore, settle, incorporate, seek territorial status, achieve statehood, 
repeat.  Over time, this progression became more than a means for national 
aggrandizement, and such iconic personages as the independent mountain man exploring 
the uncharted frontier, the hearty pioneers risking all for their stake in the new territory, 
and the stalwart farmer breaking nature to his will all came to be descriptors for America 
itself.  As a land of growth and opportunity, the United States knew no peer, and 
ostensibly no bounds.  By the 1890s, however, that depiction was beginning to change as 
the vast continent was incorporated and as shopkeepers replaced pioneers.1 
At the turn of the century, America discarded this tested pattern and instead 
undertook the project of overseas adventurism.  This enterprise was informed by Alfred 
Thayer Mahan’s prescription for embracing an expanded international role, and made 
possible by recent naval reform and expansion.  Beginning in 1898, the United States 
engaged in a brief fit of imperialism, a transformation the nation then spent the following 
decades struggling mightily to rationalize, rectify, and finally—excepting Guam and 
Puerto Rico—undo.2   
During these two decades the legislative branch sought an expansion of its own, 
seeking to assert its will by crafting foreign policy, previously the purview of the 
executive.  This synergistic eruption of naval reform, overseas expansion, and attempted 
legislative power grab offers an opportunity this dissertation seeks to exploit.  This study 
                                                 
1 Even discounting the frontier thesis espoused by Fredrick Jackson Turner, the period of overland 
expansion was over. The last contiguous territory established was Oklahoma Territory in 1890, and while 
Alaska did not become a territory until 1912, it was purchased in 1867, termed District of Alaska in 1884 
with the establishment of local government. 
2 Alfred Thayer Mahan, Influence of Seapower Upon History, 1660–1783 (Boston, MA: Little, Brown 
and Company, 1890). 
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examines how a fundamental change in national character—from an ethos of growth of 
the core to one of territorial acquisition without intent to increase the core—was 
explained, supported, and contested in a national debate through the congressional 
deliberations on imperial policy from 1898–1917.   
The result is a clearer understanding of how the deliberate selection of a policy 
course considered antithetical to the core values of the republic was re-evaluated 
throughout the period in question, and then modified by policies that have had significant 
consequences through to today.  In short, this study charts the procession of Senate 
opinion from resistance to empire, through acceptance, to both qualified rejection and 
qualified retention, and introduces domestic and international events to show how and 
why that procession occurred. 
One event that set the stage for all that followed was the Naval Act of 1890, in 
which Congress deliberated funded the corpus of Mahan’s recommendations by literally 
authorizing the “new navy.”3  Far from a mere modernization of existing capital assets, 
this ambitious plan called for a shipbuilding schedule designed to shift the very reason for 
maintaining a navy—from a regional to a worldwide power—and thus reflected a 
corresponding fundamental alteration in national mindset.   With this expanded ability to 
exert national will at great distance came the associated capability to establish, 
administer, and defend more than just trade relations, but eventually overseas imperial 
possessions as well.  In this light, the Naval Act of 1890 was a key enabler for American 
imperialism, for when the opportunity arose through Spain’s defeat in 1898, the United 
States was able to contemplate taking, and keeping, Cuba, Puerto Rico, Guam, and the 
Philippines.   
Despite owing feasibility to the precedent and expectations sowed by the Naval 
Act of 1890, the central debates on American imperialism stand apart and are the subject 
of this dissertation.  The positions taken and points advanced in these debates reflect not 
                                                 
3 “An Act Making Appropriations for the Naval Service for the Fiscal Year Ending June Thirtieth, 





only opposing views of the issues at hand, but also serve to illuminate the larger changes 
in the United States during this period.  It is this concentration on legislative debates of 
empire, and the associated employment of primary sources underutilized by other 
scholars, that makes this dissertation unique. 
A. LITERATURE REVIEW 
Many other studies have approached the issue from the view of the executive, the 
press, the business community, the anti-imperialist opposition, and the military.  The rich 
and diverse literature on American imperialism offers the context in which this project 
will nest, and a brief summary of the various approaches taken by the more significant 
works is presented here to outline broad reference base available.  The selections are 
grouped for ease of comparison—for instance early works, military, diplomatic, gender, 
race, political, diplomatic, et cetera—but include notations to show connection to the 
larger historiographical discourse.  
This literature review includes both standard and recent works on the topic with 
an eye toward exposing the void this dissertation fills.  Congressional influence in 
American imperialism has been lightly treated in the bulk of this literature, and at best the 
focus of a chapter or two in grand works on American foreign policy or Senate history.  
The remainder of this chapter then outlines how Senate debates at three inflection points 
in the American imperial process are analyzed in this paper, and how detailed study of 
the primary sources adds flesh to the bones described in this literature review. 
While the seminal works that formed an overview of the topic are slightly dated, 
they continue to serve nicely as bedrock for later additional views and approaches.  
Unlike many other discrete periods of American history, in which studies focusing on 
gender, populist political movements of opposition, race, and sub-altern voices contested 
the classics that proceeded, the addition of such studies to American imperial literature 
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has served to advance the narrative and more fully develop the picture.4  As a result, 
many of the most influential works first published in 1955–1980 still contribute to an 
understanding of the discourse, and are augmented by later studies concentrating, for 
instance, on the views of Cubans or Filipinos. 
Among the classics of the early American imperial literature are four works with 
their own unique approach to the issue.  Each was written not only with an individual 
agenda, but also in concert with the historiography of its time.  Robert Beisner’s volumes 
provided an examination in depth of the motivations and actions of the Anti-Imperialist 
movement leaders who sought to mobilize public opinion against international expansion, 
and the foreign policy that resulted.5  Conversely, Walter LaFeber focused on the pro-
interventionalist movement, averring that its employment of Victorian mores to justify 
conquest concealed baser financial motivations for empire.6  Richard Hofstadter explored 
the influence domestic politics played in the formulation of foreign policy, specifically 
showing that imperial decisions were more products of political pandering than concerted 
efforts to advance national interests abroad. 7   
Finally, Ernest May offered the most comprehensive look at the influences 
affecting all parties in the conflict.  In Imperial Democracy, May examined the domestic 
pressures faced by the Spanish royal court and legislature.  He juxtaposed those domestic 
concerns with the interplay between the other European imperial powers as they 
contemplated the strategic benefits of placating the United States versus the common 
bonds with Spain.  May then continued this examination of domestic and international 
dynamics—but from the Cuban point of view—presenting the counterpoise between 
                                                 
4 Early works on the Revolutionary Period, Civil War, Reconstruction, the Great Depression, and the 
Civil Rights Movement were often followed by revisionist works seeking to disprove central theses by 
using a previously silent viewpoint. Conversely, the primary works on the Spanish American War that have 
sought to give voice to the subaltern have tended to support the central theses of earlier works, and to add 
richness. 
5 Robert L. Beisner, Twelve Against Empire: The Anti-Imperialists 1898–1900 (New York: McGraw 
Hill, 1968); From the Old Diplomacy to the New, 1865–1900 (New York: Cromwell, 1975). In addition, 
both Beisner and LaFeber were reacting, and contributing, to the 1960s New Left historiography. 
6 Walter LaFeber, The New Empire: An Interpretation of American Expansion, 1860–1898 (Ithaca, 
NY: Cornell University Press, 1963). 
7 Richard Hofstadter, The Age of Reform: From Bryan to FDR (New York: Knopf, 1955). 
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military leaders on the island and junta leaders in the United States.  Completing the 
survey, he also contrasted the multi-faceted deliberations in the American government 
and public spheres.8  To that end, May’s work expands the scope of the other three by 
incorporating their detailed argument and core theses.  By careful consideration of all 
four of these works, a rich understanding of both domestic and international factors 
influencing the course of the Spanish-American War can be developed. 
1. Military Histories 
Similarly, studies focusing on the military aspects of the American imperial 
period complement each other.  David Trask attempted a sweeping overview of the 
individual campaigns of the war with Spain in one volume, broadly covering 
deployments, maneuvers, and engagements of the armed forces in Manila Bay, Cuba, and 
Puerto Rico.9  Further specializing, Graham Cosmas studied the campaigns in Cuba and 
Puerto Rico strictly from the viewpoint of the American land forces.10  Many early works 
featured first person accounts from nearly every position on the battlefield, with some 
released immediately following the war and the bulk as reminiscences decades later.  
Unfortunately, very few were insightful or comprehensive in examination of the conduct 
of the campaigns.  
While still concentrating on the military aspects of the war with Spain, several 
later works embraced a broader perspective and thus add considerable depth to the 
literature.  For example, Ivan Musicant enhanced the understanding of the military efforts 
by examining the intersection of military and political goals, albeit mostly from the 
American side.11  Louis Perez Jr., however, provided a mirror image study written from 
the Cuban and Spanish perspectives.12  These two broad views, along with a group of 
                                                 
8 Ernest May, Imperial Democracy (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Court, 1961). 
9 David F. Trask, The War With Spain in 1898 (New York: Macmillan, 1981). 
10 Graham Cosmas, An Army for Empire: The United States Army in the Spanish American War 
(Columbia, MO: University of Missouri Press, 1971). 
11 Ivan Musicant, Empire By Default: The Spanish-American War and the Dawn of the American 
Century (New York: H. Holt, 1998). 
12 Louis A. Perez, The War of 1898: The United States and Cuba in History and Historiography 
(Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 1998). 
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more specialized works, form a marked shift in the approach by military historians as 
they meld the “guns and bugles” detail of the campaigns with the larger context 
previously found in such works as May’s Imperial Democracy, thus providing the reader 
with a more nuanced understanding of the causes and implications of the Spanish-
American War. 
These works each close with the occupation of the newly conquered territories or 
the ramifications of the Treaty of Paris, and thus do not include the Filipino-American 
War.  Among the military historians that focused on the Philippine Insurrection, John 
Gates and Brian Linn stand out by featuring a meld of military operations and the hybrid 
civil-military governance and occupation that administered the territory.13  Outside of the 
military history genre, many authors approached the conflict from unique angles, and a 
broad reading that runs the gamut is recommended.   
For example, Stanley Karnow examined the conquest and administration of the 
Philippines with the gimlet eye of a journalist.  His account is strongest in his treatment 
of the atrocities committed by both sides during the pivotal final year of the insurrection, 
and of the beneficial aspects of the American occupation—most notably the 
improvements in education and infrastructure.14  Much like Karnow’s earlier work 
Vietnam: A History, the Pulitzer Prize-winning In Our Image strives to combine the best 
of military and political history with a journalistic approach.   
Political historians writing in the immediate aftermath of the Vietnam War also 
used distinct approaches to understand the Philippine War and to establish precedent in 
the challenges associated in the exportation of American values.  One of the most notable 
of the genre was Stuart Creighton Miller’s Benevolent Assimilation. Written by an Asian 
specialist and political historian who focused on policy, the book features an excellent 
                                                 
13 John M. Gates, The U.S. Army and Irregular Warfare (College of Wooster, Ohio, Nov. 2002), 
http://www3.wooster.edu/history/jgates/book-contents.html; Brian McAllister Linn, The Philippine War: 
1899–1902 (Lawrence, KA: University Press of Kansas, 2002). 
14 Stanley Karnow, In Our Image: America’s Empire in the Philippines (New York: Random House, 
1989). 
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overview of American policy in the occupation and the early years of colonial 
administration of the Philippines. 15 
Finally, recent works in military history—perhaps inspired by the American 
experience in Iraq—have marked a resurgence in the examination of the Philippine-
American War.  As an example, David Silbey draws the parallel between the two events 
separated by a century, specifically the quick conventional victory by superior forces 
resulting in a protracted insurgency.16  Unfortunately, by focusing on the war itself and 
not the policies of imperialism that follow, this line of inquiry has little new to offer this 
project. 
2. Political Histories 
Just as military historians have approached the American imperial experience 
from myriad viewpoints, political histories illuminate the dark recesses of the period by 
shining their lights from different angles.  In An Unwanted War and his subsequent 
article, “McKinley and the Spanish-American War,” John Offner contends that the 
president was unable to overcome domestic political pressures for war even after he 
successfully maneuvered the Spanish into agreeing to nearly every American demand.17  
Howard Morgan took the opposite position by showing the executive as controlling the 
developments that led to the conflict, and as being more in tune with the electorate than 
the putative representatives in the legislature.18 
Covering the same period, Lawrence Goodwyn examined the pressures leading to 
war through the lens of the domestic political policies of the nascent Populist Party, 
explaining how members of both the legislature and executive had to adapt to the threat 
                                                 
15 Stuart Creighton Miller, Benevolent Assimilation: America’s Conquest of the Philippines, 1899–
1903 (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1982). 
16 David Silbey, A War of Frontier and Empire: the Philippine-American War, 1899–1902 (New 
York: Hill and Wang, 2007). 
17 John L. Offner, An Unwanted War: The Diplomacy of the United States and Spain Over Cuba, 
1895-1898 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1992); “McKinley and the Spanish-American 
War,” Presidential Studies Quarterly, 34, no. 1 (March 2004): 50–61. 
18 Howard Wayne Morgan, America’s Road to Empire: The War with Spain and Overseas Expansion 
(New York: Wiley and Sons, 1965). 
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of third-party politics that tied international events directly to domestic concerns through 
the local impact of national economics.19  A critic of the progressive treatment of 
American history, Richard Hofstadter sought to reassess the myth of the Populist 
Movement, revealing the futility of anachronistic resistance to progress.20 
Working from an entirely different starting point, David Traxel used the domestic 
political and social events of 1898 to provide context for the events of the Spanish-
American War.21  His central thesis was one of American exceptionalism, as evidenced 
by the subtitle The Birth of the American Century.  Traxel demonstrated that the 
transformations inside the United States during that single year powered America’s leap 
into imperialism and made the war all but inevitable.   
Philip Foner, writing two and a half decades earlier, made the opposite case.  
Perhaps as a reflection of the time in which he was writing, Foner sought to prove that the 
United States intentionally entered the mature conflict between Spain and Cuba only after 
the success of the Cuban cause was a foregone conclusion.  Additionally, this 
intervention occurred after Spanish inability to prevent American interference was clear, 
and after diplomatic efforts had muted international protestations.  In Foner’s estimation, 
the United States was far from indispensible and exceptional, American assistance was 
neither required nor desired by the Cubans, and the decisions to intervene were more 
calculated than forced.22 
3. Social and Cultural Histories 
In addition to the contributions of recent works of political and military history, 
the literature of the Spanish-American War benefitted considerably by inclusion of social, 
race, and gender history.  Ted Smythe takes on one of the major forces cited as 
instigating the Spanish-American War—muckraking journalism—illustrating the effect 
                                                 
19 Lawrence Goodwyn, Democratic Promise: The Populist Moment in America (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1976). 
20 Hofstadter, Age of Reform (New York: Knopf, 1955). 
21 David Traxel, 1898: The Birth of the American Century (New York: Random House, 1998). 
22 Philip Foner, The Spanish-Cuban-American War and the Birth of American Imperialism, 1895–
1902 (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1972). 
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that mobilizing public opinion may have in a democracy, while discounting yellow 
journalism as a war cause.23  Kristin Hoganson linked conception of gender roles to 
events on the international stage, positing Cuba as the damsel in distress, Spain as the 
villain, and America as the knight-errant.24 She also demonstrated the malleability of 
these roles by showing how, once the Spanish were defeated and American intentions 
shifted from liberation to occupation, the popular depiction of Cubans changed to that of 
an infant incapable of caring for its own basic needs—a graphic depiction of a people 
unfit for self-governance.25 
Race issues occupy two related categories: race discrimination within the United 
States military forces, and American racist attitudes toward the peoples of the newly 
conquered territories.  In the first category, both military and cultural historians have 
contributed, and two works exemplify each class.  From the military camp, Edward Van 
Zile Scott chronicled the transition of black professional soldiers from the end of the 
Indian Wars in the American west to the campaign in Cuba in 1898, showing how the 
inroads black soldiers made in the United States Army after the conclusion of the Civil 
War were eroded by the predominance of all-white volunteer units in Cuba. 26  
Representing cultural historians, Amy Kaplan and Donald Pease go further, 
showing a trade-off between sectionalism and race.  In “Black and Blue on San Juan 
Hill,” the authors depict the Cuban campaign as a salve to help heal old Civil War 
animosities of northern and southern white soldiers in both regular Army and volunteer 
units.27  This bonhomie, however, undermines the grudging respect black soldiers had 
earned from their regular Army white compatriots during the Indian Wars, an erosion 
                                                 
23 Ted Curtis Smythe, The Gilded Age Press, 1865–1900 (Westport, CT: Praeger, 2003). 
24 Kristin Hoganson, Fighting For American Manhood: How Gender Politics Provoked the Spanish-
American and Philippine-American Wars (New London, CT: Yale University Press, 1998), 108. 
25 Ibid. 
26 Edward Van Zile Scott, The Unwept: Black American Soldiers in the Spanish American War 
(Montgomery, AL: Black Belt Press, 1996). 
27 Amy Kaplan, “Black and Blue on San Juan Hill,” in Cultures of U.S. Imperialism, edited by Amy 
Kaplan and Donald Pease (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1993). 
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exemplified by white officers’ treatment of black troop immediately after both groups 
stormed San Juan Hill.28  
The other category of race studies dealt with the treatment of Cubans, Puerto 
Ricans, Chamorro, and Filipinos at the hands of quasi-xenophobic Americans, and no 
author examined this dynamic more thoroughly than Matthew Frye Jacobson.  Carrying 
the undercurrent of nativism from the Civil War period into the turn of the century, 
Jacobson investigates the dichotomy of racist expectations and policies held against the 
American inclusionary tendency—legal and ideological if not social.29  Moreover, 
Jacobson shows how American public perception of the peoples indigenous to the newly 
conquered territories was manipulated to align with political necessities—the depiction of 
doughty patriots resisting Spanish depravities changing to brutal insurrectos once they 
contested the American occupation.   
4. Diplomatic and Foreign Policy Histories 
The seminal works of American foreign policy history all address the conflict and 
its causes, but as noted in the opening section of this review, do so as a small part of a 
larger work.  Julius Pratt showed the influences of business interests, proselytizing 
religious groups, and followers of Mahan’s naval doctrine on the formulation of foreign 
policy related to the Spanish-American War.30  In the end, however, he points to the 
primacy of domestic politics in the validation of foreign policy, showing the election of 
1900 as a referendum not only on imperialism, but on the gold standard versus the free-
silver plank of the Democratic Party.  This linkage cascaded into the all-important Senate 
debates on foreign policy, as fence-sitters there “discovered that they preferred 
McKinley, with the gold standard and a little imperialism, to Bryan and free silver.”31   
                                                 
28 White officers led the four black regiments, but the reputation of the Buffalo Soldiers had extended 
to all-white units that served in the Indian Wars, and later in Cuba.  Ibid. 
29 Matthew Frye Jacobson, Barbarian Virtues: The United States Encounters Foreign People at Home 
and Abroad, 1876–1917 (New York: Hill and Wang, 2000). 
30 Julius Pratt, A History of United States Foreign Policy (New York: Prentice Hall, 1955); America’s 
Colonial Experiment: How the United States Gained, Governed, and in Part Gave Away a Colonial Empire 
(New York: Prentice Hall, 1950). 
31 Pratt, America’s Colonial Experiment, 81–2. 
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Similar treatment and depth is available in Bailey’s Diplomatic History of the 
American People,32 and Bemis’s Diplomatic History of the United States.33 Richard 
Leopold’s work followed a generation behind Bailey, Bemis, and Pratt, and proves more 
useful to the task at hand, as one section of the chapter on the foreign policy 
developments surrounding the Spanish American War deals explicitly with the Senate 
debates and counter-resolutions on several of the bills related to American colonialism.34 
More recent overviews of United States foreign policy by Thomas Paterson, 
Walter LaFeber, James Field Jr., and George Herring, however, reflect the experiences of 
the Vietnam War, the end of the Cold War, and even the current conflicts in Iraq and 
Afghanistan.  This added perspective allowed Thomas Paterson to rethink the groupings 
assigned to historians of foreign policy—the sequence of nationalist (Bemis, Bailey, and 
Pratt), progressive (Beard), realist (Kennan and Morganthau), nationalist/realist (May), 
and revisionist (W. A. Williams), and post-revisionists (J. L. Gaddis).35   
Subsequent works, such as Paul Kennedy’s Rise and Fall of Great Powers, build 
on the contributions of Gaddis and bring the focal point back to the realist preoccupation 
with power, yet with new features.  This approach includes increased relevance assigned 
to the environment, the decrease of American economic power, and the increased 
spending on the United States military.  Patterson espouses a holistic examination of 
international, regional, national, and personal levels—including the interrelationships—to 
discover “who has the power to create, to set agendas, to control, to shape, to condition, 
to dominate, and to cooperate?”36 
                                                 
32 Thomas Bailey, Diplomatic History of the American People (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 
1950). 
33 Samuel Bemis, Diplomatic History of the United States (New York: Holt, 1936). 
34 Richard Leopold, The Growth of American Foreign Policy: A History (New York: Knopf, 1962), 
188-196. 
35 Thomas Paterson, “Defining and Doing the History of American Foreign Relations: A Primer,” 
Explaining the History of American Foreign Relations, ed: Michal Hogan and Thomas Paterson 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), 38. 
36 Ibid. 
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LaFeber, writing just after the end of the Cold War, hinged his work on economic 
uncertainty and international instability—themes as relevant in 1993 as in 1898.37  His 
central thesis was that the United States became a world power in direct response to the 
1893–7 economic crisis: “the post-1898 empire was a product of the pre-1897 chaos at 
home.”38  This economic theme, therefore, permeated international relations, McKinley’s 
centralization of power in the executive, and his relationship with Congressional 
leadership.  LaFeber sought to show that this reaction to the Second Industrial Revolution 
and the subsequent depression resulted in United States foreign policy designed—through 
the administrations of McKinley, Roosevelt, and Taft—to intentionally cause regional 
instability to allow expansion of American economic might.39 
Herring shares LaFeber’s characterization of President McKinley as purposeful 
and resolute in crafting a foreign policy of empire.40 The president’s manipulations of 
Congress, international opinion, and domestic support in order to advance the interests of 
the United States at the end of the nineteenth century showed strength of character as he 
“used the war to advance America’s status as a world power and achieve his expansionist 
objectives”—hardly Musicant’s Empire by Default.41  Uniquely, Herring also connects 
the increasing difficulty of suppressing the Philippine Insurrection with the 
administration’s power-brokering in the Senate during the debates on the Platt 
Amendment, and shows the resultant increased interest in maintaining Puerto Rico to 
guard the eastern approaches to a Central American canal.42  Both Herring and LaFeber 
sought to right an historical wrong by challenging the earlier characterizations of 
American foreign policy related to empire as bumbling, and specifically McKinley as 
inept, indecisive, and weak. 
                                                 
37 Walter LaFeber, The Cambridge History of American Foreign Relations, Volume II: The American 
Search for Opportunity, 1865–1913 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993). 
38 Ibid.,103. 
39 Ibid., 126, 135, 144. 
40 George Herring, From Colony to Superpower: U.S. Foreign Relations since 1776 (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2008). 
41Ibid., 317. 
42 Ibid., 318, 325. 
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For a counter point to LaFeber, James Field Jr. derides Pratt, Beard, Williams, 
Hofstadter, LaFeber, and McCormick as having inverted the historical process to 
accompany their own preconceived ideas.  He attacks the notion that American business 
interests were focused on the Far East, stating the China route was primarily an East 
Coast United States interest, and the Navy’s heyday of overseas stations was in the 
1850s.  Empire in Asia was not pre-planned, Field finds.  He asserts that the Asiatic 
Squadron was also considered for action against the Canary Islands, and the primary 
purpose of either that destination or the Philippines was to open a second theater and 
force Spain out of Cuba to defend elsewhere, not territorial gain by the United States.  
Field’s title refers to the War of 1898 as the “worst chapter” in any history book because 
it is all wrong—assigning causation nonsensically and overlooking deep-seated 
characteristics of American behavior.  Had the war not taken a Pacific bent, America 
would have embraced a much smaller sphere of influence with interests in the Caribbean, 
the isthmus, and Hawaiian Islands to carry economic expansion abroad.  In the same 
issue of the American Historical Review, Beisner and LaFeber’s rebuttals to Field’s 
article sharpen the argument, contesting many of Field’s points, but ultimately accepting 
a few while pointing to the benefit to the field as a result of continued study from 
different approaches.43 
Other authors that deal—in useful detail—with at least a few of these debates on 
empire are Barbara Tuchman, Robert Johnson, and Richard Welch.  Tuchman offers a 
comprehensive analysis of the period as a precursor to her true interest, the debates 
preceding American entry into the First World War, and offers unique insights into the 
debates and leadership in the House of Representatives at the time.44  Johnson deals 
specifically with the opposition to imperialism, and links the legislative agitation of 
1898–1900 to subsequent resistance to the Treaty of Versailles.45  Welch examines solely 
                                                 
43 James Field Jr., “American Imperialism: The Worst Chapter in Almost Any Book,” The American 
Historical Review 83, no. 3 (June 1978): 654, 666–67, 669–78. 
44 Barbara Tuchman, The Proud Tower: A Portrait of the World Before the War, 1890–1914 (New 
York: MacMillan, 1966), 153–164. 
45 Robert Johnson, The Peace Progressives and American Foreign Relations (Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press, 1995), 25–32. 
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the Philippine-American War, to include a particularly strong treatment of the anti-
imperialist debates, missionary zeal to proselytize in the Philippines, and the views of 
black servicemen fighting there.46 
The study closest to the aspirations for this dissertation is Paul Holbo’s essays on 
the debates in the Senate.47  Self-identified as an admirer of May and Morgan, Holbo 
sought to examine the complexity of the debates of the Spanish American War for 
insights into the tenor of the conversation.  Intriguingly, he focuses not on the main 
resolutions of the period, but instead on a rather obscure debate offered as an alternative, 
doomed to failure, but powerful in implication and result.  The Turpie-Foraker 
Amendment changed the dialog in the Senate at the time, represented a powerful 
assertion of legislative power in the face of a dominant executive, and warrants additional 
attention.  It is the work that Paul Holbo did on this forgotten amendment that inspired 
the central thesis of this dissertation. 
B. OPPORTUNITIES AND OUTLINE 
Much of the scholarship employing executive, business, anti-imperialist, and 
military approaches necessarily suffers from ahistorical presentism.  To study President 
McKinley’s decision to annex the whole of the Philippine Islands, for example, is to start 
with the result and search for possible influences on McKinley as he weighed his options 
regarding the issue.  His communications to others are selective in audience, quite 
possibly meant to feel out reception for a decision already arrived at, and certainly not 
transcripts of a running dialog addressing both sides of the choice.48   
                                                 
46 Richard Welch, Response to Imperialism: The United States and the Philippine-American War, 
1899–1902 (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 1979). 
47 Paul Holbo, “Turpie-Foraker Amendment,” in The War of 1898 and U.S. Interventions 1898–1934: 
An Encyclopedia, edited by Benjamin Beede (New York: Garland Publishing, 1994), 549; “Presidential 
Leadership in Foreign Affairs: William McKinley and the Turpie-Foraker Amendment,” American 
Historical Review 72 (1967), 1321–35. 
48 Trachtenberg’s comments on the dangers of evidence collection to support a preconception, and a 
section addressing attention to variables when examining evidence to ascertain how a decision was made, 
are instructive. Marc Tractenberg, The Craft of History: A Guide to Method (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 2006), 16, 141–45. 
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Conversely, the debates in the Senate on the ratification of the Treaty of Paris, to 
take one example, feature transcripts composed of open dialog on the future of the 
Philippines in which both sides seek to influence a decision as of yet unmade.  In 
addition, senators engaged in this debate were more directly affected by myriad local and 
regional interest groups reacting to changes in the domestic and international 
environment.  As a body, Congress certainly brought more of these disparate influences 
and viewpoints to bear on the debate than did the president and his Cabinet, and did so in 
a very public forum.  In essence, the Senate debates offer a participant’s view of the 
discussion on American imperialism, and it is that unique attribute this dissertation seeks 
to exploit. 
In this paper, the congressional debates on empire are arranged in three clusters.  
They are organized functionally, and for the most part, chronologically.  Beginning 
shortly after the 1895 re-ignition of the Cuban insurrection against Spanish colonial rule 
and continuing through the debates on ratification of the peace treaty between Spain and 
the United States in early 1899, the first group of debates center on the question of 
whether the United States should engage in imperial expansion.  Pivotal debates in this 
cluster include deliberations on President McKinley’s War Message to Congress, the 
Teller Amendment, the proposed Turpie-Foraker Amendment, and the pivotal question 
regarding disposition of the Philippine Islands at the center of the Treaty of Paris.49 
The second cluster of debates deserves individual attention by virtue of topic 
more than timing.  After Congress had resolved the question of the desirability of 
becoming an imperial power, the focus of debates over the next several years centered on 
the question of how to go about the tasks of organizing, administering, and defending the 
new American possessions.  Especially troubling, and therefore most interesting, were the 
multiple solutions crafted to gather these new territories close, but not too close, to 
Liberty’s bosom.   
                                                 
49 The main access to most of the following Acts of Congress and debate transcripts is through 
ProQuest Congressional, augmented by the Foreign Relations of the United States series accessed through 
the U.S. Department of State website. 
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Beginning with the Foraker (Organic) Act to establish colonial administration and 
some form of local government in Puerto Rico, and ending with the Philippine Organic 
Act to codify imperial and local rule there, the Senate deliberated compromise solutions 
to accommodate each case individually.  That these debates touched on the bedrock of 
American norms is perhaps best illustrated through the manufacturing of new categories 
by which to classify territories never destined to become states, and new packages of 
rights and responsibilities to bestow upon the people that reside there.  These debates on 
how to govern an American empire provide insight not only into the domestic and 
international pressures acting on senators, but also the tension between established 
American precedent and the new realities to which precedent did not fit neatly. 
The third cluster of Senate debates on empire overlaps the other two 
chronologically, but presents their antithesis: how to extract the United States from its 
imperial obligations.  The debates on the Platt Amendment in 1901 established the 
process for granting Cuban independence while restricting Cuban sovereignty.  The 
debates on the Jones Act of 1916 comprised the first declaration of intention to grant 
independence to the Philippines, leading directly to dominion status.50   
Within the same Congress—indeed, featuring one of the same sponsors—the 
Jones-Saffroth Act debates resulted in exactly the opposite outcome for the remaining 
former Spanish colonies.  This 1917 law codified the “organized but unincorporated” 
classification for Guam and Puerto Rico, a bespoke and unprecedented fabrication to 
accommodate colonies in a republic.51  The act created a permanent status—between 
protectorate and statehood with limited citizenship rights extended to the included 
inhabitants—that continues to the present.  Constant through the above-listed debates is 
the dichotomy of a liberal democratic republic—with government that derives its “just 
                                                 
50 The resultant acts that advanced independence for the Philippines—to Commonwealth status in 
1934 and actual independence in 1947—fall outside the scope of this dissertation, but hew to the line 
established by the Jones Act of 1916.  
51 That is, bespoke in that the classification was crafted specifically to constitutionally accommodate 
keeping the territories of Porto Rico and Guam; fabrication in that the classification had no basis in 
constitutional law or territorial precedent. 
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powers from the consent of the governed”52—ill at ease with the concept of imperialistic 
domination and searching for ways to provide distance or dispensation.   
The period selected for this study offers three compelling opportunities to 
examine the enduring character of the United States.  First, this 18-year period constitutes 
the bulk of discourse on American engagement in traditional imperialistic enterprise.  
One benefit of the small scale and late establishment of the American empire was that the 
experience proceeded at an accelerated pace, spanning decades vice centuries.  For the 
purposes of this dissertation, this means that many of the same senators played a role in 
the debates regarding the establishment, the maturation, and the eventual 
disestablishment of the American empire.   
Further, these debates played out against strikingly similar backgrounds—while 
there were admitted differences between the domestic and international environments 
surrounding the Platt Amendment debates of 1901 on Cuba’s independence and the Jones 
Act of 1916 on independence for the Philippines, those differences pale in comparison to 
the broad changes occurring between the debates in Parliament surrounding the Sepoy 
Rebellion in 1857 and Indian independence 90 years later.  Thus, the compressed 
timeline of American Empire is an intriguing characteristic that delineates the period of 
this study. 
The second compelling opportunity this period offers is a fundamental 
reassessment of the balance of powers between branches of the United States 
government.  Before the period in question, the executive dominated foreign policy, a 
pattern that would again become the norm by the second half of the twentieth century.  
During the period of this study, however, the Senate sought to assert itself.  For a brief 
period, senators reached beyond the limited foreign policy role of earlier times and 
attempted to extend their prerogative and influence matters more directly through a wide 
range of congressional foreign policy initiatives.  During these debates on imperialism  
 
 
                                                 
52 Declaration of Independence, 1776. 
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the Senate sought equal foreign policy status with the executive branch, the progenitor of 
similar twentieth century attempts, starting with the rejection of the Treaty of Versailles 
in 1919. 
The related debates reflected not only a change in the role of this branch of 
government, but also change in the interests of the constituents they represented.  This 
period of transition encompassed not only a shift from regional to global foreign affairs, 
but also an increased interest by local power groups in the international environment.  By 
virtue of greatly reduced transportation costs and transit times, even the traditional 
local/regional interests of agriculture expanded to the global sphere as markets for 
American corn and wheat became tenable further afield than ever before. 
These changing interests also resonate in the third and final compelling 
opportunity of the period: that this period represents a moment of contemplation between 
distinct phases in the American story.  At the end of the nineteenth century, the United 
States entered a transition phase, the heart of which was an opportunity to redefine what, 
as a nation, Americans hoped to become.  The nearly completed process of continental 
expansion could portend either a period of consolidation or a shift to international, 
overseas expansion.  This debate was carried out, sometimes unconsciously, often 
overtly, on a national stage during Senate debates on empire. 
In addition to the opportunities offered by study of this period, however, the 
opportunities offered through an approach that features the legislative viewpoint are most 
promising.  Uniquely, this viewpoint offers an insight into deliberations on the concept of 
a national narrative, specifically in how one gets formed and is then changed over time.  
Such narratives are not unitary, nor are the contributing and contending discourses 
coordinated, so examining only one strand may be representative but not inclusive.  Thus, 
examination of Senate debates during this period offers but one view of the narrative, yet 
this view is uncommonly supra-regional and accessible.  
What “the nation stands for” changed to some extent to suit current mores, but 
also maintained commonality over time.  In the case of the legislative debates on empire 
from 1898–1917, a liberal democratic republic was coming to grips with an expanded 
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international role to play, and attempting to rationalize and justify imperial domination of 
foreign peoples.  The give and take of Senate debates offers an intriguing way of viewing 
this discussion as point and counterpoint attempt to define the national narrative. 
As a proxy for national debate, the Senate deliberations on empire offer an 
exceptionally well-documented approach: various stakeholders discuss the issues of the 
day in a common national forum, with each seeking to advance regional and local 
agendas.  In this way, a melding of national and disparate pressures forged a 
compromise—if not a consensus.  At least, competing views informed decisions to some 
extent.  The result may be, generally and over time, representative and a reflection of 
popular will. 
While individual issues wax and wane with popular opinion or unrelated 
influences, taken broadly enough a composite view can be cobbled together.  By relating 
a selection of debates with the context in which they occur, it is possible to clearly see 
something larger, more enduring, and to some extent, defining.  The premise of this 
study, therefore, is to accept the reality of politics by influence peddling, by ideological 
loyalty, and by dubious compact as valid in the individual events, yet too varied to evenly 
influence outcomes across time.  By reading through Senate debates on the foreign policy 
challenges related to overseas expansion in this period to identify trends, an inductive 
argument is formed using a technique analogous to that used in pointillism: to allow the 
myriad individually unique dots to, if viewed from distance and with perspective, form a 
unitary and powerful picture. 
One popular supposition was that the American imperial project began and was 
conducted largely as an afterthought.  By defeating Spain, the United States came to 
possess former Spanish colonies, which forced the legislature to find accommodations for 
same.  With distance and perspective, however, the individual dots of discrete debates in 
Congress can be viewed as a continuum of dialog on a national narrative, part of an 
ongoing process of defining American meaning and interest in the changing context of 
the time.  While the subject had changed from slavery and western expansion to naval 
might and imperial conquest, the product of the process remained a distilled expression of 
American values and purpose. 
 20 
An associated benefit of approaching the issue through debates in the legislature 
is that of access.  The Senate debates are available verbatim in the Congressional Record 
as are the final text of the major legislative acts of the period.  While many of the 
committee proceedings were not published, the reports are generally read into the record 
and exist in the daily transcripts.53  The context in which each debate occurred, the 
associated international developments of the period, domestic pressures brought to bear 
on individual senators, and resultant applications of American imperial policy decisions 
are all available in a robust literature of primary and secondary sources.  
However accessed, the goal of examining the Senate debates on American empire 
is to expose either trends, or perhaps more intriguingly disconnects, in the language used 
across the period by senators and representatives to support or resist imperial policy.  
Studying the positions held and the rationale mustered from 1898–1917 serves to identify 
change and disparities—how a Senator could justify support for both Teller and Platt 
Amendments, or later vote to begin the process to free the Philippines while voting to 
keep Guam and Puerto Rico as permanent territories—that animated the American 
imperial experience.   
By focusing not on a single actor, but instead on all the recorded debates on the 
key bills that spanned nearly two decades, the end product is a discourse between the 
rhetoric employed in the floor and committee debates, and the elected officials’ 
understanding of the tolerance in the electorate for the ideas there on display.  In this 
way, it is possible to illuminate the changing national narrative regarding the popular will 
related to empire through the actions of the national representatives engaged in 
translating mandate to policy.  These debates offer a reflection, however imperfect, of 
American values as they changed from abhorrence of empire to acceptance—or at least 
acquiescence—of the enterprise. 
                                                 
53 Senate Standing Committees were set up in 1816. Eleven were permanent: Foreign Relations, 
Finance, Commerce and Manufactures, Military Affairs, Militia, Naval Affairs, Public Lands, Claims, 
Judiciary, Post Offices and Post Roads, and Pensions. The House of Representatives followed a similar 
pattern in the late 1820s. Specific temporary committees that dealt with colonial affairs were the House 
Committee on Insular Affairs and Senate Committee on the Philippines. 
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II. A DIFFERENT TYPE OF SENATE IN A DIFFERENT SORT 
OF TIME 
Should American seek to control an overseas empire?  This question was brought 
to the fore in the United States Senate by the anticipation, and eventual delivery, of 
President McKinley’s “Message to the Congress of the United States” regarding Cuba on 
11 April 1898.54  One year later, the question was resolved, for practical purposes, by 
ratification of the Treaty of Paris, which transferred ownership of the former Spanish 
colonies to the newly imperial United States.  Between these two bookends lies the 
entirety of the Spanish-American War; the chapters immediately following will examine 
these two actions of the Senate that bracketed the war.   
To lend context to these debates, it may first be helpful to establish the long-
standing patterns—in foreign policy, domestic politics, and Senate composition—from 
which the Senate of the 55th Congress so dramatically departed during its deliberations 
over whether or not to engage in imperialism.  Looking through this lens clarifies how 
timeworn constraints of partisanship, loyalty to the administration, and sectionalism were 
shifted or cast off completely by a Senate resisting the president’s attempt to shape 
foreign policy on his own terms. 
The Congressional Record transcripts of the Senate debates on whether or not to 
engage in imperialism reveal curious characteristics of the 55th Congress, both in its 
foreign policy actions and its composition.  A broad reading of legislative actions related 
to foreign policy between the end of the Civil War and the onset of the First World War 
establishes a trend fundamentally different from that followed by the Senate during its 
debates on Cuban intervention and on the eventual annexation of American colonies.  
Similarly, the domestic political scene in the period from the Civil War to the beginning  
 
 
                                                 
54 This message was colloquially known, and is hereafter referred to, as McKinley’s “War Message.” 
31 Congressional Record 3699 (11 April 1898). To conform with the Chicago Manual of Style, 16th ed., 
14.298, subsequent references to the Congressional Record are abbreviated Cong. Rec. 
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of these debates exhibits a muscular partisan dominance by the party holding the majority 
of Senate seats, a theme that does not hold true during the 55th Congress Senate debates 
on imperialism. 
A brief review of American foreign policy after the Civil War, in which the 
pursuit of empire was to some extent foreseen but not yet acknowledged as a realistic 
policy option, helps highlight the new and unusual characteristics of the debates from 
1898–1917.  The transformation of the domestic political landscape also helped set the 
scene for the unusual cross-party alignments found in the debates of 1898.  During the 
last third of the nineteenth century disagreements over scandal, monetary policy, and 
shifting allegiances between business and agrarian power blocs produced internal 
divisions in both major parties.  The Republican Party suffered mass defections, and the 
period saw the birth of several minor parties that altered the longstanding pattern for 
legislative actions.  The result, evident in the 55th Congress Senate especially, was a 
fractured majority struggling against an opportunistic, multi-faceted opposition.  
A. A PATTERN OF LEGISLATIVE DEFERENCE 
Economically, the last decades of the nineteenth century were marked in America 
and in Europe by more frequent and dramatic cycles of boom and bust and a growing 
distance between social classes.  Against this background, three basic impulses shaped 
America’s political outlook both internally and internationally.  Reconstruction consumed 
great attention and effort as the nation sought to heal itself, attempting to regenerate the 
defeated Confederacy into American political and economic life.  Simultaneously, 
westward expansion continued, spurred by the advent of a transcontinental railroad and 
the land grant policy initiated during the war.55  In much of the country, a third theme 
emphasized increased economic and manufacturing development, which propelled the 
                                                 
55 Noting that the continent was spanned finally by the 1854 Gadsden Purchase, Walter Nugent 
underlines the ideology involved in subsequent consolidation: “Expansion resonated with the people. It 
meant progress, national glory, and successful stewardship…white people were certain that they had the 
right and duty to take land because they would make it more productive…and because it would eventually 
become states coequal with the original thirteen, and thus provide free and democratic institutions, the 
blessings of liberty, to ever more people.” Walter Nugent, Habits of Empire: A History of American 
Expansion (New York: Random House, 2008), 234. 
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consolidation of a number of commercial sectors into behemoth entities, of sufficient 
weight to make themselves felt politically.   
While these three thrusts were rooted in domestic conditions and found their main 
expression internally, they also informed American foreign policy.  Reconstruction 
reshaped traditional political allegiances and priorities.  More than 30 years after the war 
ended, it continued to encourage the formation of partisan positions that, while originally 
unrelated to questions of imperialism, still provided a kind of ready-made starting point 
when the issues of international expansion came to the fore.  At the same time, westward 
expansion led to an increase in the number of seats in the Senate, and amplified the 
support for policies more important in the west than in the traditional power centers on 
the east coast. 
Earlier episodes of American overseas expansions, which bracketed the Civil 
War, were fundamentally different than those that followed at the end of the century.56  
The acquisitions brought about by the Guano Islands Act of 1856, for instance, were 
small and widely dispersed islands, uninhabited and unclaimed by other sovereign states, 
thus terra nullis under international law.  The purpose of annexation was to assure access 
to the guano needed for fertilizer and saltpeter production, not territorial expansion per 
se.57  
This kind of limited, pragmatic, and socially inconsequential action falls outside 
the rather strict definition of imperialism employed in this study.  Although words like 
“empire” and “imperial” seem destined to defy precise analytic definition, in this 
                                                 
56 The primary difference between early and late American expansion, Nugent writes, was “the 
emphasis shifted from settlement of commerce, from peopling an area, to controlling its politics and 
economy.” Ibid., 244. Indirectly, land use justification was extended to the overseas territories, but as those 
acquisitions were not about land, the focus of the justification changed as well. For continental expansion, 
justification was the right to land because native cultures were unable to use it properly. For the overseas 
territories, this morphed instead into a right to rule because the native culture was unequipped to administer 
properly. 
57 “Guano Districts; Claim by the United States” identifies applicable islands as “not within the lawful 
jurisdiction of any other government, and not occupied by the citizens of any other government…” The act 
was also non-specific in location—it was applied in the Caribbean, Pacific, and along the Canadian 
border—and thus unfocused strategically. Legal Information Institute, Cornell University Law School, 48 
USC Chapter 8 section 1411 “Guano Districts; Claim by the United States,” 
http://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/48/1411. 
 24 
dissertation, these words are intended, at a minimum, to conjure policies directed toward 
the establishment of substantial, even if informal, territorial and social control over 
populations recognized at the same time as distinctly “other.”   
By this definition, the pursuit of empire went beyond the mere pursuit of 
economic advantages, even unfair ones, in international markets.  Although overseas 
expansion for the United States, as for other imperial powers, did not necessarily entail 
outright territorial conquest and rule, it was not something to which native populations 
submitted voluntarily, or in which they can plausibly be regarded as having any kind of 
equal say.  There is no doubt the United States defeated and controlled the Philippine 
insurrectos against their will, for instance.  Even if Filipino partners and collaborators in 
this exercise of American rule were eventually found, the Philippine population was 
compelled to remain in colonial status until granted independence.  Occupying armies, 
forced adoption of a new state language, and many other similar measures were routine 
facts of life for the native inhabitants of American overseas possessions, as they were for 
all the native people ruled by Western powers during this period. 
American overseas expansion was also marked by a policy of non-assimilation.  
Subject peoples were allowed, and often compelled, to retain their identities as “other,” 
with no expectation that they would be someday absorbed into the fabric of American 
society.  This distinction applied both to colonized territories and to the people within.  
The westward expansion of the United States had been conducted on quite a different 
basis.  All the territory thus acquired later became states, while the native populations, 
although not exterminated, were decimated, confined, and marginalized to the point 
where their habits and interests ceased to count in the future life of the territory they once 
controlled.  The American approach to overseas expansion was quite different and 
conforms well to the definition proposed by Paul Schroeder:  
Empire means political control exercised by one organized political unit 
over another unit separate from and alien to it. Many factors enter into 
empire—economics, technology, ideology, religion, above all military 
strategy and weaponry—but the essential core is political: the possession 
of final authority by one entity over the vital political decisions of another. 
This need not mean direct rule exercised by formal occupation and 
administration; most empires involve informal, indirect rule. But real 
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empire requires that effective final authority, and states can enjoy various 
forms of superiority or even domination over others without being 
empires.58 
This paper is focused on American political control of its colonies—specifically 
how such control was agreed to, conducted, and finally abrogated—by the debates and 
votes of the United States Senate. 
Given the framework above, some may argue the purchase of Alaska from Russia 
in 1867 marked the initiation of American overseas colonialism, if only because the new 
purchase was accessible primarily by sea.59  The rebuttal to this claim lies not in mode of 
access, rather in the paired facts that Alaska did follow the usual path blazed by the states 
of the trans-Mississippi west, through incorporated territory to statehood, and that the 
scattered indigenous inhabitants did not form a nation that was simultaneously subjugated 
and formally held apart from the conquering nation.  In contrast to the classic imperialism 
that would follow a generation later, the purchase of Alaska represents a combination of 
territorial bargain hunting on the one hand, and on the other a strategic maneuver to 
check British ambitions along the Pacific coast of North America. 
America’s involvement in Samoa and Hawaii provide more convincing examples 
of nascent imperialistic impulses, both of which, however, were accompanied by 
legislative inaction.  Interest in Samoa as a provisioning and coaling station for South 
Pacific transit was shared by the United Kingdom, Germany, and the United States.  The 
three powers had individually negotiated agreements with different tribes on the islands, 
and Germany and the United States nearly came to blows over Samoa from 1887 to 1889 
during the Samoan Civil War.60  Disagreements continued for another decade until 
                                                 
58 Paul Schroeder, “Is the U.S. an Empire?” 10 February 2003, History New Network, George Mason 
University, http://hnn.us/articles/1237.html.  
59 A related extension of this assertion would be that the earlier incorporation of California into the 
Union was quasi-overseas expansion as most of the Gold Rush settlers came by sea. The existence of land 
routes through territories contiguous to the United States, however, is markedly different than land routes to 
Alaska blocked by the sovereign territory of British North America. Thus the sea access to California is 
attributable more to speed and preference than necessity. 
60 Britain and Germany were aware the United States felt itself predominant in Hawaii and argued 
Germany should be preeminent in Samoa (with Germany compensating Britain on the side). The 
disagreement nearly came to blows. Richard Leopold, The Growth of American Foreign Policy: A History 
(New York: Knopf, 1962) 140. 
 26 
settled by the Tripartite Agreement of 1899, dividing the islands between Germany and 
the United States, with the United Kingdom compensated by cession of German claims in 
West Africa and other Pacific islands and German support for Britain’s Egypt position.61 
While involving inhabited territories to which other imperial powers also wished 
to lay claim, American interest in Samoa is nevertheless closer in its motives to the 
Guano Islands Act than to open-ended imperialism practiced in Cuba, the Philippines, 
and elsewhere after 1898.  The premise for American involvement in Samoa did not 
extend beyond a desire for harboring rights and a means to supply transiting ships.  
Neither territorial expansion nor the legal and political domination of indigenous peoples 
were part of the plan.  Samoa exists to this day as a non-organized self-governing 
entity.62  This choice was not a reflection of American weakness, but simply of the limits 
of its interests there.  
What distinguishes Samoa from the other still-current U.S. territories of Guam, 
Puerto Rico, and the U.S. Virgin Islands is the failure of Congress to implement an 
Organic Act for Samoa specifying how it should be integrated into the American federal 
structure.63  Instead, Samoan government was created administratively and sanctioned a 
locally ratified constitution.64  It was not the outcome, but the process that led Assistant 
Secretary of State John Bassett Moore to remark that the Samoa acquisition directly 
foreshadowed that of the Philippines.65 
                                                 
61 Robert Louis Stevenson, A Footnote to History: Eight Years of Trouble in Samoa, Chapter X 
(Swanston, 1892), Project Gutenberg, http://www.gutenberg.org/files/536/536-h/536-h.htm; Leopold, 
Growth of American Foreign Policy, 141. 
62 The original executive order, signed in 1900, placed American Samoa under the authority of the 
Navy Department for use as a naval station, and empowered the Navy to “give the islands necessary 
protection.” William McKinley, Executive Order 125-A, “Placing Certain Islands of the Samoan Group 
under Control of the Navy Department,” 19 February 1900, Wikisource, 
http://en.wikisource.org/wiki/Executive_Order_125-A.  
63 The spelling of the name “Porto Rico” was officially changed by congressional act in 1934. 
References to the island by this author before that date are in the modern form “Puerto Rico.” 
64 Ratification Act of 1929, Pub. Res. 70-89, 45 Stat. 1253, enacted 20 February 1929, codified at 48 
U.S.C. § 1661; and Revised Constitution of American Samoa, U.S. House of Representatives, 
http://www.house.gov/faleomavaega/samoan-constitution.shtml.  
65 “No incident in the history of the United States…better prepares us to understand the acquisition of 
the Philippine Islands” than does U.S. policy on Samoa. Secretary Moore quoted (with this author’s 
paraphrase appended) in Walter La Feber, Cambridge History of American Foreign Relations, Volume II: 
The American Search for Opportunity, 1865–1913 (Cambridge University Press, 1993), 91. 
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The transition in Hawaii from kingdom, to republic, to territory, and eventually to 
state, transpired over an even longer period.  Early in the nineteenth century, a variety of 
powers—notably France, Russia, and the United Kingdom—had expressed interest in 
controlling the islands.66  American influence gained prominence through an 1875 
agreement with Hawaii’s King Kalakaua, by which Hawaii was granted the right to 
export its sugar duty-free to the United States in exchange for 10 years of exclusive 
basing rights for American ships at Pearl Harbor.  After the king refused to renew the 
treaty, European and American planters forced him to sign a new constitution in 1887 
severely limiting monarchal powers.67   
Six years later, his successor attempted to undo these restrictions and was 
overthrown by the planter class, with the assistance of the United States minister to 
Hawaii and American military forces.  The treaty, however, did not receive approval by 
the United States Senate before President Benjamin Harrison’s term ended.  The re-
elected President Grover Cleveland, friendly to the monarchy and opposed to the 
planters’ revolution, ordered an investigation.  He eventually recalled the minister and 
punished the military commander involved, but left the question of reinstating the 
monarch to the Senate, which eventually demurred.    
Hawaii remained in political limbo until President William McKinley’s 
administration and the changed strategic environment of the Spanish American War.68  
The early steps to annex Hawaii not only set the stage for the debate on the islands’ final 
annexation in 1898, but also served to illustrate how changes in the American domestic 
                                                 
66 Russia established and occupied three forts on Oahu in the early 1800s. In the 1840s an over-eager 
Royal Naval officer deposed the king and imposed British sovereignty for six months before superior 
officers countermanded his rash move, and France overwhelmed and occupied Fort Honolulu six years 
later. 
67 A through summation of pre-annexation history and foreign intrigues in the Hawaiian Islands can be 
found in the pro-annexation Morgan Report, by Senator John Morgan, Chairman of the Senate Foreign 
Relations Committee, at University Of Hawaii, 
http://libweb.hawaii.edu/digicoll/annexation/annexation.html.  
68 The Blount report was the result of the investigation President Cleveland ordered, and its pro-
sovereignty findings were the basis for the president’s repudiation of the revolt. Representative James 
Blount, former Chairman of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, Foreign Relations of the United States, 
Appendix II, 1984, “Blount Report: Affairs in Hawaii,” University of Hawaii at Manoa Library, 
http://libweb.hawaii.edu/digicoll/annexation/blount.html.  
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political situation directly affected acceptance of the planters’ revolution.  While the 
variable in the Hawaii example was the alternating sequence of Republican and 
Democratic executives, single party retention of the White House until President 
Woodrow Wilson in 1912 served to shift the scene of party influence on foreign affairs to 
the Senate, further elevating the importance of the legislative debates on imperialism. 
The other two examples of legislative inaction in foreign policy occurred in the 
Caribbean Basin.  One reason the United States could choose to avoid or engage in 
foreign affairs throughout this period was the enduring benefits flowing from Pax 
Britannica.  British naval supremacy led to commercial advantage in the western 
hemisphere, as lucrative markets in newly liberated South American countries attracted 
significant investment in long-term development there.  While France developed 
substantial interests in the Caribbean—both in the islands, their mainland colony of 
French Guiana, and briefly in Mexico—their expansionary energies were drawn more 
and more toward Africa and Asia as the century progressed.  Following the sequential 
declarations of independence by its New World colonies, Spain’s empire dwindled to a 
clutch of Caribbean islands, and Spain’s weight in the affairs of the western hemisphere 
was greatly reduced.  
During this period of conversion in the Americas, the United States enjoyed 
stretches of external peace and security.  The few instances of international friction were 
largely a product of the propensity for the United States to proclaim hemispheric interests 
directly connected to American “peace and safety” in the Monroe Doctrine.69  Two 
examples of self-inflicted crises that occurred at the end of the nineteenth century—both 
involving the United Kingdom—were the Venezuela border dispute and the agreement 
on the prospective isthmian canal.  The executive primarily resolved both crises, with the 
acquiescence of a legislature dominated by his party. 
                                                 
69 President James Monroe, “Seventh Annual Message to Congress,” 2 December 1823, United States 
National Archives and Records Administration, 
http://www.ourdocuments.gov/doc.php?flash=true&doc=23.  For discussion of President Cleveland’s 
reiteration of the Monroe Doctrine relative to Venezuela, see Dexter Perkins, A History of the Monroe 
Doctrine (Boston: Little, Brown, 1963), 189–91. 
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The Venezuela crisis grew from an inherited border disagreement.  Exact lines of 
demarcation in the dense jungles between a Spanish colony and a Dutch colony along the 
Caribbean coast of South America remained unsettled but unimportant for centuries.  For 
60 years after Venezuela declared independence from Spain and the English took what 
would become British Guiana from the Netherlands, however, gold mining in the 
contested zone grew more lucrative and ownership of the area more critical.  By the 
1890s, diplomatic relations between the two countries had been severed, military outposts 
constructed and manned, and demands for international arbitration rejected.  Given the 
disproportionate might of Britain there seemed little that Venezuela could do to sway 
international opinion and force English settlers back into Guiana until Venezuela came 
upon a tactic that would be employed to great success a few years later by the Cuban 
Junta.   
To depict the border dispute as a challenge to the Monroe Doctrine, the 
Venezuelan government hired as a lobbyist the former U.S. Ambassador to Venezuela.70  
He convinced a friendly congressman to introduce a bill recommending arbitration and 
offering the good offices of the United States.  The bill passed unopposed and was signed 
into law by President Cleveland.  In his message to Congress on the topic, the president 
not only affirmed proper application of the Monroe Doctrine, but chose to interpret the 
British position as a willful extension of territory at the expense of “one of our 
neighboring republics against its will, and therefore in derogation of its rights…thereby 
an attempt to extend its system of government to that portion of the continent…an action 
dangerous to our peace and safety.”71  He then called for appropriation and appointment 
of a commission to press for the Venezuelan claims and American rights. 
The outcome of this strident resistance was that Britain eventually agreed to 
arbitration.  In adopting this course, however, the British government tacitly validated 
America’s new interpretation of the Monroe Doctrine and specifically the extension of its 
                                                 
70 George Herring, From Colony to Superpower: U.S. Foreign Relations Since 1776 (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2006), 307. 
71 28 Cong. Rec. 191(17 December 1895) (President Cleveland’s letter to Congress “Venezuelan 
Border Controversy”). 
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protection to pre-existing colonies.72  This decision sent a clear signal that the British 
acknowledged the rising power of the United States in the western hemisphere and would 
allow the republic increased latitude to interpret and safeguard national interests in the 
Americas.  In just a few years, this precedent of American intercession would be replayed 
in a much more significant and consequential venue: Cuba. 
The second Caribbean event extended well into the period of American 
imperialism, and yet remained distinct.  It was also of more direct significance to 
American national interests, both economic and strategic.  As the United States 
completed its transcontinental expansion, routine transportation of people and goods to its 
growing Pacific region proved increasingly cumbersome.  The process required either all-
sea transit around the southern tip of the Americas; or alternately by sea through the 
Caribbean to Central America, by land across the isthmus, and again by sea to San 
Francisco.  Even as the newly completed transcontinental railroad began to take up a 
portion of the load, dramatic population and commercial growth on the West Coast 
multiplied the demand for transport capacity in the form of a journey-shortening canal 
across the narrow neck of Central America. 
A French attempt to construct a canal had failed by 1890, and American planners 
remained undecided whether the optimal route was through Panama or Nicaragua.73  The 
final decision was economic, as the French eventually accepted a fraction of their lost 
investment for the Panama route.  Before construction could commence, however, the 
legal niceties currently in place to limit canal building on the isthmus had to be 
renegotiated.  To prevent British control of an isthmian canal, the United States had 
entered into the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty of 1850.  In essence, the treaty prohibited either 
party from exclusive control of an isthmian canal and guaranteed neutrality.74  Fifty years 
later, however, the United States sought to abrogate Clayton-Bulwer.  The result, the 
Hay-Pauncefote Treaty of 1901, allowed the United States to unilaterally develop and 
                                                 
72 Leopold, American Foreign Policy, 162–165. 
73 S. Rep No. 57–54, Serial 4225, p. 263 (4 December 1901) (Report of the Isthmian Canal 
Commission).  
74 Text of Clayton-Bulwer Treaty, at http://avalon.law.yale.edu/19th_century/br1850.asp.  The treaty 
is also embedded in appendix of the Canal Commission Report cited in notes above. 
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fortify an isthmian canal if the transit remained neutral and accessible to ships of any 
flag.75  All that remained was to convince the government of Colombia, the actual 
owners of the land, to grant a cession to the United States.   
What happened next is what makes the Panama Canal relevant in a discussion of 
American imperialistic tendencies.  In 1903, the Colombian legislature refused to grant 
the necessary cession.  As this project was essentially a commercial enterprise, albeit an 
interaction directly between governments, the rejection did not constitute casus belli to 
justify a solution similar to President Polk’s invasion of Mexico to gain the American 
southwest and west coast territory a half century earlier.  Instead, it was made known to 
Panamanian separatists that the United States would look favorably upon their move 
toward independence from Colombia, and that material support would be provided.76  As 
a result, visiting American military forces were able to dissuade Colombian intervention 
to prevent an independent Panama, and the new country in turn granted the cessions 
required to complete the canal, thereby re-launching the most ambitious civil engineering 
project in history.77   
While Colombia belatedly received an apology and reparation in 1921, this 
circuitous route to obtain canal cessions by the United States was largely unopposed—or 
accepted as fait accompli—in international foreign policy circles.  It remained distinct 
from later imperialism, however, in that the Canal Zone more closely resembled a 
business contract than colonial subjugation.  In all four cases above, American actions 
differed from those related to Cuba, Puerto Rico, Guam, and the Philippines, and the 
Senate either demurred or was denied much of a role in crafting foreign policy. 
The reinterpretation of the Monroe Doctrine—coupled with British necessity to 
counterbalance increased fleet requirements nearer home waters with corresponding 
                                                 
75 For a contemporary treatment on the shortcoming of Clayton-Bulwer, the importance of the right to 
fortify the canal in order to assure its neutrality, and of Pauncefote’s role in both the Suez Commission and 
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decreases in the western hemisphere—clearly limned the need for American naval 
expansion to meet the increased demand for presence and influence in the Caribbean, 
South Atlantic, and Pacific.78  The United States’ newly clarified pre-eminence in 
constructing and operating an isthmian canal similarly dictated a need for naval control—
including the required support network—of the canal’s approaches.  This extended area 
of concern, thereby increased interest in Cuba and Puerto Rico in the east and Hawaii, 
Samoa, and Guam in the west, each of which would in turn require protection as well.79  
And thus the foreign policy scene was set for the debates on imperialism in the 
American legislature. 80  The events from 1898 to 1917 were all played out against the 
backdrop of earlier American policies and interests in Samoa, Hawaii, Venezuela, and 
Panama, especially in the Senate, where those treaties were ratified.  Throughout all the 
foreign policy debates of the period, tensions between the branches of government were 
informed by partisan calculations, and continued the precedent set in the rejection of 
Hawaiian annexation.  
Specific to Cuba, the preceding discussion of American foreign policy 
developments provides powerful precedents for the upcoming debates.  The First Cuban 
Revolution, or the Ten Years’ War of 1868–1878, had served to sharpen differences 
within the American government regarding Cuba.  On one hand the United States treated 
Spain as a normal trading partner and even sold her weapons that were eventually used to 
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suppress the rebellion.81  On the other, the conduct of the Spanish in oppressing their 
Cuban subjects received mounting approbation both in the press and in Congress.82  With 
royal forces freed for overseas deployment by the resolution of the Third Carlist War, 
however, the Spanish were able to bring the Cuban uprising to an eventual conclusion, 
returning competing positions regarding Cuba to the backburner of American politics.83   
When the Spanish reforms in Cuba promised by the armistice failed to 
materialize, rebellion erupted anew in 1895, enflaming competing passions in America 
again.84  One of the motivators for Cuban insurrection leaders to restart the independence 
movement was awareness of growing American imperialistic interest in the island.85  
Directly opposing long-standing interest in annexing Cuba was a growing sympathy for 
Cuba Libre and association of Cuban efforts toward liberation from Spain with American 
independence struggles against Britain.  These competing positions eventually came to a 
head in a series of resolutions in Congress, which in turn were the direct precursors of the 
subsequent debates on imperialism. 
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B. POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS THAT SHAPED THE 55TH CONGRESS 
SENATE 
Much as legislative foreign policy actions described above display a trend from 
which the 55th Congress Senate would later deviate, the latter third of the nineteenth 
century featured domestic political patterns that would be upset in 1898 as well.  The 
period was one of transformation in domestic politics from single party dominance, to 
dual party alternation, to multi-party contestation.  This growing political competition 
shaped the uniqueness of the 55th Congress Senate and animated the oppositional 
coalition’s defiance of partisan solidarity.   
The dominance of the Republican Party since the presidential election of 1860, 
and subsequent slow rebuilding of the post-Civil War Democratic Party, yielded to 
alternating two-party politics only in 1892 when the Democrats finally captured the 
presidency and a clear majority in both houses of Congress.  Democratic control proved 
exceedingly brief, however, as the Depression of 1893—one of the most significant in 
American history—again altered the political calculus.86  Both major parties underwent 
internal divisions, new parties emerged to represent subaltern voices, and the very 
composition of the Union changed due to western expansion.  By 1898, the upper house 
of Congress was the embodiment of these changes.   
The Party of Lincoln had emerged victorious from the national struggle in 1865, 
and remained dominant—with the brief exception of the second Cleveland administration 
and 53rd Congress—until the elections of 1912 again united both houses of the 63rd 
Congress with the executive under the Democratic banner.  It should be noted that the 
only Democratic presidents between 1860 and 1912 were both aberrations.  The first was 
Lincoln’s ascended Vice President Johnson, a Unionist from Tennessee chosen as a 
conciliatory gesture to fence-sitting southerners in the midst of the war.   
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The second was the former Governor of New York, Grover Cleveland, a pro-
business conservative Democrat who ran as a pro-gold standard, anti-corruption 
alternative.  As such, Cleveland was well situated to contrast both the scandal-plagued 
Republican legacy and the traditional Democratic sympathies to agrarian and southern 
concerns.87  This distinction is important not only in breaking the sectionalism that had 
denied the Democratic Party the White House for so long, but also in establishing the first 
of five fissures that would feature so prominently in the Senate deliberation in 1898.  
The Democratic opposition by 1898 was split between a northern conservative 
branch, which enjoyed some national success, and a traditional southern branch that was 
regaining power at the state-level.  The Democratic presidential victory of 1892 did not 
signify a return of traditional Democratic strength, but rather a temporary alliance of 
northern pro-business Democratic conservatism (the Bourbon Democrats) and anti-
corruption Republican Party bolters (the Mugwumps).88  In fact, the Bourbon Democrat 
opposition to agrarian subsidies and bimetallism—seen as antithetical to the pro-business 
stance that gained them national respectability—would cause great popular Democratic 
dissatisfaction in the slow recovery from the 1893 depression, leading directly to 
Populism and rise of the pro-agrarian wing of the Democratic Party united under William 
Jennings Bryan.   
By the beginning of the 1896 election cycle, the Democratic Party was shedding 
its image as nationally conservative but state-level agrarian in favor of national 
bimetallism that was promoted as friendly to agrarian interests and more suited to 
economic recovery.  This move was in part a reaction to stalled economic recovery and 
part political wariness of the Populist Party’s gains in the 1892 general and 1894 off-year 
elections. 
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During this period, the Republican Party experienced infighting as well, 
establishing the second and third major fissures that would loom large in the Senate of 
the 55th Congress.  The first split occurred due to the inability of the Party to clean up its 
act; the second was due to the Party’s allegiance to the gold standard.  The result was a 
greatly diminished solidarity within the Republican Party, a major factor in its inability to 
manage the threat of all the minority parties acting in coalition during the debates on 
intervention in Cuba. 
The scandal-plagued Grant administration bequeathed a legacy for which 
subsequent Republican administrations—those of Hayes, Garfield (briefly), and Arthur—
all struggled to compensate.  Elections tainted by corruption, along with the morally 
corrupt Compromise of 1877—which negotiated a Hayes presidency in exchange for 
Reconstruction’s demise—all further undermined the brand, setting the stage for the 
reform Democrat Cleveland’s 1884 success.  By nominating former Secretary of State 
James Blaine, unable to shake allegations of past scandal, the Republican Party provided 
the perfect foil for Cleveland’s candidacy.89  Blaine’s nomination also caused the flight 
of the Mugwumps—reform-minded Republicans who could not stomach a Blaine 
presidency—into the waiting arms of the Democratic Party’s conservative wing. 
The second schism developed in the Republican Party during this period over the 
issue of “free silver.”  A monetary policy of bi-metallism was championed as a salve for 
rising prices and boom and bust cycles of the gold standard economy.  The slow recovery 
following the 1893 depression brought the issue to the fore, and the same passions 
pushing the Democratic Party to abandon Cleveland’s gold-standard conservatism in 
favor of Bryan’s bimetallism were at work in the Republican caucus.  At the national 
convention in St. Louis in 1896, disaffected western delegates bolted—following 
unsuccessful contestation of the Republican Party plank supporting the gold standard—
and instead founded the Silver Republican Party.   
More than a dispute over policy within the party, this revolt demonstrated the 
shifting interests of an increasingly transcontinental polity.  The composition of the 
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Union was changing, as nearly completed settlement in the west and admission of seven 
new states over the previous decade was necessarily reflected in Congress.  In the 
summer of 1896, however, those interests served to produce a fissure in the granite block 
of Republican political dominance as the Silver Republican Party endorsed the 
Democratic candidates in that the election that fall.  Much of the opposition within the 
larger Republican camp in the 1898 debates over imperialism would be drawn along 
these lines. 
In a related development, the Silver Party constituted a vocal, but limited, 
additional political organ espousing bimetallism.  With both senators and representatives 
of the Silver Party eventually representing the State of Nevada, as well as four 
consecutive governors, the party demonstrated a uniquely western-state single-issue 
platform closely linked to that state’s prime industry.  Idaho, Colorado, and Washington 
were the only other states to send single-term Silver Party representatives to the House, 
but it must have been a lonely designation as each of them were the only Silver Party 
member in his state’s delegation, and none of their terms overlapped.90  In Washington 
D.C., they caucused with the Democratic Party and also endorsed the candidacy of 
William Jennings Bryan, adding to the voices in opposition of the Republican Party in 
1896. 
Unlike the dramatic party-splitting mass bolt exhibited at the birth of the Silver 
Republican Party and the earlier defection of Mugwumps to the Democratic Party, the 
birth of Nevada’s Silver Party seemed to be a mere exercise in relabeling.  Both Senators 
Jones and Stewart began their Senate career as Republicans, and the rise and fall of the 
Silver Party meant only a change of their party affiliation, demonstrating a remarkable 
constancy in both the dominance of the silver industry over the state legislature and the 
compatibility of the single-plank Silver Party platform with the Republican Party 
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leadership in Nevada.91  Stewart’s affiliation was the first to change to Silver, in 1893 at 
the start of the 53rd Congress, and Jones’s changed two years later.  When they resumed 
their seats at the March 1901 opening of the 57th Senate, however, they were both once 
again Republicans and there were no Silver Party senators, evermore. 
Nearly as fleeting, but much more diverse than either the Silver Republicans or 
the Silver Party, the People’s Party was the fourth major block in opposition to 
Republican dominance.  The members of the People’s Party, or Populists, were not 
splinters of either the two main parties, but were instead a third party formed in reaction 
to cyclic boom and bust economy.  Domestically focused, anti-elite, and largely 
representative of Southern and Great Plains farmers, they were inflationary bi-metalists, 
anti-bank and pro-agrarian.  They favored nationalizing the railroads to give small 
farmers advantageous freight rates.   
Formed in 1891, the Populists garnered a million votes in the 1892 presidential 
election and seated a smattering of representatives, governors, and senators from the 
South and West.  For the 1896 election they too nominated the Democratic candidate for 
president, William Jennings Bryan, whose pro-silver and economic recovery platform 
largely co-opted their party line.  After Bryan lost by over half-a-million votes, the 
People’s Party’s fortunes ebbed until eventually disbanding after the 1900 presidential 
election.92   
The pro-silver cause garnered impressive popular support, but suffered 
unfortunate timing.  Propelled by the Depression of 1893, bimetallism’s vitality was 
sapped by signs of economic recovery just prior to the fall elections in 1896.  Bryan’s 
attempt to keep the issue at the forefront of the 1900 elections was doomed as well, 
undone by returned prosperity and popular preoccupation with the debates on 
imperialism, which by then had become the central issue in American public life. 
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Thus the scene was set for the Senate of the 55th Congress to proceed in a manner 
significantly different than its predecessors.  The party with the most seats would not 
necessarily command a majority, nor would it act cohesively.  Similarly, the other major 
party was split into two major factions, and simple classifications only served to obscure 
multiple, more subtle interest areas.  Finally, the three minor parties were each 
fortuitously placed to amplify their importance by forming temporary alliances of 
convenience to further their disparate goals and sway the course of events.  Given the 
tortured landscape of this Senate, the administration’s plans for intervention in Cuba were 
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III. THE SENATE OF THE 55TH UNITED STATES CONGRESS 
The proceedings of the 55th Congress Senate in 1898 were dramatically different 
that those that came before.  This unique Senate can, in large part, be attributed to the 
confluence of three ingredients: the events it dealt with, its unusual composition, and the 
contributory foreign affairs and domestic political events described in the previous 
chapter.  It was the positions and allegiances developed in this Senate that would 
eventually decide the outcome of the debates on intervention in Cuba, and later, on 
annexation of the Philippines, Guam, and Puerto Rico. 
This chapter will show how this Senate, unlike those that went before, was 
uniquely predisposed to conduct the sort of coalition-of-convenience legislating that will 
feature prominently in the next three chapters.  The Republican hold on the House of 
Representative was nearly a supermajority, which for all intents stifled debate and 
rendered House opposition moot.  In the Senate, however, the Republican Party needed to 
convince at least part of the opposition to join its side.   
The concept of the party in the majority facing opposition from the party hoping 
to gain the majority is part and parcel of the political process, as is, to some extent, the 
splintering within parties over discrete sub-topics.  The 55th Congress Senate went well 
beyond the norm.  It performed a ballet of fracturing and reforming over a series of 
separate topics that all influenced the outcome of the larger debate on imperialism.   It is 
this interaction between senators, parties, topics, platforms, and resolutions that make the 
study of this series of debates so interesting, and so unique. 
A. HOW THE 55TH UNITED STATES CONGRESS SENATE WAS 
DIFFERENT 
The changes within the Republican and Democratic parties described in the last 
chapter, along with the creation of the Silver Republican, Silver, and Populist parties, all 
contributed to the complex composition of the 55th Congress.  The establishment 
Republican Party, ensconced in the Northeast and the Midwest (the former Northwest 
Territories), championed issues and concerns of business. The movement of reform 
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continued to define the Bourbon Democrats—who split state caucus with the mainstream 
Republicans in many of their stronghold Northeast and upper Midwest states—and their 
pro-business orientation distinguished them from the rest of the Democratic Party.   
The southern caucus was solidly non-Bourbon Democratic, animated by the large 
agricultural concerns of that section.  In the Senate, the Democratic Party filled all the 
seats of the former Confederacy save North Carolina (split with the Populists, who 
caucused with the Democrats), plus Missouri.  Half of the remaining states east of the 
Mississippi seated two Republican Senators, the other half seated one each Democratic 
and Republican.  Omitting that lone Populist, eastern senators were invariably from the 
two major parties.  Conversely, everything west of the Mississippi, save Texas, was 
variegated.  Only four states had solely major party representation, and all the others 
featured minor party senators, one exclusively.  
The 55th Congress Senate can thus be understood as dramatically bifurcated.  In 
the east, the two major parties continued the old struggle as the Democrats and 
Republicans restated the arguments of a half-century earlier.  The split between the 
Bourbon and pro-Bryan Democrats was reminiscent of the 1860 split between Northern 
and Southern Democrats.  In the west, however, party affiliations were all jumbled, 
creating a crazy-quilt fabric instead of a two-tone map.  Only one of the 32 states in the 
east sent a minor party senator to Washington D.C., while in the 13 western states (with 
the three territories excluded), nine seated minor party senators, one state exclusively.93   
This pattern of sectional affiliation is relevant in that the goals of those disaffected 
major party and slightly radical minor party senators would feature prominently in the 
upcoming debates on intervention in Cuba.  The domestic concerns that created and 
sustained the minor parties, and the splinter groups within the major parties, were often 
diametrically opposed to the domestic interests of the major parties.  The insurgency of 
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Bryan Democrats contesting the Bourbon Democrat platform and the stark geographic 
divide between the major party east and increasingly minor-party influenced west 
represented significant change.  Admission of seven states in the decade preceding the 
55th Congress amplified an increasingly western interest set.  Coupled with the creation 
of three minor parties during that decade—the People’s Party in 1891, the Silver Party a 
year later, and the Silver Republicans in 1896—this divergence of domestic political aims 
would have tremendous impact on the foreign policy debates in the Senates of the 55th 
and 56th Congresses. 
The combined voices of Democratic (both Bryan and Bourbon), Populist, Silver, 
and Silver Republican senators and representatives formed the opposition to mainstream 
Republican policies.  Thus, when the 55th Congress convened in March of 1897, the 
Republican Party enjoyed a clear majority in the House sufficient to allow Speaker 
Thomas Reed to prohibit discussion on bills that he, or the president, felt sure they could 
pass. 94  Preventing debate eliminated the threat that potential Republican fence-sitters 
might shift their vote after hearing convincing presentations by the opposition.  This 
power silenced the House minority, but magnified the importance of debate in the Senate.   
In the Senate, meanwhile, the Republicans mustered only a plurality.  After the 
final Democratic senator was seated in May, there were 43 Republicans, 34 Democrats, 
five Populists, five Silver Republicans, and two senators from the Silver Party in the 
chamber.95  Although the four opposition parties might, in principle, unite to overrule the 
Republican plurality, closer inspection reveals how difficult it would be for these diverse 
groups to find common ground, even in the short term. 
The development of an anti-Republican majority coalition in the Senate was 
undone by orthodox American political tensions: urban interests versus rural, business 
versus consumer, corporation versus freeholder, and patronage versus reform.  For 
example, the platforms of all four included pro-“free silver” planks.  The schism within 
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the Democratic Party, however, would prevent unity on that issue as the Bourbon 
Democrats from the Northeast were doggedly pro-gold standard.  Their stance would 
have the effect of reducing a potential bloc of 46 votes by at least eight, converting a 
potential majority into a minority.   
Similarly, tariffs on agricultural imports, viewed favorably by Populists interested 
in higher crop prices were opposed by Democrats, Silver, or Silver Republicans from the 
west whose constituencies were already susceptible to higher food costs.96  Questions 
like whether or not to recognize the legitimacy of the insurgent government in Cuba were 
not regarded as sufficiently momentous to cause these kinds of concerns to be set aside.  
On the contrary, arguments about foreign policy in the Senate were always filtered 
through the domestic concerns of its constituent parties. 
B. COMPOSITION OF THE 55TH CONGRESS SENATE: THE 
DEMOCRATIC AND MINOR PARTY SENATORS  
The American experience with imperialism would prove fleeting.  It began with 
the 1899 annexation of the former Spanish colonies; less than two decades later the 
territorial status of the new American colonies would be established, and the Philippines 
put on a track for commonwealth status and eventual independence.  For the United 
States, the span from establishment to dismantling its empire could be measured in three 
senatorial terms.  Many of the senators who participated in the initial debates over 
intervention in Cuba would also be influential in the debates over granting 
commonwealth status for the Philippines at the period’s end.   
From the Democratic side, Senators John Tyler Morgan and Edmond Pettus, both 
of Alabama, came to represent the solid bloc of ex-confederate Democratic strength.  
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Both were former CSA generals who would serve in the Senate until 1907.97  A former 
chair of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and future chair of the Interoceanic 
Canals Commission, Senator Morgan authored the Senate report on the coup in Hawaii 
and eventually served on the commission to setup a territorial government there.98  Two 
other classic southern-bloc Democrats who played a large part in these debates were 
Senators Benjamin Tillman of South Carolina and James Berry of Arkansas.99  Known as 
“Pitchfork Ben,” the former was a firebrand who would not leave the Senate until 1918, 
the latter a passionate defender of southern loyalty to the Constitution who would 
complete his 22-year career in 1907.100   
In contrast to the southern Democratic bloc that these gentlemen exemplified, 
Democratic senators from border and Mid-Atlantic States tended to exhibit a milder 
brand of partisanship.  Senator George Gray from Delaware, for instance, sought to 
ensure that the Senate’s actions aligned with international law and conventions, as 
opposed to party preferences.101  His willingness to work across the aisle was later 
rewarded by successive appointments to judicial positions in both federal courts and at 
The Hague, all of which were made by Republican presidents.102  Senator George Vest of 
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Missouri, and Senator William Lindsay of Kentucky, exhibited a similar focus on law 
over party preference.103   
Similarly, Senator John Daniel from Virginia seemed more measured in his 
positions during the debates over intervention.104  He was concerned mostly with 
ensuring the upper house felt no undue pressure to rush a decision, continually 
championing thoroughness over haste.  Another member less ardent in his support of the 
central Democratic position, Senator Stephan White of California, was broadly 
representative of the western viewpoint.  He generally favored recognition of the Cuban 
insurgency but was adamant that the power to do so lay solely with the executive—the 
latter exactly the mainstream Republican position.105   
At the furthest end of the spectrum from Senators Pettus and Morgan were 
Senators Charles Faulkner of West Virginia and Donelson Caffery of Louisiana, who 
could only be classified as pro-administration in these debates.106  These two-term 
senators, both staunch Democrats and distinguished Confederate soldiers, sided with 
predominately Republican positions on all matters relating to the war.  Their speeches on 
the floor indicate their motivations were two-fold: They believed their interpretation of  
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the Constitution, backed by long precedent, supported the Republican views, and they 
thought that supporting the administration was the clearest path to American annexation 
of Cuba.107 
The opposition participants from the minor parties generally were less likely to 
stray from the positions established at their conventions.  During the course of these 
debates, Populists, Silverites, and Silver Republicans all promoted party platform planks 
of free silver and recognition of Cuban independence, and Populists continually 
excoriated bonded debt.  This loyalty can be attributed in part to the newness and slightly 
more radical character of the minor parties.  But, as all three would disappear from the 
American political scene after the next presidential election, the relevance here of their 
unity is limited to their monolithic support of Cuban independence. 
C. COMPOSITION OF THE 55TH CONGRESS SENATE: THE 
REPUBLICAN SENATORS 
On the Republican side, the outstanding figures were firmly pro-administration.  
The McKinley administration had held its course since inauguration in early 1897: no 
recognition for an independent Cuba and official American neutrality.  The Senate 
Foreign Relations Committee was the point of referral for the president’s request for 
authorization to intervene in Cuba, and its chairman, Senator Cushman Davis of 
Minnesota was thus most responsible for implementing the administration’s agenda.  
Senator Davis personally ensured the administration’s position shaped the approach taken 
by committee members in negotiating the subsequent joint resolution with the House of 
Representatives, a step that proved instrumental in defeating the opposition’s position.  
President McKinley later appointed him to serve as a negotiator for the Treaty of Paris, 
but did not influence subsequent debates on American imperialism as he died shortly 
thereafter.108 
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Senator Orville Platt of Connecticut was also rigidly supportive of the 
administration’s positions, deriding any debate or opposition as disloyal.  His tone 
evoked both military and moral righteousness, a particularly effective combination to a 
body peopled largely with Civil War veterans from both sides.109  Just as rigid but adept 
at employing legalistic argument to defend the administration’s plan, Senator John Gear 
of Iowa countered the Democratic argument that the recommendations in the majority 
report were unconstitutional by interpreting the same legal citations to argue the minority 
report was unconstitutional.110  Finally, Senator Henry Cabot Lodge of Massachusetts 
deserves inclusion in this category for his service as an outspoken proponent of the 
administration’s interventionist agenda during these debates.  His long career spanned all 
the debates on American imperialism, culminating in his successful opposition to 
President Wilson over the Treaty of Versailles in 1919.111 
While the diehard administration partisans were effective and well placed, most 
Republicans in the Senate did not belong to that group.  There were two categories of 
Republican senators who generally supported the administration’s prerogatives, but 
differed on discrete issue items on which they felt strongly.  One additional senator 
differed mainly by dint of his hardline position so set against accommodation that he far 
outstripped the administration’s zeal.   
In the first category, the clearest example of general agreement with only discrete 
issue-driven difference is Senator Redfield Proctor of Vermont.112  A Union colonel in 
the Civil War, Proctor served as a state representative, state senator, and governor of 
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Vermont; as President Harrison’s secretary of war; and 17 years as senator from Vermont 
until his death in 1908.113  He was a diehard Republican and a recurring candidate for 
presidential nomination himself, more dedicated to the party than to any particular 
president. A second member of this “mostly dedicated” group was Senator George 
Frisbee Hoar from Massachusetts, a Republican Party fixture who served as the National 
Convention Chairman in 1888.114  He was generally supportive of the McKinley 
administration, but he parted ways with the president after the Spanish American War, 
becoming a prominent opponent of imperialism and the Philippine-American War during 
his final five years in the Senate. 
A third of this group was Senator Eugene Hale of Maine, who spent a decade in 
the House before his 30-year career in the Senate.  He parted with the McKinley 
administration over intervention in Cuba because he was vehemently opposed to 
expansionism.  His feelings on the topic ran in parallel with mainstream Republican 
arguments for refusing to recognize the rebels, but went beyond them in rejecting any 
attempt to force Spain to quit the island.  His stand was so determined that he was 
disparagingly referred to as the “Senator from Spain,” and publicly lauded the benefits of 
Spanish rule in Cuba to counter Junta propaganda.115 His anti-expansionist stance would 
be a factor in the Senate until his retirement in 1911. 
The members of the second category—Republican Senators aligned in general 
opposition to the administration’s position—were too numerous to list, but a select group 
of five will serve as examples here.  The most prominent, both by product and position, 
was Senator Joseph Foraker from Ohio, who would play a crucial role in the votes to 
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modify the War Message.  The first-term senator was a prominent member of the Senate 
Foreign Relations Committee and had a long history of pivotal deal making within the 
Republican Party.116  A hopeful himself for the presidential nomination in every cycle 
from 1884 to 1908, Senator Foraker repeatedly curried favor by dealing away his votes 
through endorsement of a more competitive candidate. While this tactic resulted in the 
Ohio governorship, and eventually a seat in the Senate, it also marked Senator Foraker as 
a threat to every incumbent and a competitor to every future aspirant, thus ensuring 
perpetual semi-outsider status.117   
During the debates on intervention in Cuba, this Republican Party fixture would 
find himself cast as the spokesman for the minority report, and as such the de facto head 
of the opposition to the administration’s agenda, an opposition stocked with Populists, 
Silver Party, and Silver Republican senators.  With his support, the minority report 
became the lodestone for many issues, and its approval became the benchmark of 
opposition success or failure in these debates. 
The next four Republican senators were all in opposition as they favored the 
minority report of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee over the administration-
blessed majority report.  Each was distinct, however, in his reasons for disliking the 
majority report.  The positions they set forth in floor speeches during the debates make 
them representative of small groups of opposition senators.   
Senator Jacob Gallinger of New Hampshire supported the recognition of Cuba on 
idealistic grounds—in short, that legitimacy is derived not from the trappings of 
government, but from its performance and stated ideals.118  Senator Knute Nelson of 
Minnesota defended the prerogative of the legislature relative to the executive and made 
a case for Cuban legitimacy through historical comparison to America’s own 
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118 31 Cong. Rec. 3976 (16 April 1898); “Gallinger, Jacob Harold (1837–1918),” Biographical 
Directory of the Unites States Congress, 
http://bioguide.congress.gov/scripts/biodisplay.pl?index=G000023.  
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revolutionary experience. He remained supportive of all other aspects of the 
administration agenda regarding Cuba, and later during the debates on annexing the 
Philippine Islands, the Treaty of Paris, and administering the American empire.119 
Senator George Perkins of California advanced the notion that the choice between 
the majority and minority reports of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee was not a 
political question at all because all of the major and minor party platforms, except the 
Silver Party, included planks supporting recognition of an independent Cuba.120  Senator 
John Thurston of Nebraska represented the small minority of Republican Senators who 
opposed the concept of intervention in Cuba in favor of a peaceful solution.121  He 
favored recognition of the insurgency because it would remove the strictures of neutrality 
on American conduct.  The result, he believed, would be American funding and arms to 
the Cuban insurgents ensuring that Spain could be evicted and Cuban independence 
achieved without loss of a single American life. 
The third and final category of Republican opposition—a category with a single 
occupant—was aligned with the administration over the executive’s sole prerogative of 
recognition, but differed sharply from McKinley on the issue of clearly stated intentions.  
Senator Stephen Elkins of West Virginia preferred stating outright American intention to 
annex Cuba, Puerto Rico, the Philippine Islands, and any other Spanish holdings in the 
western hemisphere, and believed recognition of the Cuban Republic would be a setback 
in progress toward that goal.122  In short, Senator Elkins opposition to the McKinley War 
Message is remarkable in that he was out of the Republican norm by being too 
                                                 
119 31 Cong. Rec. 3984 (16 April 1898); “Nelson, Knute (1843–1923),” Biographical Directory of the 
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straightforward, a quality that the president characteristically felt would prove too 
constricting during the upcoming developments.   
D. THE EBB AND FLOW OF PARTISAN SOLIDARITY 
Reading through the transcripts from 11 to 25 April 1898, a consistent pattern 
emerges.  During the Senate debates on President McKinley’s War Message and the 
resultant declaration of war against Spain, 30 senators of all stripes were passionately 
engaged, while the remaining two-thirds were largely silent.  The two major parties, 
Democratic and Republican, were evenly represented by a dozen voices each in the 
transcripts.  After accounting for those 24 participants, almost no other major party 
senators offer more than the most routine comments.  Similarly, the three minor parties—
Silver, Silver Republican, and People’s parties—field two vocal participants each, a 
cumulative number representing exactly half the minor party slate.123  The other half 
simply disappears from view.124 
There is no mistaking the overwhelming solidarity of the three minor parties, 
compared to the fractured infighting of the two major parties.  The two vocal Populist 
senators concur with each other on every substantial debate point, as do the two Silver 
senators and the two participating Silver Republican senators.  Distrust of northeastern 
business interests, the vexing question of liability for Cuban debt, and limiting the power 
of the executive relative to the legislature animated all six minor party participants 
throughout the debates.   
The counterpoint to the solidarity of the minor parties is the divisiveness 
displayed by both Democrats and Republicans, as often as not across sectional lines.  In 
addition, major party senators were often animated by questions of constitutionality.  
They debated the appropriate foreign policy roles for the legislature and the executive 
                                                 
123 Of the 12 total minor party seats in the 55th Congress Senate, five each were held by Silver 
Republicans and Populists, with the Silver party holding the remaining two. 
124 While they were in attendance and speak on other issues, other than their names tallied in votes 
with “yeas and nays recorded,” three each Populist and Silver Republican senators appear nowhere in the 
Congressional Record’s transcripts of debates on Cuba, 11–25 April. Seniority cannot explain preferential 
speaking opportunities as, in the People’s Party for instance, the two senators that spoke at length were both 
in their first and only term. The only Populist that had been reelected (Sen. Kyle from South Dakota) was 
among the silent. 
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and the contrasting duties of party loyalty or senatorial obligations to provide advice and 
consent.  On such questions of principle, members of the same party could easily find 
themselves diametrically opposed, even when arguing from the same set of facts.125  
Similarly, senators of different parties occasionally arrived at the same conclusion but 
based their position on perfectly opposed rationales.  In short, party affiliation, allegiance 
or opposition to the administration, and sectional interests did not predetermine the 
Senate’s consent to President McKinley’s request for authorization to intervene in Cuba 
on his preferred terms.   
E. READING THE CONGRESSIONAL RECORD 
In considering the debates in the 55th Senate, it is important to understand the 
function of the discussion recorded in the Congressional Record.  Legislative debate at 
the turn of the twentieth century was a matter of direct public interest, far more that it is 
today.  In addition, the theatrics and content of congressional debates had a palpably 
different character.  It was not uncommon for long excerpts from the Congressional 
Record to be repeated in popular newspapers.  It is also true, conversely, that senators and 
congressmen in that period had far fewer sources of information at their disposal and no 
army of staffers and lobbyists to support them.  As a consequence, and to a degree that 
may seem surprising, the intent of most speeches during these debates was to convince, 
educate, and search for common ground on which to build compromise, not merely to 
deploy what would today be called “sound-bites.”   
An average day presented in the Congressional Record may feature approximately 
a third of the copy filled with administrative proceedings—opening prayer, 
communications received, messages from the other house, petitions and memorials, bills 
referred, presidential approvals, and the introduction of bills private and public—in short 
the daily business of Congress.  The remainder of the space is generally filled with 
                                                 
125 There are like numbers of instances in which two senators of different major parties—such as the 
Democratic and Republican senators from West Virginia—agree on the topic of precedent establishing 
foreign policy roles of the executive and legislature, a result unpredicted by partisan position or constituent 
interests. As will be detailed in the following chapter, Democratic Senator Faulkner and Republican 
Senator Elkins both supported presidential prerogative for recognition and the recommendations of the 
majority report from the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on intervention in Cuba, both pro-
administration Republican positions. 31 Cong. Rec. 3979 (16 April 1898). 
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discussion of contentious issues in an attempt to influence opinion in advance of a vote.  
In the House the issues discussed generally revolve around either funding or patronage, 
such as the construction of railroads, bridges, dams, and canals or the restructuring of the 
support establishment for the Army.  In the Senate, however, loftier topics dominated the 
discourse, and lengthier debates were the norm.  It is here that the bulk of the discussion 
on American imperialism was conducted. 
The Congressional Record recounts each day’s business, generally 50–60 pages 
of typeset transcripts, offering a detailed reconstruction of what was said and done, 
including applause, interruptions, and protestations from the floor.  The format is 
oversized, two-column layout with usually 1500–1600 words per page beginning with the 
Senate proceedings from convening to adjournment, then the same for the House.  A 
typical daily transcript in the Congressional Record during this period fluctuates between 
75,000 and 100,000 words.  The proceedings often began in late morning or at noon and 
ran to five or six-o’clock, every day but Sunday.   
The momentous debates on foreign policy occasioned by the War of 1898 often 
extended into evening sessions, once extending beyond midnight before culminating in a 
conclusive vote.  Some of the most dramatic speeches feature prominently in the 
transcripts of these extended sessions.  Inclusion in these lengthy monologues of 
references to the previous day’s presentations, or refutations of points made even just 
prior to the last meal break, conjure images of Senators furiously scribbling in the 
cloakrooms during breaks or by candlelight in their rooms late in the evening to prepare 
for their upcoming opportunity to weigh in on the discourse.   
Embedded in the hundreds of pages of daily transcripts that chronicle each of the 
significant debates on American imperialism are small gems that make the exploration 
worthwhile.  Time and again, dozens of pages may be filled with a single speech, which 
in the end amounts to little, but must be read for context.  It is, however, often a single 
sentence or quote that perfectly captures the entire discussion rewards the diligent search.  
The debates on imperialism in the Senate feature the highest rhetoric and the basest 
political machinations, but both, in the end, are necessary to understand the progress from 
republic to empire and back again. 
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IV. LURING THE ISSUE INTO THE LIGHT: PREPARATORY 
SENATE DELIBERATIONS ON CUBA  
Empires grow at a rate inversely proportional to the attention they receive.  
When competition is keen, the publicity is enormous and gains small.  
Empire builders flourish in the shadows of indifference.126 
The preceding chapter outlined the environment and policy precedents for the 
debates in the 55th Congress on imperialism, and this chapter explores the opening moves 
of the debates themselves.  These preparatory deliberations are especially noteworthy in 
contrast to the partisan solidarity Congress previously displayed over tariff and foreign 
policy matters.  As detailed in the previous chapter, congressional preferences—such as 
for altering excise rates, or entertaining appeals from planters who had gained control of 
the Hawaiian Islands—often varied directly with the change of party in the majority.  
During these debates on imperialism, however, partisan solidarity was continually 
nudged aside by competing allegiances to sub-issues that crossed party lines.   
Herein lies the importance of unique composition of the Senate of the 55th 
Congress, with its empowered minorities and fractured majority.  In earlier such 
deliberation, unity was enforced by subordination of any competing sub-issues to party 
fealty.  Conversely, the theme that developed during these preparatory debates—and 
continued in the Senate throughout the imperial deliberations of the 55th Congress—was 
that an opposition unable to coalesce on a single topic could instead work alternately with 
and against elements of the majority party.   
Applying this approach, minority Democrats created ad hoc coalitions with 
Populists, Silverites, and Silver Republicans.  These various combinations championed 
small sub-issues that usually appealed to a few dissident Republican senators as well.  By 
splitting the Republican bloc, the opposition was able to effectively force a public 
discussion on imperialism, which the administration would have preferred not occur.  
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Small groups of senators, galvanized by what were often small, ancillary issues, were 
thus able to pry the national debate on imperialism out into the open. 
To detail the development of this opposition approach, the first half of this chapter 
will cover the early joint resolutions that proposed recognition of Cuban belligerency, 
Senator Redfield Proctor’s influential speech recounting his fact-finding mission to Cuba, 
and four further Senate resolutions that framed the argument just prior to President 
McKinley’s 11 April delivery the of his War Message.127  The second half will consider 
the reception of the War Message in the Senate, the composition of the Senate Foreign 
Relations Committee to which the message was referred, and the majority and minority 
report from the committee. The events collectively constituted the opening salvos of the 
debates on American imperialism in the Senate and served to clearly define the basic 
arguments for and against overseas expansion. 
A. BUILDUP TO A FIT OF IMPERIALISM 
U.S. annexation of Cuba, periodically advanced even before the Civil War, had 
been a recurring topic of discussion in Congress since the Grant Administration.128  
Passions aroused by Spanish depredations during the Ten Year’s War of 1868–1878, 
which included Spanish executions of American citizens, often elicited calls for 
American action, leading to discussion of Cuba’s ultimate fate.129  Seventeen subsequent 
years of uneasy peace in Cuba dimmed, but did not extinguish, this ardor. 
When the Cuban war reignited in early 1895, however, those enthusiasms were 
also rekindled and were soon exacerbated by Spanish conduct, particularly toward the 
civil population.  Unable to effectively control the island with the troops assigned, the 
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Spanish uprooted civilians from their rural subsistence farms and concentrated them in 
fortified cities.  Labeled reconcentrados, these dislocated peasants were left to their own 
devices to find food and shelter within the confining walls.  Despite American attempts to 
provide relief—including the ministrations of Clara Barton’s Red Cross mission—
thousands died of disease or starvation. Public outrage in the United States over 
inhumane Spanish treatment of the reconcentrados led to a new American justification 
for potential intervention: humanitarianism.130 
In an attempt to characterize the insurrection as merely a civil disturbance—and 
thus keep relations between the United States and Spain amicable—President Cleveland 
declared official American neutrality on 12 June 1895.  His proclamation served two 
purposes.  First, it was intended to reassure both the Spanish government and the 
American business community that the official position of the United States favored 
Spain’s retention of Cuba.  It was hoped this assertion would simultaneously stave off 
Spanish concerns about American intervention and American concerns about risk to their 
investments in the island.   
Second, the declaration specifically upheld the illegality of “filibustering”—
actions by private citizens of one country that constitute acts of war in another country’s 
territory—to support the Cuban rebels.  The declaration urged all officers of the United 
States to stop and “rigorously prosecute” all such activity.  Without question, the 
declaration was intended to aid the Spanish war effort by attempting to stop up the 
biggest flows of private American money and arms that had sustained the 
insurrection. 131 
Cleveland’s neutrality declaration was intended to preserve American interests in 
the likely event Spain should prevail.  The policy was, nevertheless, immensely 
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Senator Proctor’s speech, and senatorial debates detailed later in this chapter. On the “total war” policies of 
the Spanish Governor General Valeriano Weyler-Nicolau—popularly called “Butcher Weyler”—and the 
specific policy of reconcentrado, see Harold Dana Sims, “Cuban Revolt (1895–1898),” in Beede, The War 
of 1898, 151.  Numerous citations of correspondences and publications chronicling public outrage at the 
Spanish policy are also found in the 700-page committee report. 
131 Grover Cleveland, “Proclamation 377: Neutrality of Citizens of the United States in the Civil 
Disturbances in Cuba, “12 June 1895, American Presidency Project, 
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=70684.  
 58 
unpopular.  Disaffected Democratic and opposition Republican senators joined forces to 
support a bipartisan concurrent resolution authored by Senators Morgan and Cameron.132   
At the heart of this bill lay recognition the Cubans were engaged in a legitimate 
belligerency.  Adoption of the Senate’s proposed designation would contradict the 
president’s laissez faire declaration that the struggle in Cuba constituted only a domestic 
civil disturbance, and was thus an internal matter for the Spanish state to handle.  Instead, 
recognition that the struggle in Cuba constituted a legitimate belligerency would confer 
upon the Cubans a status short of recognition as an independent state, but one that 
nevertheless implied they were due—under international law—rights and recognition 
greater than either the Spanish or President Cleveland were inclined to bestow.  In short, 
this proposed legislation was an attempt by the Senate to craft foreign policy contrary to 
that of the Secretary of State and the president.   
The Senate resolution passed in February 1896 and was later endorsed in the 
House of Representatives as well.133  This expression of the voice of Congress carried no 
legal weight, most especially with President Cleveland, who “hated Congressional 
interference in diplomacy” and “never permitted Congress to dictate or formulate policy, 
any resolution merely expressing Congressional opinions.”134  The chief executive thus 
simply ignored the Senate’s attempt to influence foreign policy by resolution. 
Nevertheless, contesting the executive branch’s declaration of neutrality set the stage for 
the more protracted and visible Senate forays into foreign policy that would occur once 
Cleveland left office. 
Following President McKinley’s victory in the fall elections, Senators Cameron 
and Morgan made another attempt.  This time they crafted the bill as a binding 
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resolution—which, should it pass both houses, would only require presidential 
endorsement to attain the force of law—in order to establish a position for the incoming 
Congress to bring to the new president.  The Senate Foreign Relations Committee report 
on the resolution was brought to the floor on 21 December, but extensive debate was 
delayed until after the new Congress was seated in March.135  Periodically, the joint 
resolution was addressed by lengthy speeches to keep it in the forefront of senators’ 
minds until actual debate occurred.136 
In May 1897—shortly after the 55th Congress convened—Senators Cameron and 
Morgan’s second bill passed overwhelmingly in the Senate, with only 14 in dissent.  In 
the House, however, the Republican faction most in support of neutrality had gained 
strength in the recent elections, and party leadership ensured the joint resolution 
recognizing belligerency in Cuba never made it out of committee.  The operational 
difference between the tightly controlled, solid Republican majority in the lower house 
and that party’s mere plurality in the upper house—a difference that would play an 
outsized role in the debates on empire yet to come—had made itself felt a mere two 
months after the congressional session had begun.  Those who believed that recognition 
and material support from the United States was all that was required for the Cuban 
rebels to triumph over their Spanish oppressors would later point to these two resolutions 
as a lost opportunity to attain their aims on the cheap and without military 
intervention.137 
The same day the joint resolution was reported out in the Senate, 21 December 
1896, another bill arrived on the floor and opened debate on the question of how exactly 
recognition of Cuban belligerency could legally be accomplished.  This bill asserted that 
                                                 
135 For the entire SFRC report and text of the resolution, see 29 Cong. Rec. 326–54 (21 December 
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136 For an example, see 29 Cong. Rec. 656–63 (8 April 1897). 
137 For a summation of all three resolutions—the Senate and House concurrent resolutions of 1896, 
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the responsibility and authority to recognize a new government did not rest solely in the 
executive, but was a shared authority with Congress.138  
The main sponsor of this argument was Senator Vest of Missouri, whose research 
during the recent Venezuelan border crisis convinced him that the president did not have 
sole authority to recognize other governments.  He found it most astounding, given that 
the power to declare war resided in the legislature, that the executive branch “could bring 
about war by exercising the high prerogative of declaring whether or not a people 
struggling to achieve its liberty was entitled to recognition.  If that proposition were true, 
then, for a hundred years, the statesmen of the country had been in the dark on the 
question.”139   
Invoking senatorial privilege to delay discussion of any issue, Republican Senator 
Hale of Maine moved to table Democratic Senator Vest’s bill.  Vest’s bill would languish 
on the table and expire, but—along with Senator Cameron’s report from the Senate 
Foreign Relations Committee—it was quoted verbatim and at length in national 
newspapers.140 
Thus, with the Cubans locked in the second year of their revived struggle for 
independence, the process of drawing battle lines for the upcoming Senate debates on 
intervention had begun.  Even though the Republican, Silver Republican, Populist, and 
Democratic Party platforms each had planks supporting recognition of the rebel 
government in Cuba as independent from Spain—and both houses of the United States 
Congress had passed resolutions recognizing the belligerency on the island as 
legitimate—partisanship and bicameral relations had so far prevented those efforts from 
acquiring real legal and political force. 
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Some senators constructed deliberate arguments designed to support or disprove 
the constitutionality of intervention.  Simultaneously, other senators were searching for 
precedent to establish or refute the legislative role in recognition of newly independent 
nations.  Through it all ran the pro-administration cadre’s intimation that any questioning 
of the executive policy toward Cuba was disloyal, and thus asserted that parliamentary 
maneuvers to block debate entirely were justified. 
As 1897 progressed, the increasingly brutal Spanish campaign to pacify the island 
resulted in elevated sympathy for, and more frequent professions of, Cuba Libre in the 
United States.  Although the Cuban resistance persevered, it was a series of changes in 
Spain that eventually altered the situation in Cuba.   
In August 1897, an anarchist assassinated the conservative Spanish Prime 
Minister, Antonio Canovas.  The following month, his replacement, Práxedes Sagasta, 
recalled the Spanish commander in Cuba, General Weyler, and initiated the process to 
grant a form of home rule to the Cubans as an alternative to independence.  Throughout 
the fall and winter of 1897–98, the Cuban revolutionaries won significant battles, 
consolidating their hold over the eastern half of the island and contesting the rest.  With 
the implementation of autonomy as official policy on 1 January 1898, these political and 
policy changes suggested that expectation of continued Spanish rule of Cuba was no 
longer a certainty, even in Madrid.141   
By the spring of 1898, however, American popular focus had shifted away from 
outrages toward Cubans and instead concentrated on insults toward the United States. 
Publication of the DeLome Letter, in which a Spanish embassy official revealed intent to 
delay, not implement, promised reforms and repeatedly disparaged the President of the 
United States, brought to the fore Spanish duplicity in negotiations over Cuba.142  This 
scandal was followed on 15 February by the explosion of USS Maine in Havana harbor, a 
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calamity that a Naval Board of Inquiry found to have been externally caused.143  
Thereafter, public enthusiasm for war was at an all-time high.   
Congress was not idle during this period.  It took two actions that would have 
outsize influence on the coming debates.  Deeming the outbreak of war a swiftly 
approaching eventuality, both houses passed a bill in early March—without debate or a 
single vote of dissent—for emergency appropriation of 50 million dollars to increase 
American military preparedness.144  This congressional largess signaled admission that 
the American forces were woefully inadequate to conduct operations that the American 
public appeared to be demanding.  This bill also reflected the near universal support for 
military intervention in Cuba.  The debates to come would be over how to authorize and 
control military operations more than about whether or not to intervene. 
The second congressional event of March 1898 with profound import on the 
imperial debates occurred one week later.  It was a measured and influential speech on 
the condition in Cuba, delivered by a stalwart Republican.  It changed the tenor of the 
discussion in the Senate.   
B. THE CALM VOICE SPEAKS THE LOUDEST 
Redfield Proctor was a solid Republican beginning his second of three terms as 
Senator from Vermont.  Formerly the governor of that state and President Harrison’s first 
Secretary of War—preceding Senator Elkins in that post—he was generally pro-
administration, backing protective tariffs and the gold standard.145  In short, until late 
1897 Senator Proctor could have only been characterized as an administration asset in the 
Senate.  In that capacity, and with those credentials, he traveled to Cuba to assess the 
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state of the insurgency and continued reports of Spanish atrocities.  It is precisely because 
of these benign expectations, however, that the presentation of his findings caused such a 
sensation. 
On 17 March 1898, Senator Frye of Maine—the President pro tempore of the 
Senate and a staunch supporter of the administration—called for Senator Proctor to 
present the findings from his recent inspection of Cuba.146  This solicitation of Proctor’s 
views by such a pro-administration stalwart may be interpreted as expectation that the 
speech would bolster the pro-intervention argument by chronicling harsh Spanish 
treatment of Cuban non-combatants.  The content of the speech did, indeed, advance 
these points, but it also deeply undermined both the administration’s case not to 
recognize the Cuban insurgency and the associated assertion that the declared rebel 
government lacked legitimacy. 
Senator Proctor began by stating the trip was “entirely unofficial and of my own 
motion, not suggested by anyone,” but added he had verified in advance the President had 
no objections.147  During the visit, Proctor met with the three American representatives in 
Cuba—the presidential representative and two consuls—and toured exclusively the four 
provinces (of six total on the island) in Spanish control.148  In those regions, he viewed 
the desolation and despair wrought by the Spanish policy regarding the reconcentrados.  
Nothing but uninhabited and burned ruins existed outside the smattering of fortified 
Spanish-held towns, which he characterized as “prison yards.”149  What made this speech 
so powerful was the strength of the speaker’s conservative credentials paired with his 
measured, balanced delivery.   
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After confessing he had fully expected to find conditions in Cuba generally 
acceptable and the previous reports overstated, he proceeded to substantiate those early 
reports.150  The bulk of the speech progressed away from the administration position and 
sought instead to dispel myths and stereotypes employed to denigrate the prospect of a 
free and independent Cuba or to portray a Spanish victory as assured.  In vivid detail, 
Senator Proctor painted a picture of a rather moderate Spanish non-military population, 
an educated and homogenous Cuban white and colored population, and a black 
population not victimized by race prejudice.  He described the Spanish Army of about 
60,000 effectives—a quarter of the force originally deployed to Cuba, the rest having 
died or become invalid—as a marginally capable army that rarely ventured far afield 
from the fortified towns for extended operations.151  
It was his characterization of the Cuban forces involved in the struggle and of the 
political situation on the island that did the most harm to the administration’s case.  
Proctor met with “an American from a southern state” serving as a field officer in the 
Cuban Army and was later able to acquire independent verification of the information the 
former Confederate related.  The 30,000 active insurgents were largely unmolested in the 
two eastern provinces they held, and operated widely in the other four, listing many 
attacks and assassinations within miles of Havana.  Well trained and led, their most 
pressing needs were for supplies of ammunition and clothes.  This statement supported 
the position of some Senators that American recognition and supplies alone would ensure 
Cuban success, and directly opposed the administration’s assertion American intervention 
alone would right the situation in Cuba.152  
In describing the unity of the Cubans behind the goal of independence, Senator 
Proctor rebutted the claim of many in his party that Spanish reforms and the promise of 
autonomy for Cuba would resolve the conflict on the island. His interviews with 
prominent businessmen, professionals, and autonomist officials—the very parties those 
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opposing independence cited as the true Cuba—universally found that independence or 
complete Spanish victory were the only plausible alternatives left, concluding “you do 
not have to scratch an autonomist very deep to find a Cuban.  The division…is Cuban 
against Spaniard. It is practically the entire Cuban population on one side and the Spanish 
Army and Spanish citizens on the other.”153 
His closing paragraphs began, “I have endeavored to state in not intemperate 
mood what I saw and heard, and to make no argument thereon, but to leave everyone to 
draw his own conclusions.”154  Instead of recommendations, he then shared his personal 
impressions.  He would not support annexing Cuba due to the problems associated with 
assimilating foreign elements.155  Rather, he supported independence because he thought 
fears that a free Cuba would be ungovernable or troublesome were unfounded.  He 
believed, on the contrary, that self-government and stable institutions were likely to take 
hold there.156 
Senator Proctor’s speech gave the impression that his sole aim was to get at the 
truth about what was going on in Cuba.157  That such a party loyalist spelled out 
conditions as they were—some favorable to the administration’s position but others 
inimical to it—was powerful, and continued to resonate in the debates that would 
accompany and follow President McKinley’s War Message. 
                                                 
153 Senator Proctor continued “I do not count autonomists in this division as they are far too 
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C. FOUR ATTEMPTS TO FRAME THE ARGUMENT 
The final three weeks before the delivery of President McKinley’s War Message 
to Congress were punctuated by pronouncements on, and references to, the struggle in 
Cuba, but none as significant as Senator Proctor’s speech.  On 29 March—the day after 
the formal report on the explosion aboard USS Maine arrived in the Senate—however, a 
minor flood of resolutions swept through the Senate, along with an impassioned speech 
outlining one senator’s position on the Cuban question.  The text of the four resolutions 
and the single speech comprise only six of the 116 pages in the Congressional Record for 
that day, but they are notable examples of the solidifying positions held on the topic in 
advance of the upcoming debates. 
One after another, four joint resolutions were proposed and referred to the Senate 
Foreign Relations Committee, the final two coming from members of that committee.  
The Populist Senator from Nebraska went first, proposing a joint resolution recognizing 
the independence of the Republic of Cuba on the grounds of the valor and sacrifice of the 
insurgents.  Citing the Monroe Doctrine as the source of America’s obligation to 
intervene, the resolution authorized immediate military action by the executive and 
provided aid to the refugees.158  He was immediately followed by the Democratic 
Senator from Utah, whose resolution also recognized an independent Cuba, but added a 
declaration of war against Spain on multiple grounds, including destruction of American 
property in Cuba, mistreatment of American citizens there, treacherous sinking of USS 
Maine, Spanish inhumane treatment of Cuban non-combatants, and the need to ensure 
“the approving judgment of all civilized people.”159 
Neither of these first two resolutions ever made it out of committee.  The third, 
proposed by Senator Foraker—a Republican of Ohio and a member of the Foreign 
Relations Committee—proved far more influential, including some of the crucial 
language around which future debate would revolve.  Foraker proposed a resolution of 
four parts.  The first stated that “the people of the island of Cuba are, and of right ought 
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to be, free and independent.”  The particular phrasing, echoing the American Declaration 
of Independence, would later be criticized by opponents of intervention as a non-factual 
statement with no business in a declaration.160  Its basic import, explicitly affirmed in the 
second section, was to recognize the Republic of Cuba as the lawful government.  The 
third section demanded Spain remove her forces from the island, and the fourth 
“authorized, empowered and directed” the president to use American forces to “carry 
these resolutions into effect.” 161  Again, the choice of phrase—Congress directing the 
president to intervene—would cause much consternation.  Foraker’s resolution did not 
include a declaration of war. 
None of these three resolutions conformed to the president’s wishes, nor were 
they sanctioned by the Republican leadership.  Their sponsors were all well ahead of the 
administration in responding to, and inevitably encouraging, the pro-Cuban sympathies of 
the general populace.162  The fourth speaker was determined to apply a counterbalance 
and shift the direction of the discourse in the Senate back toward the administration’s 
position. 
Stating that he was offering his resolution in direct response to the preceding 
submissions, Senator Frye of Maine, another committee member, then introduced another 
joint resolution with similar phrasing but dramatically different meaning.   Senator Frye’s 
resolution was designed to sound forceful without actually requiring anything of the 
administration.  It left intervention entirely to the president’s discretion, and deftly 
sidestepped the problem of recognizing the political legitimacy of the insurrection by 
declaring that the hostilities existed “between Spain and the people of Cuba.”163   
The body of Senator Frye’s resolution continued in this vein, scrupulously 
avoiding plain speech to allow room for alternate interpretations later.  It detailed the 
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barbarous Spanish suppression of the insurgency without officially recognizing who and 
what the insurgents purported to be and decried the loss of American investment and 
commerce without demanding recompense.  It complained of costs incurred enforcing 
neutrality without revoking that policy and stated Spain’s loss of Cuba was now 
irreversible, but without recognizing Cuba’s independence.  Finally, it resolved that the 
president should take action to end the hostilities in Cuba, see Spain withdraw its forces 
from the island, and “the complete independence of said people” all by “such steps as, in 
his discretion, may be necessary.”164   
Thus the battle lines were drawn.  To one side, Senator Foraker—a member of the 
Republican majority on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee—had spelled out a 
proposal that declared Cuba independent, recognized the rebel government as legitimate, 
and directed the executive to force Spain to quit the island.  The chairman of the same 
committee had then countered with a proposal designed to leave matters in the hands of 
the executive, calling for commitment to little that was concrete, and allowing wide 
latitude for discretion and interpretation.  Both resolutions were referred to the 
committee, of which Senators Foraker and Frye were members, and further discussion 
was rendered moot until a report emerged. 
D. A STUDIED LACK OF CLARITY: MCKINLEY FURTHER MUDDIES 
THE TURBID WATERS 
On 11 April 1898, after the opening prayer and dispensing with ordinary business, 
Secretary of the Senate William Cox read President McKinley’s war message in its 
entirety to the assembled senators.  In excess of 5,000 words, the transcript of the 
message fills seven columns on four pages of the Congressional Record.  In it, the 
president characterizes the importance of events in Cuba using language nearly identical 
to Senator Frye’s 29 March resolution: cost and effort of enforcing American neutrality 
laws, lost American commerce and investment, and the “irritation, annoyance, and  
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disturbance among our people” that had distracted Congress from more pressing issues 
—by which he meant domestic matters appropriate to the legislative branch, rather than 
foreign affairs.165 
The next section of the message alternated between cataloging Spanish 
depravities and American attempts at redress.  For every increase in misery brought on by 
the Spanish concentration policy, the message listed an American humanitarian aid effort.  
Every Spanish rejection of mediation services was met with an American suggestion to 
use the good offices of the president.  Each Spanish delay of reform, and then later 
autonomy, in Cuba was met with American encouragement for reconsideration.166 
Following this lengthy preamble, the author then began to substantiate his 
position regarding Cuba.  The president first reiterated his statements in the most recent 
annual message to Congress: recognition of belligerence was “not warranted according to 
the facts,” recognition of independence was “impractical and indefensible,” and “forcible 
annexation…would be criminal aggression.”167  President McKinley then cited President 
Jackson’s independence recognition threshold—no recognition until any danger that the 
former ruler could re-conquer its former colony had passed—as justification for 
withholding a recognition that would hamper a potential American intervention without 
appreciably simplifying the task “pacify the island.”168  The message then built a case for 
American “forcible intervention as a neutral to stop the war” in order to protect American 
commerce, spare the effort required to enforce neutrality, and eliminate annoyance to  
 
 
                                                 
165 Urging the Senate to stay out of foreign policy matters, the president stated the topic had 
“inevitably found its expression from time to time in the National Legislature, so that issues wholly 
external to our own body politic engross attention and stand in the way of that close attention to domestic 
advancement that becomes a self-contained commonwealth whose primal maxim has been the avoidance of 
all foreign entanglements.” 31 Cong. Rec. 3699 (11 April 1898) (William McKinley, “Message to the 
Congress of the United States”). 
166 Ibid., 3699–70. 
167 Ibid, 3701. 
168 Ibid. 
 70 
Americans, all justifications echoed in Senator Frye’s resolution.169  Finally, he added 
the sinking of the USS Maine and resultant inquiry report as a basis for American 
intervention. 
Having thus declared his preference for “intervention as a neutral” without 
recognition of the government in Cuba, President McKinley then stated that the time had 
come for “enforced pacification of Cuba in the name of humanity, in the name of 
civilization, in behalf of endangered American interests….”170 He specifically asked 
Congress to authorize and empower (not direct) the executive to use the military and 
naval forces of the United States to pacify the island, and “secure in the island the 
establishment of a stable government, capable of maintaining order and observing its 
international obligations….”171  Once again recreating the space for interpretation 
featured in Senator Frye’s proposed resolution, the language in the War Message 
intimates much while committing to little.  It closes by putting the ball squarely in the 
Senate’s court: “the issue is now with Congress.  It is a solemn responsibility.  I have 
exhausted every effort” and “await your action.”172 
The War Message codified the administration’s position, while attempting to 
mollify concerns over the president’s plans.  Its effect was to ignite parallel debates over 
how to interpret a number of seemingly straightforward statements whose true meaning 
became more obscure with closer scrutiny.   
For example, the War Message stated the executive wished to use armed force to 
“pacify the island.”  Did that imply using force only to stop Spanish depravities, or would 
the American military also act against the Cuban rebels?  If the former, would not “to 
compel Spain to withdraw its forces from Cuba” be more clear and eliminate the 
possibility the American military could be used to quash Cuba Libre?  Resolving such 
questions raised a broader one, of whether the aim of a Senate resolution should be to 
limit and circumscribe action—in which case ambiguities and loopholes needed to be 
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ferreted out and eliminated—or to authorize the executive to act as it felt best, in which 
case more expansive language would be called for. 
Before the War Message was referred to committee, and immediately after the 
Secretary completed the first reading, two senators leapt to their feet to attempt to force 
discussion to inform the committee proceedings.  Silver Senator William Stewart of 
Nevada requested public discussion before referral to committee.  He declared that 
uninvited intervention without first recognizing a state of belligerency would have the 
appearance of simple conquest, an appearance substantiated by language that could be 
construed to allow American force to be used against the Cuban insurgents.  Recognition 
of Cuban independence prior to intervention would limit application of American force 
strictly to Spanish resistance, and he cited the joint resolution of 1896 and the pro-
recognition planks in all three party platforms as indication of the will of the nation on 
the topic.    
Senator Stewart also proposed that international law held both the Cubans and 
Spanish jointly accountable for all Cuban debt, unless the Cubans achieved 
independence.  In that instance, the debt would be Spain’s alone, because it would be to 
have been incurred while attempting to subdue the successful revolt.  If the United States 
took Cuba by force, however, it would have to assume the burden of the debt.  He 
therefore asserted that the safest course was to first recognize Cuban independence.173   
Populist Senator Marion Butler of North Carolina then rose to state that the 
American people had long awaited the message received today, and when they read it 
they would be unimpressed.  He averred the message neither recognized Cuban 
independence nor served an eviction notice on Spain.  Rather the president “requests 
Congress to authorize him to make the Cubans stop fighting for their liberty and 
surrender to the cruel rule of Spain and the greedy demands of bondholders…to help 
Spain crush the Cuban patriots.  Shall we permit the President to take that course?”174  
To prevent that eventuality, Senator Butler then introduced a joint resolution recognizing 
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Cuba as an independent nation and demanding Spanish withdrawal from the island 
compelled by American force.175  With that, the Vice President referred the War 
Message to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, while in the House the message was 
read and referred to the Committee on Foreign Affairs without comment. 
E. A FRACTURED COMMITTEE RENDERS A DISJOINTED REPORT 
The composition of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee—one of the original 
standing committees in the Senate—that received the War Message was similar to its 
predecessors.176  Historically composed of nine members, with the deciding seat held by 
the majority party, the previous committee of the 54th Congress had been the first to swell 
to 11.  The six Republicans and five Democrats on the committee in April 1898 included 
some of the leaders in both major parties, underscoring the fact that Foreign Relations 
was considered a plum committee assignment.  
For this reason several influential senators served on the committee for extended 
tenures.  This is relevant to the subject at hand because many committee members in 
1898 had also participated in the committee’s deliberations during the events in Hawaii, 
Samoa, and Venezuela described in the preceding chapter.  Inescapably, those senators 
brought those experiences to bear in the preparation of the committee report on Cuban 
intervention.  Further, a number of senators who served on the committee during the 55th 
Congress would be influential in the debates to come on administering, and finally 
dismantling, the American empire. 
On the Republican side, Senator Davis of Minnesota—then in his fourth and next 
to last stint on the committee—was the chairman not by virtue of tenure but of Senate 
rules and traditions.  Senator William Frye of Maine, whose Senate career began in 1881, 
would have been the chair but for a prohibition on heading two committees 
simultaneously.  Serving on the committee for his seventh Congress Senate, to be 
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followed by eight more before his death in 1911, Senator Frye would participate in 
deliberations over all the critical issues of American imperialism save its swan song.177   
Two other Republican committee members were building more impressive 
resumes.  Senator Shelby Cullom of Illinois arrived in Congress in the same election that 
gave Abraham Lincoln his abbreviated second term and moved across the Capitol to the 
Senate in 1883.178  By the 55th Congress he had already served two congress terms on the 
Foreign Relations Committee and was destined for seven more, the final six in the chair 
until leaving the Senate in 1913—a record that would stand as the longest chair tenure 
until exceeded by Senator Fulbright in 1970.179   
Senator Lodge of Massachusetts was also on the committee for the second time.  
Before his Senate career ended in 1924, he would serve on the committee 13 more 
times—including three as minority leader and three as chairman—spanning his entire 30-
year tenure with the exception of his first term, which coincided with the Democratic 
majority 53rd Congress.180  Senator Lodge would also chair the temporary standing 
Committee on the Philippines during the 56th to 61st Congresses.181  The Republican 
contingent was rounded out by recent additions of Senators Foraker of Ohio and Clarence 
Clark of Wyoming, who would serve together on the committee five more times, then 
Clark alone once more. 
On the other side of the committee table, Senators Daniel of Virginia, David 
Turpie of Indiana, and Roger Mills of Texas were serving for the second time; Daniel 
would serve twice more, but for the latter two it would be the last.  This committee of the 
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55th Congress would also be the last for Senator Gray of Delaware, having served thrice 
prior.  These terms of service border on insignificance, however, when compared to that 
of Senator Morgan of Alabama.  His wide and varied Senate career was outlined in the 
previous chapter, but of note here the 55th Congress marked his tenth on the Senate 
Foreign Relations Committee, and he would serve four more times until 1907, with the 
last five being as minority leader.182  It would suffice to say that the Senate Foreign 
Relations Committee membership for the 55th Congress constituted the densest collection 
of legislative experts on American empire, spanning the duration of the endeavor. 
The jurisdiction of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee is spelled out in the 
Standing Rules of the Senate.  Four topics were of particular significance in 1898: 
international law as it relates to foreign policy; interventions abroad and declarations of 
war; safeguarding American business interests abroad; and relations of the United States 
with foreign nations generally.183  The function of the committee, beyond vetting and 
shaping prospective bills, has often been to serve a laboratory in which to conduct policy 
experiments shielded from outside interference.  At the same time, it has often presented 
a substantial obstacle to the executive branch’s prerogatives in the conduct of foreign 
affairs.184 
With a plurality in the Senate of the 55th Congress, the Republicans were entitled 
by Senate rules to one more committee seat than the Democrats, and the minor parties 
went completely unrepresented.  The committee operated, then as now, on a majority 
basis.  Any report would require endorsement by the majority of the committee, and the 
rules also allowed for inclusion of a short minority report.  As positions expressed and 
votes cast in the committee were not transcribed and preserved, these report 
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endorsements served to make the bare outline of confidential committee proceedings 
public, and thus further defined the opposing sides in the subsequent floor debates.185 
Conceivably, through strict partisan loyalty, the Republican majority could force 
through a committee report that reflected the policy of the Republican president, ensuring 
that the resolution reported out of the committee complemented the War Message.  Had 
the Republicans held a majority of the overall Senate, this result may have also been 
reflective of the will of the Senate as a whole.  In April 1898, however, the Republicans 
fell one seat short of a majority.  The combined voices of the Democratic and minor party 
senators thus had equal claim to represent the will of the Senate, against the Republican 
majority in the Foreign Relations Committee.  This contradictory outcome is exactly 
what came to pass. 
The committee report delivered to the Senate on 13 April provides the best insight 
available into the closed committee proceedings before the War Message was received 
and in the two days the committee deliberated before releasing their report to the full 
Senate.  At over 700 pages, the report had been a work in progress in the months leading 
up to the War Message, and it included correspondence and diplomatic documentation 
dealing with the Cuban issue as background information.  The first five pages 
summarized nine preceding resolutions referred to the committee over the past three 
years, recent president’s messages, and details of the sinking of the USS Maine and the 
resultant investigation.186   
The next three pages, surprisingly, stated the opinion of the committee that the 
United States ought to recognize Cuban independence, intervene to stop the atrocities 
(not just “pacify the island”), and see to the establishment of an independent government 
by free action of the Cuban people, all propositions antithetical to the president’s War 
Message.  The report then chided the administration, stating that if recognition of 
belligerency had been extended, as urged by the Senate in 1896 and 1897, the Cuban 
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insurrection would have succeeded without American intervention, now seen as the only 
recourse.  The report supported Senator Proctor’s assertion of de facto independence in 
the eastern provinces of Cuba, and declared that Spanish control of the west had been 
achieved only by virtue of the desolation that accompanied the “concentration” policy.187 
The text of the report then returned to a more legalistic overview of recognition, 
intervention, and neutrality, featuring international precedents in Turkey and Egypt.  This 
section also included lengthy passages from both Presidents Cleveland’s and McKinley’s 
most recent annual messages to Congress outlining the justifications for intervention, and 
followed with lists of events detailing how the recent deterioration of the situation in 
Cuba exceeded the threshold for justified intervention.  The deliberative portion of the 
report then closed with the text of the committee’s proposed joint resolution.188 
The anomalous center section of the report—the part that called directly for 
recognition of Cuban independence, intervention against Spanish forces, and 
establishment of a Cuban government—is curiously isolated in several aspects: in typeset 
by a series of multiple blank lines before and after, by tone, and by content from the rest 
of the document.  The strong, clear language of that rogue section seems in direct contrast 
to the resolution endorsed by the majority of the committee, which falls short of officially 
recognizing Cuban independence, the legitimacy of the insurgent government, or the state 
of legal belligerency between Spain and Cuba.  Further, there is no language in the 
resolution limiting use American force to only oppose Spanish force, nor is there 
language defining the desired end state to be achieved.189  
Nearly 700 pages of supporting documentation, to chronicle developments since 
1895, accompanied the proposed resolution.  Found here are the constitution and laws of 
the Republic of Cuba, correspondence between the Governments of Spain and the United 
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States, transcripts of testimony to the committee, a copy of the Spanish investigation into 
the sinking of the USS Maine, pronouncements of the Cuban junta, and documents 
internal to the Department of State dating to the first Cuban revolt.   
Following the draft joint resolution, and preceding this compendium of 
documentation, is a short paragraph constituting the minority report.  Centered on an 
otherwise blank page, under the header “Views of the Minority”—set in a bold type 
larger than that found on the report’s title page—appears the declaration: “The 
undersigned members of said committee cordially concur in the report made upon the 
Cuban resolutions, but we favor the immediate recognition of the Republic of Cuba, as 
organized on that island, as a free, independent, and sovereign power among the nations 
of the world.”190  This statement was signed by Senators Turpie, Mills, Daniel, and 
Foraker.  By that simple statement, the opposition to majority endorsement of vague 
language granting wide executive latitude was delineated, empowered, and called to 
action. 
With that, the committee returned its report to the Senate.  The incongruity 
inherent in the document—at once favoring recognition of the Republic of Cuba and 
intervention without recognition—would animate the discourse of the following week.  
The larger incongruity of a majority on a committee attempting to advance the 
administration’s agenda, but supported only by a plurality in the Senate, was a paradox 
that loomed large in the coming debates.   
The designs of the pro-administration senators, however, were frustrated by 
incomplete control of its fractured cohort and a series of topical, temporary alliances 
between components of the four parties arrayed in opposition.  The unique composition 
of the Senate of the 55th Congress coupled with a shrewdly constructed oppositional 
strategy would make the task of actualizing the policy put forth by the President’s War 
Message much more difficult than it might have been, and thus makes it much more 
interesting to study. 
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V. SIX FACETS OF THE SENATE DELIBERATIONS ON 
INTERVENTION IN CUBA 
This debate will go down in history…it marks an epic in the affairs of the 
United States…I desire to get the voice of the Senate of the United 
States…spread upon the records of the country elaborately…so that we 
may have a monument hereafter which will guide us in future troubles…I 
crave light.  I do not want to plunge into a war unless every phase of the 
subject is not only spread before the Senate, but before the country.191 
On 13 April 1898, the Committee on Foreign Relations delivered its report, 
including the contrasting majority and minority endorsements, to the Senate for debate.  
Official presentation of this document signaled the start of the contest proper; all previous 
discussion was merely a prelude.  Over the week that followed, the upper house parsed 
every clause of the report’s joint resolution and deliberated the wisdom and precedent 
each set forth.  The resultant discourse—a series of protracted, interconnected sub-
debates—nourished a decentralized campaign to pass judgment on isolated points 
individually and thereby influence the final resolution’s overall meaning.  In this way, an 
opposition unable to form an organized resistance to the will of the administration could 
enable its disparate components to advance their unique agendas separately, with a 
combined result that could frustrate the plans of the executive branch.   
The debates in the Senate revolved around six themes, summarized here as roles, 
debt, entitlement, law, duty, and restraint.  These headings will serve as a guide to 
understanding the Senate debates on intervention.  Those debates in turn established the 
foundation on which the emerging American imperial project would rest. 
The diversity of the issues raised increased both the complexity and sustainability 
of opposition.  The Senate’s fragmented composition, and the unique rules protecting the 
rights of the minority in debate, meant that a vote on intervention in Cuba could not be 
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dictated by the majority—as was possible in the House.192  Instead, these six distinct sub-
debates enabled disaffected Republicans, Bourbon Democrats, Populists, Southern 
Democrats, Silverites, and Silver Republicans to each find some clause of the joint 
resolution’s proposed text as firm ground on which to make a stand.  Even senators 
whose general outlook, or whose constituents’ interest, generally aligned with the 
administrations were inclined to adopt an independent line with respect to matters of 
detail, by way of taking a principled stand on a matter in which high principles were 
routinely invoked.193    
A. ROLES: “WHO CAN ACT?” 
The Senate debates on intervention in Cuba represent a scrum between two 
branches of government over the roles and responsibilities of each with respect to foreign 
policy.  Many in the Senate believed that if it were to simply approve the terms of the 
President’s War Message it would have abdicated any active role in crafting foreign 
policy.194  Conversely, if the Senate forced approval for a joint resolution resembling the 
minority report of the Foreign Relations Committee, it could have severely limited 
presidential latitude in how American forces were to be used in Cuba, thereby actively 
creating foreign policy.   
                                                 
192 Unlike Speaker of the House of Representatives Reed’s power to stifle debate cited earlier, Senate 
rules do not allow the presiding officer such control. Senators are free to speak on topic of choice and 
submit relevant resolutions, with the rules directing only “when a senator desires to speak, he shall rise and 
address the presiding officer” who “shall recognize the senator” and “no senator shall interrupt another 
senator in debate without his consent.” Committee on Rules and Administration, “Standing Rules of the 
Senate,” Rule XIX, paragraph 1(a), U.S. Senate, 
http://www.rules.senate.gov/public/index.cfm?p=RuleXIX.  
193 Richard Leopold listed the economic pressures for intervention in both partisan and non-partisan 
terms that “came from those who benefited from increased circulation, those who owned land in Cuba, 
those who engaged in a once lucrative trade with the island, those who would profit from army contracts, 
and those who hoped a war might derange the currency and upset the gold standard.” Leopold, The Growth 
of American Foreign Policy, 176. 
194 In Walter LaFeber’s view, the president saw himself as “the cosmopolitan of the system” whose 
role was to advance policies that “helped those functional groups that, in turn, most enriched the national 
interest—even if it meant knocking heads in Congress to have the president’s programs accepted. In the 
1880’s…senators visited the White House only to give advice, by 1898 they visited McKinley to receive 
advice” and “then returned to the Senate…to deliver the vote for the White House.” LaFeber, Cambridge 
History of American Foreign Relations, 135–36. For additional discussion on President McKinley as a 
strong executive, see Lewis L. Gould, The Presidency of William McKinley (Lawrence, KS: University 
Press of Kansas, 1980). 
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Justification for locating the power to make policy in one branch or another was 
to a large degree based on interpretation and precedent.  As inferred by Senator Donelson 
Caffery in the epigraph opening this chapter, the outcome of these debates would have 
repercussions extending well beyond events in Cuba.  It was also apparent to all that, 
whatever the outcome in the Senate, it too would become a precedent in turn, with 
implications extending far into the future.195   
At bottom, the struggle over roles swirled around the question of which branch 
could grant recognition to an independent government in Cuba.  On one side, the 
administration and its faithful supporters in the Senate—mostly Republicans, but joined 
by a surprising number of both Southern and Bourbon Democrats—averred the executive 
held sole authority for recognition.196  The most common rationale this group advanced 
was that the executive branch exclusively performed the state function of receiving and 
verifying the credentials of foreign ambassadors.  This procedure was more than a 
formality, they felt, but rather an official confirmation by the government of the United 
States that the country in question was indeed a sovereign nation.197  Recognition of a 
state made independent by its own proclamation was an extremely rare occurrence—
albeit one the United States itself had pioneered.198  The process of receiving  
 
                                                 
195 Paul Holbo offered that the opposition efforts in the Senate “posed a serious challenge to his 
(President McKinley’s) power” and an attempt to “assert congressional prerogatives against what they 
considered to be undue presidential power.” In the end, “presidential power was significantly increased” as 
“defeat of the Turpie-Foraker Amendment assured his leadership and made him the first modern president 
in the area of foreign affairs.” Paul Holbo, “Turpie-Foraker Amendment,” in Beede, The War of 1898, 548–
49. 
196 Variation existed within this Democratic bloc as well, from Senator Gray’s mild statement “the 
best and surest way was to cooperate with the other great branch of this government, the executive” against 
tying recognition together with intervention; to Senator Gorman’s strong statement against the Senate’s 
attempt to exert “a power which has been disputed by every executive from Washington on down—the 
right of Congress by law to provide for the recognition of a state.  By my vote and by my voice, I protest 
against it.” 31 Cong. Rec. 3888–90 (15 April 1898). 
197 Foremost in stressing this point was Democratic Senator Caffery, who, contrary to the majority of 
his party, believed the formality of receiving ambassadors constituted the codification of the executive’s 
sole authority to recognize independent nations, “all-sufficient and all-conclusive as to the existence of 
states when he recognizes their ministry as clothed with the power to transact the treaty. It springs from the 
power to appoint and receive ministers and ambassadors.” 31 Cong. Rec. 3856 (16 April 1898). 
198 On the global influence of the American Declaration of Independence, see David Armitage, The 
Declaration of Independence: A Global History (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2008). 
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ambassadors, however, and the de facto recognition of sovereignty that act implied, was 
familiar and universal, thus the most reliable indicator of where the power to recognize 
sovereignty resided.  
Supporting the other viewpoint, a host of senators—including several pro-
administration Republicans who disagreed with their party’s stance on this issue—
believed recognition to be a shared authority of the legislative and executive branches.199  
This argument was based in the proposal that the reception of credentials by the executive 
is but the opening move, incomplete and even meaningless until a reciprocal American 
representative was authorized and funded.200  Only Congress could establish the position 
of a United States ambassadorship to any foreign nation.  Recognition was, thus by 
extension, indeed a power of the Senate, as the executive’s “statements of national policy 
survive only with congressional support or acquiescence.  Presidential announcements on 
foreign policy can be revoked or modified at any time by Congress.”201 
The second major facet of the debates over executive and legislative roles proved 
to be a mirror image of the first: can authority specifically assigned to the legislative 
branch be ceded to the executive by Congress?  As the answer to this question was 
obviously negative, a group of senators sought to show that the proposed language in the 
                                                 
199 Senator Daniel cited the writings of Henry Clay—former Secretary of State and then-member of 
the Senate Foreign Relations Committee—expressing four paths to recognition: treaty by both executive 
and legislative branches, commerce law by Congress, sending a United States ambassador by Congress, 
and Presidential acceptance of a foreign ambassador’s credentials. The gist of the case was that each of 
these four paths were, in truth, shared powers, thus no branch had sole authority for recognition. 31 Cong. 
Rec. 3886 (15 April 1898). 
200 Senator Rawlins stated “It is a reciprocal duty…the President undoubtedly may receive, but has no 
power to send a representative. He cannot create the office of ambassador, he cannot provide has salary, he 
cannot determine his grade….” 31 Cong. Rec. 4010 (18 April 1898). Senator Stewart went further, stating 
that in verifying and receiving ambassador’s credentials “the questions before the executive are merely 
questions of fact” and the executive has “no cognizance of the question whether those exercising the 
government have the right along with the possession.” 31 Cong. Rec. 3902 (15 April 1898). 
201 Louis Fisher, Presidential War Power, 2nd ed. (Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, 2004), 
22.  
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majority report of the Foreign Relations Committee proposed to do exactly that, and 
thereby exceeded the limits of congressional authority.202 
The crux of this case was Congress cannot delegate to the executive the war-
making powers and responsibility explicitly assigned in the Constitution to the legislative 
branch.  Both the President’s War Message and the majority report draft resolution 
employed language so vague as to allow the President to pursue almost any course of 
action he saw fit, an eventuality even some Republican senators opposed.203  The issue 
was further complicated by the fact that the preferred policy in the War Message, 
“forcible intervention of the United States as a neutral,” did not–and does not—exist as 
an international legal concept.204   
The island of Cuba was de jure territory of the Kingdom of Spain.  An armed 
incursion by the United States without a declaration of war could rightfully be seen as 
legitimate causus belli by the Spanish government and a betrayal of the Cuban 
patriots.205  Those who took this line argued that Congress could not authorize 
presidential action that would directly result in a state of undeclared war without 
abrogating its constitutional responsibility.  Either the vaguely worded joint resolution 
                                                 
202 Senator Pettus drew unfavorable comparison between the War Message and the power of the 
monarchy “where the king can use the army and navy to make war or intervene whenever and wherever he 
desires to do so.” Instead, in the United States, the president cannot declare war, or conduct war undeclared 
by Congress, which “has no authority to delegate that power to the President or to any other officer.” 31 
Cong. Rec. 3730–31 (12 April 1898). 
203 Most dramatically, Senator Turner of Washington cited the vague language and President 
McKinley’s avoidance of discussions on independence with the Cuban leaders as proof the executive 
desires not Cuban independence, but instead “he proposes to leave the flag of Spain flying over the Island 
of Cuba” and “to use the power of this Republic to compel the people of Cuba to submit to that bloody 
flag.” 31 Cong. Rec. 3830 (14 April 1898). 
204 31 Cong. Rec. 3701 (11 April 1898) (William McKinley, “Message to the Congress of the United 
States”). Also, Senator Daniels read aloud an article contemporaneous to the debates, “Neutral Intervention 
Impossible,” Washington Post which stated: “we are without reason for interfering in Cuba at all unless we 
go there as friendly to Cuba and correspondingly unfriendly to her Spanish oppressors.” 31 Cong. Rec. 
3883 (15 April 1898). This sentiment has been echoed recently by, among others, Professor Gary Bass of 
Princeton University’s Woodrow Wilson School of Politics and International Affairs: “There is no such 
thing as neutral intervention, one that solely protects civilians without taking sides.” Gary Bass, “Why 
Humanitarian Wars Can Go So Wrong,” Washington Post, 4 April 2011. 
205 John Offner, “William McKinley and the Spanish-Cuban/American War, 1898,” in Beede, The 
War of 1898, 286. 
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had to be accompanied by a declaration of war, or the independence of the Republic of 
Cuba would have to be recognized.206 
This was the logic of the minority report.  Its language went beyond the 
majority’s expression, that Cuba should be independent, to assert the Senate’s power to 
recognize the legitimacy of the nascent Cuban government.  That such a challenge would 
come from heretofore-loyal Republican Senator Foraker, one of the minority report’s 
authors, and the man who formally nominated McKinley for President at the convention 
in 1896, underlined the non-partisan nature of this issue.   
B. DEBT: “WHO PAYS?” 
The second topic that tested Senate loyalties was whether the United States, or the 
nascent Republic of Cuba, would be forced to assume the debts incurred by Spain in 
seeking to control the island.  The Cuban economy, which was expected to bear the cost 
of maintaining Spanish forces there, was based on sugar.  Sufficiently productive in 
tranquil times, this income stream had been greatly disturbed and revenue driven nearly 
to zero by the destruction of mills and crops.  Without the sugar income, the costs to 
Spain of sustaining its army had been addressed by annually increasing bond levies.  By 
1898 the Spanish Government had amassed an estimated 175 million dollars in debt 
explicitly to fuel three years of operations in Cuba.207 
                                                 
206 Senator Bacon stated it was the responsibility of the Senate to clarify the joint resolution language 
so the legislature retained war-making power and did not cede any part to the executive: “The President of 
the United States has his prerogatives and we have ours; he has his duties, and we have ours; and each is 
responsible for the proper discharge of the same.” He found the majority position violated this dictum, and 
called for recognition of the government in Cuba “as essential in the case of intervention.” 31 Cong. Rec. 
3949 (16 April 1898).  
207 Senator Allen, in a lengthy speech, showed that the total Spanish bond debt regarding Cuba 
approached $520 million with an annual interest charge of $30 million, or roughly six percent. The discrete 
account for Spanish military operations on the island, however, reflected charges only for the preceding 
three years. 31 Cong. Rec. 3945 (16 April 1898). 
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The Cuban insurrectos were similarly funded through bond sales, primarily to 
sympathetic Americans willing to bet on the revolution’s eventual success.208  Under the 
circumstances, success for either side would mean likely insolvency for the other; 
defeated insurrectos would be unable to redeem their bonds at any value, and a defeated 
Spain would have no colonial income streams left to attach.209   
Even so, potential bondholder losses were not the crux of the issue in the 
Senate.210 There the primary concern was that the United States government would be 
forced to absorb the Spanish debt as a result of American intervention in Cuba.  This 
would happen because the European states where most of the Spanish bonds were held 
might deem an American victory a war of conquest.  In that case, bonds issued by Spain 
but guaranteed by future Cuban profits would transfer to the United States, much as a lien 
would transfer with the sale of a mortgaged property.211 
                                                 
208 For a concise review of the role the Cuban Junta (Cuban exiles engaged in fundraising and 
propagandizing in the United States) played, including its orchestration of the Cuban League efforts to 
influence Congress, see Mary Mander, “Public Opinion and the Spanish-Cuban/American War,” in Beede, 
The War of 1898, 451. Specific to Cuban Junta raising funds for the insurrection through bond sales, see 
John L. Offner, An Unwanted War, 62–63. 
209 Future income streams of the island’s sugar industry secured the Cuban bonds. If Spain succeeded 
putting down the revolt, it would be the Spanish owners that controlled future profits, and the Cuban bonds 
would be worthless.  
210 31 Cong. Rec. 3945 (16 April 1898) (statement of Senator Allen). Regarding lack of concern for 
potential bondholder losses: “the holders of these (Spanish) bonds had ample notice of their character. 
Every holder of these bonds made his bet against liberty and lost. I say, let them lose the whole amount; let 
them look only to Spain for any retrieval of such loss.” 31 Cong. Rec. 3839 (14 April 1898); LaFeber, The 
Cambridge History of American Foreign Relations, 143. 
211 31 Cong. Rec. 3902 (15 April 1898) (statement of Senator Stewart). For an excellent exchange 
between two senators on the appropriateness of the mortgage metaphor, see Senator Hoar “I do not believe 
a man who enters a house to put out a fire becomes legally responsible for every mortgage on the house,” 
and Senator Mason “after a man who enters a burning house has extinguished the fire, if he sets up 
ownership and says he will decide who shall run the house thereafter, does he not then incur 
responsibility?” 31 Cong. Rec. 3833 (14 April 1898). 
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The issue was complicated by concern about the consequences of Spanish debt for 
a newly independent Republic of Cuba.212  Should the United States establish an 
independent government in Cuba, then that debt would transfer to the new government in 
Havana.  Thus, the opposition argued, the President’s preferred course of action would 
“make it possible for Spanish bondholders to enforce their claims against the Cuban 
people.” 213  To this was added a general fear that a Spanish defeat would cause 
consternation in European capitals, which looked for stability on the Iberian Peninsula in 
addition to redemption of the Spanish bonds. 214 
The Senate debates of April 1898 addressed the bond issue along three separate 
lines of reasoning that, once again, cut across party lines.  The first centered on the 
proposition that neither the American nor Cuban governments would have to assume 
Spanish liability when the music stopped.  The second, favored by the administration, 
argued that America could insure herself against the liability.  The third was essentially 
an ideological screed against bondholder power in general.   
The first line of reasoning held that debt follows sovereignty, so that a newly 
created state must absorb the debt of whatever regime preceded it.215  This rule applied 
equally to the costs incurred in founding a new nation, and to the debts brought into a 
                                                 
212 Concerns for American and Cuban liability were closely interrelated. Paul Holbo wrote the 
Populists and Silver Republicans “demanded recognition of the Republic of Cuba in order to invalidate the 
Cuban bonds. Bryanite Democratic members followed suit” not only to serve their parties’ vilification of 
bonds, but to protect a future Cuban government from unjustly being forced to service Spanish debt 
incurred to hold Cuba. Similarly, a Silver Republican senator looking to protect the Colorado sugar beet 
industry and evade American responsibility for both the Spanish and Cuban bond debt advanced the Teller 
Amendment, now often seen as an idealistic defense of Cuban independence. Paul Holbo, “The Cuban 
Bond Conspiracy,” in Beede, The War of 1898, 148–9. 
213 “Instead of liberating Cuba, we would put her in the condition of suffering Egypt…substituting 
bonded slavery for Spanish cruelty.” Ibid. 
214 The majority of the Spanish bonds were held in Spain and the remainder throughout the financial 
centers of Europe. Many European governments, therefore, had concerns not only for the redemption of the 
bonds they held, but also for the solvency of the Spanish treasury itself. 31 Cong. Rec. 3945 (16 April 
1898). 
215 Senator Lindsay made the case that if the United States ejected Spanish forces and constrained the 
insurrectionists, these actions would satisfy requirements to consider Cuba as taken by conquest. Citing the 
writings of Secretary of State John Quincy Adams on the occasion of sequential revolutions against 
Spanish rule in South America, he showed that such conquest, the conqueror who “takes all rights of the 
conquered, also incurs all the obligations and duties of the conquered, and in the estimation of morality, as 
well as the American interpretation of international law, those obligations he must perform.”  31 Cong. 
Rec. 3788 (13 April 1898). 
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newly consolidated nation by parts previously separate.  The sole exception to this rule 
arose in the case of a successful rebellion, in which the newly independent nation would 
owe no debts incurred by the sovereign it had cast off, only those of its own creation. 216   
The question before the Senate was how intervention by the United States might 
affect the operation of this rule in Cuba.  If American forces ejected the Spanish from the 
island, would the criteria of successful revolution absolve Cubans of Spanish-incurred 
debt?  If not, who would be liable?  In the view of the opposition, the answers were clear: 
the Cuban independence struggle would not be validated in the eyes of the world, so that 
the United States would have to assume the Spanish debt until it managed to pass 
responsibility off on the Cubans.  One senator stated that intervention by the United 
States resulting in a Cuba assuming “in some form or another of the obligation of the 
Spanish debt” would in turn bring ruin to the new republic: “Mr. President, God forbid.  
When the deed of Cuban freedom is signed by the powers of the world, let there be no 
stain of blood money upon it, and let it not be sealed by a dollar mark.”217  Would it not 
be wise, the opposition then offered, to recognize the Republic of Cuba as an independent 
state first?  That is what France had done when it assisted the American revolutionaries, 
after all, and it has worked for them.218   
In response, the pro-administration senators argued that intervention as a neutral 
would render the entire issue moot.219  Under this interpretation, intervention to prevent 
                                                 
216 As a recognized authority on the international and “American doctrine in regards to the liabilities 
which occur on the division of a country,” President Woolsey of Yale University was cited writing that a 
successful revolution against a “despotic and usurping government had contracted debt” to oppress “a 
nation attempting to recover its liberties” was the sole means to eradicate such debt. 31 Cong. Rec. 3902 
(15 April 1898). 
217 In a rousing speech on this subject, Senator Thurston—a staunch Republican but here in alignment 
with his Populist Nebraska delegation-mate—parted with the administration and its sympathies with 
European allies on the question of passing the Spanish debt onto the Cuban government. 31 Cong. Rec. 
3986 (16 April 1898). 
218 Senator Nelson added: “There are better and stronger grounds for our recognizing the Cuban 
Republic than there was for recognizing the United States by France in 1778.” 31 Cong. Rec. 3984 (16 
April 1898). Also, see 31 Cong. Rec. 3785 (13 April 1898) (statement of Senator Lindsay). 
219 As events would later prove, this position was legally dubious but actually closest to reality. The 
totality of the American victory over Spanish forces, both in Cuba and the Philippines, left the United 
States with considerable power to dictate terms of the peace agreement. This included deftly avoiding 
assumption of the Spanish debt, and paying $20 million in compensation for taking all the Philippine 
Islands. 
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atrocities and deliver humanitarian relief would insulate the United States from liability 
as a conqueror, and preserve the “successful revolution” exception for the Cubans.220   
The third and final line of reasoning ventured in this phase of the debates was a 
more generalized vilification of government policies benefiting bondholders.  Led by the 
Populist senators, who believed functions and control of the American government had 
“been basely surrendered by our public servant to corporate monopolies,” this line of 
opposition rested on two platform planks of the People’s Party.221  The People’s Party 
was vehemently against bonds as a means of public finance in any circumstance.222  To 
the Populists and like-minded observers, the debate on Cuba offered the potential to 
simultaneously achieve two stated goals: officially recognize Cuba, and confront the 
stranglehold that they believed bondholders exercised over governmental policy in the 
United States. 
Thus, by contesting the bond question, the opposition was afforded a three-
pronged resistance to the administration’s plans.  While none of the individual 
approaches—recognition of independence to avoid bond liability, ruinous conditions 
should the nascent Republic of Cuba be saddled with debt, and rabid anti-bondholder-
ism—would prove conclusive, each provided a vehicle by which to air dissent, often also 
crossing party lines.  Most importantly, however, these approaches revealed chinks in the 
                                                 
220 31 Cong. Rec. 3833 (14 April 1898) (statement of Senator Hoar). Also, Senator Gray stated, “if 
you take our conduct measured and characterized by our declarations, then we are absolved and free from 
the conditions upon which any power on earth could claim that we were responsible for the incomes which 
have been mortgaged to pay the Spanish bonds.” 31 Cong. Rec. 3842 (14 April 1898). Senator Elkins, 
typically, went even further, stating that recognition should be withheld to enable the United States 
government to force “the Cuban government to pay part of the expenses of the war.” 31 Cong. Rec. 3979 
(16 April 1898).  Senator Fairbanks added: “Spain has…forfeited her right to further dominion over Cuba 
or its revenues. If the revenues were…subject to the forfeiture of the island for the violation of those 
humane principles and precepts which are observed by the civilized nations of the earth…the rights of 
humanity are superior to the rights of the bondholders.” 31 Cong. Rec. 3846 (14 April 1898). 
221 “The influence of European money changers has been more potent in shaping legislation that the 
voice of the American people…plutocracy has thereby been enthroned upon the ruins of Democracy.” 
“People’s Party Platform: Adopted at St. Louis, 24 July 1896,” J. M. H. Frederick, comp., National Party 
Platforms of the United States (Akron, OH: Werner Company, 1896), 91. 
222 The People’s Party platform continued: “We denounce the sale of bonds and the increase of public 
interest-bearing debt made by the present administration as unnecessary and without authority of law, and 
demand that no more bonds be issued…” and “We tender to the patriotic people…our deepest sympathies 
in their heroic struggle for political freedom and independence…believe the time has come when the 
United States, the Great Republic of the world, should recognize that Cuba is and of right ought to be a free 
and independent State.” Ibid. 
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administration’s armor, most especially its reliance on the dubious notion of “neutral 
intervention,” to insulate itself from the broader consequences that armed intervention 
would almost certainly entail. 
C. ENTITLEMENT: “WHAT DO THE CUBANS DESERVE?” 
The topic of debt liability could be cast in black and white: either a country would 
be forced to accept liability or not.  In contrast, the question whether the Cuban 
insurrectos were entitled to recognition as a legitimate government could only be 
answered in shades of grey.  On this issue the Senate debate turned on historical 
memories of the American Revolution, informed by more recent events in the Republic 
of Texas and the Confederate States of America, and colored by impressions senators 
brought back from visits to the island.  It was an issue ideally suited to highlight 
conflicting interpretations of American exceptionalism: the United States’ revolution and 
republican form of government were awe-inspiring and worthy of emulation, but 
independence movements that accept the challenge were sub-standard and unworthy. 
At the core of the controversy stood a phrase common to both the American 
Declaration of Independence and the proposed joint resolution: “are, and of a right ought 
to be, free and independent.”223  The central question was what, exactly, this phrase 
meant in connection with military action ostensibly intended only to restore order and 
provide humanitarian relief.224  The joint resolution text applied this phrase to the people 
of Cuba, and as it remained silent about the status of its self-proclaimed revolutionary 
government, the argument could be made that such a phrase was merely a pleasant 
sounding, but ultimately meaningless, expression.   
To achieve the stated goals of stability and cessation of atrocities, while 
preserving significant freedom of action, the pro-administration side argued that 
                                                 
223 Henceforth referred to as “are, and” language. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Report of 
the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, Relative to Affairs in Cuba, S. Rep. No. 55–885 
(13 April 1898), XXII. 
224 In fact, all the way down to the last votes on the issue on 18 April, the discord over “are, and of 
right ought to be” remained central. The final two points of contention the committee of conference 
struggled to overcome were “are, and” language and recognition; the majority could not successfully kill 
“are, and” and could not successfully insert recognition. 31 Cong. Rec. 4033 (18 April 1898). 
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recognition of the Republic of Cuba was not a precondition to American success.  
Atrocities could be stopped, stability returned, and Spain evicted.  Afterward the people 
of Cuba would be free to decide on their preferred form of government.225 
Premature recognition would saddle the United States with a ward of debatable 
character, unproven competence, and unreliable temperament.226  One senator professed 
“I can not find in the Cuban situation an independent government such as I can vote to 
recognize.”227  Administration spokesmen contended that the insurrecto regime was 
primarily representative of the dregs of Cuban society.  Only peasants and farmers had 
remained as Spanish oppression escalated; all of the elite and intelligentsia had either fled 
or were detained in fortified towns on the Spanish portion of the island.  The selection of 
a legitimate successor regime could only occur once these responsible elements of society 
were restored to their natural place.228 
To substantiate the wisdom of delaying recognition until that came to pass, the 
pro-administration forces mustered evidence that the insurrecto government was 
unworthy of validation.  In their depiction, it did not collect taxes, and it extorted tribute.  
It did not rule from a permanent capital but conducted business on the fly in remote 
villages.  Its courts were summary tribunals, and its treasury was a cash box behind the 
                                                 
225 Representative of this argument was the summation delivered before the vote by Senator Hoar. He 
forecast, if only the Senate would adopt the administration’s position and strike any language regarding 
recognition and change “are, and” to read only “ought to be free,” the situation in Cuba would reach a 
speedy conclusion: “you will have within ten days everything you desire. You will have had it in a 
constitutional way…that does not entangle or commit the American people, and you will have it in a way 
where the President, the House, and the Senate will not be embarrassed” and “will all be agreed.” 31 Cong. 
Rec. 4034 (18 April 1898).  
226 Historian Leopold noted that to prevent this eventuality, the lower house acted swiftly: “The 
administration doubted whether a nation worthy of that name actually existed on the island and opposed 
such a step. Hence the House, where McKinley’s lieutenants were in control, passed a resolution without 
any encumbrance on 13 April 1898 by a count of 325 to 19.” Leopold, The Growth of American Foreign 
Policy, 178.  
227 31 Cong. Rec. 3892 (15 April 1898) (statement of Senator Wolcott). Regarding the unreliable 
nature of a recognized insurgent government, see comment of Senator Elkins 31 Cong. Rec. 3779 (16 April 
1898). 
228 Senator Proctor argued that “Many prominent Cubans, unfitted for field service, have left the 
island. Some have left to gain a subsistence. Some have been sent away by the Spanish authorities. When 
peace is established, these men will return, and should be allowed to take part in the formation of the 
government which the Cuban people will accept.” 31 Cong. Rec. 3983 (16 April 1898). 
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counter of a New York cigar shop.229  Recognition of such a body as a sovereign state 
would be a travesty and reflect poorly on the United States. 
The opposition, conversely, sought to show that the Republic of Cuba was a 
functioning, durable, and legitimate government-in-fact, lacking only recognition as a 
government-in-law.230  Several senators offered testimonials and evidence that, since 
1895, the rebel government had held sway over fully one-half of the landmass and nearly 
all of the non-Spanish inhabitants.231  By way of proof, they produced copious 
correspondence depicting the daily conduct of the business of state and entered into the 
record the lengthy Republic of Cuba’s constitutional documents, in an effort to show that 
it was no fly-by-night enterprise.232   
The opposition also rebutted the professed illegitimacy of the insurrecto 
government by means of historical comparisons.  They contrasted the performance and 
viability of the Republic of Cuba’s government in 1898 to the condition of the nascent 
American government in 1779, after three years of its war for independence.  To the 
charge that the Republic of Cuba did not have an established capital, these senators 
pointed out “during the Revolutionary struggle, our capital was on wheels.”233  Rebutting 
                                                 
229 Senator Gear, a pro-administration stalwart, stated the Cuban treasury was kept in a cigar store in 
New York City the past 20 years, taxes were collected by threatening to burn plantations, and a Cuban 
general one morning ordered the execution of 650 prisoners. “Do Senators propose to recognize that kind 
of a government? If they do, I, for one, do not.” 31 Cong. Rec. 3973 (16 April 1898). 
230 In addition to the major functions of the state, tangible evidence of responsible government 
brought forth included such seemingly minor matters as postal service: “You can go to New York and 
deposit with the junta a letter addressed to anybody, in any place in Cuba, with a Cuban postage stamp 
attached, and it will find its destination just as surely as a letter deposited in a United States post-office.” 31 
Cong. Rec. 3779 (13 April 1898). 
231 In one example, a Senator Nelson offered: “no fair and unbiased mind can question the integrity of 
the Cuban Republic. [It] has occupied, to the exclusion of the Spanish…half the island [where] there has 
been a good and orderly government. In the western (Spanish) half of the island, the military 
government…has laid the balance of the country wasted and driven the people…into camps.” 31 Cong. 
Rec. 3984–85 (16 April 1898). 
232 The Cuban Constitution was also cited during speeches by senators who believed the document 
showed the insurrecto government represented “an intelligent and thoughtful constituency,” and proof 
“they are capable of forming a government, and that it is our duty to recognize them.” 31 Cong. Rec. 3981-
82 (16 April 1898). 
233 Senator Allen declared: “The capital of the Republic of Cuba was established at Cubitas and had 
never been moved since. Ours was moved seven different times…it was on wheels with the army, and 
under the protection of the army, and yet we were a Republic then as Cuba is a Republic now.” 31 Cong. 
Rec. 4107 (20 April 1898). 
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the assertion that Cuba’s military and navy were insufficiently substantial for an 
independent nation, several senators showed that rebel forces were larger than those 
fielded by General Washington, albeit just as poorly equipped.234  Finally, addressing 
disparaging remarks about the state and location of the Cuban treasury, one senator 
detailed the insufficiency and tardiness of the funding provided to Washington’s army by 
the Continental Congress, adding General “Gomez has a bigger army and more of a 
government at his back than Washington had.”235  
It was also apparent, conversely, that a government with a permanent capital, a 
proper treasury and tax system, and a robust military can nevertheless remain outside the 
community of recognized states.  This had been the fate of the Confederacy, which never 
received the European recognition required to consummate its separation from the 
Union.236 
Confronted with a choice between war or no war, America’s greatest deliberative 
body sought only black-and-white solutions.  Both sides of the argument over whether or 
not the Cuban government was entitled to recognition were reluctant to accept the 
ambiguous truth that the Republic of Cuba was neither completely competent nor 
completely incompetent as an independent state.  Nevertheless, middle ground options—
                                                 
234 Senator Turpie spoke regarding commonality between Washington’s service without pay and that 
of the Cuban officers and president. 31 Cong. Rec. 3839 (14 April 1898). Senator Teller compared the 
forces engaged in the American and Cuban struggles for independence. 31 Cong. Rec. 3898 (15 April 
1898); as did Senator Pasco, 31 Cong. Rec. 3969 (16 April 1898). Regarding equipment, and reminiscent of 
Valley Forge, Senator Proctor stated that “many of the infantry were entirely naked above the waist except 
for straw hats, and had been sleeping on the ground all winter without blankets.” 31 Cong. Rec. 3983 (16 
April 1898). 
235 Senator Prichard continued: “The insurgents have a more stable government, a bigger army, and a 
better organized administration than the colonies had during the Revolutionary war…the Continental 
Congress was helpless, unpopular, and well-nigh without any power.” 31 Cong. Rec. 3985 (16 April 1898). 
236 For a lengthy dialog on the comparison of the putative Cuban Republic with the Confederate States 
of America, see 31 Cong. Rec. 3787 (13 April 1898) (statements of Senators Lindsay, Hoar, Stewart, 
Daniel, Gallinger, Spooner, and Carter).  
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for instance, to offer provisional recognition to be followed by broad-spectrum elections 
once stability had been restored and the exiles returned—were never discussed.237   
D. LAW: “WHAT CAN WE DO?” 
Apart from the international legal status of “neutral intervention,” the most 
common legal issue raised in the April 1898 debates was whether the Constitution of the 
United States would prove insufficiently elastic for the task at hand.  Continental 
expansion had repeatedly tested that flexibility, most dramatically in relation to Andrew 
Jackson’s incursions into Spanish Florida and territorial issues that arose following the 
Mexican-American War.  Some in the opposition felt that the Constitution’s subtleties 
would not survive an ocean voyage.  From the outset, America’s overseas imperialism 
would have a character distinct from her long history of continental expansion.238 
It had long been a commonplace of American public life that the United States—
the world’s greatest experiment in republican governance—was fundamentally different 
from the monarchies and empires of Europe.  Those who opposed intervention in Cuba 
feared that reliance on legal precedents established by European behavior in similar 
situations would undermine America’s distinctive virtues?  While such precedents might 
support American intervention to end Spanish misgovernment, there was a fear that 
                                                 
237 Just before the final votes on 18 April, Democratic Senator Lindsay made the speech closest to 
promoting a middle of the road solution. Resigned to the fact that administration forces would not allow 
recognition of the Republic of Cuba, he proposed reasserting the recognition of belligerency that the Senate 
had passed twice already the past two years “so that when the Spaniards yield to our demand and 
withdraw…there shall be an organized government on the island capable of bringing the people together 
for the formation of a permanent republican government.” The proposal fell on largely deaf ears. 31 Cong. 
Rec. 4031 (18 April 1898). 
238 Walter LaFeber wrote that Democrats in opposition, especially those who served under both 
Cleveland administrations, would recall Secretary of State Gresham’s concern for “the consequences of a 
colonial policy that stretched the Constitution so far over water” in regards to Hawaiian annexation in 1893. 
They revisited that position during President McKinley’s first attempt to annex Hawaii, arguing, “it would 
be the first step toward colonialism and the destruction of the Constitution, which, they believed, could not 
easily extend across large expanses of water or over multiracial populations.” LaFeber, The New Empire, 
94, 147. Regarding continental expansion, the Hispanic Reading Room, Library of Congress, offers text 
and explanations of the “Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo,” http://www.loc.gov/rr/hispanic/ghtreaty/. 
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evoking past European actions would naturally associate the American intervention with 
similar actions by the British in Egypt or by the Turks in Armenia.239 
The pro-administration senators argued, to the contrary, that intervention in Cuba 
without desire for conquest would distinguish American behavior from European 
precedents.  Such intervention, they claimed, could only be seen as a humanitarian action, 
and therefore clearly distinct from all that came before, safely insulating the American 
reputation from unsavory European examples, for as Senator Hoar warned: “If we put the 
issue on any doubtful ground, we make the cause of Spain the cause of every European 
Government that has got a colony in another continent or in an island adjacent to another 
continent.”240 
Conversely, the opposition maintained the best route to distinguish American 
motives in regards to Cuba from all others was to recognize and nurture the new republic.  
This action alone would confound European assumptions that the United States was 
simply bent on seizing the island for itself.241  Once again, the contesting blocs in the 
Senate each proposed diametrically opposed action—recognizing or refusing to recognize 
the Republic of Cuba—that they believed was the only way to achieve the identical 
desired end state, in this case the perception of American exceptionalism in foreign 
affairs.  
                                                 
239 Senator Tillman warned that even with ostensibly pure motives, the United States could become 
bogged down in Cuba while also assuming Spain’s debt much as the British had become mired in Egypt 
largely to protect against Egyptian default in paying off bonds raised to finance Nile River exploration and 
Suez Canal construction. 31 Cong. Rec. 3891 (15 April 1898). Senator Daniel labeled Spain as “the Turk of 
the West” for similarities between Spanish treatment of Cubans and Turkish treatment of Armenians. 31 
Cong. Rec. 3887 (15 April 1898).  
240 31 Cong. Rec. 3832 (14 April 1898). 
241 Senator Turpie argued: “If we go to war or intervene by arms, not recognizing the independence of 
the Cuban Republic, we miss one great element in the cause which will make our quarrel just. We shall lay 
ourselves open to a great variety of complicated questions and conditions. The open, free path is to make 
the recognition before we land upon the shores of that island at all.” 31 Cong. Rec. 3738 (14 April 1898). 
Senator Berry stated that “The nations of Europe do not make war for unselfish purposes…to relieve 
suffering humanity [but rather] in the hope of some advantage and benefit. They will naturally attribute to 
us the same motives [if we] refuse to recognize the Cuban Republic.” 31 Cong. Rec. 3879 (15 April 1898). 
This point was supported by historian May, who wrote that European countries expected America’s 
intervention in Cuba was motivated by potential territorial aggrandizement. Ernest May, Imperial 
Democracy, 263. 
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E. DUTY: “WHAT IS RIGHT?” 
Closely tied to concerns with international perceptions of American motivations 
were the senators’ own perceptions about what America should do, and why.  Most 
believed that the United States had a duty to intervene in Cuba.  They differed as to the 
nature of that duty, which they addressed under three general rubrics: humanitarianism, 
honor, and revenge. 
The case for duty to humanity was the least contentious of the three.  The Spanish 
depravities in Cuba had continued despite American diplomatic entreaties, and the 
European monarchies were seemingly uninterested in meddling.  The combination of 
proximity to the problem, interest in hemispheric matters inherent in the Monroe 
Doctrine, long-standing commercial ties, and the ubiquity of Cuba Libre-inspired 
sympathies among the American public, spurred many senators to anoint the United 
States as duty bound to halt the brutality. 
The case for duty to national honor came from both sides of the aisle.  Senators 
evinced revulsion at the affront to American honor by the DeLome Letter, by the 
generally dismissive attitude of Spain toward American protest, and by the lack of 
activity in Washington to address a crisis so close to home.242  Support for intervention 
was tied to national honor nearly as often as it was to national interests.243  More 
precisely, America’s rise to the status of a great nation had made the safeguarding of its 
reputation into a national interests in itself. 
Concern about national honor led naturally to the question of how properly to 
revenge the destruction of USS Maine.  Dozens of speeches contained tributes to the dead 
in Havana Harbor and advocated forceful action to avenge their loss; both sides of the 
                                                 
242 Examples abound, a few will represent the many here. Regarding the perfidy of “a minister of 
Spain, accredited to this government, to insult the President of the Republic” see 31 Cong. Rec. 3877 (15 
April 1898) (statement of Senator Cullom). Regarding inactivity, Populist Senator Butler stated “I voted to 
put $50,000,000 in the hands of the President to defend our national honor…the President has proven 
himself incompetent…the responsibility is now on Congress, we must remove the humiliation that is upon 
us as a nation.” 31 Cong. Rec. 3733 (13 April 1898). 
243 Senator Lindsay offered one example, of many entreaties, for intervention to protect national 
honor: “The time has come when we can not with honor say to the world that Cuba shall continue a 
Spanish province…we are bound to intervene for the preservation of our good faith and national honor.” 31 
Cong. Rec. 3789 (13 April 1898). 
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partisan divide largely agreed on this position.  Yet intervention for revenge alone 
seemed empty and unworthy in itself.  Entreaties not to have “let the boys have died in 
vain” were readily extended to include larger goals: “The Maine must be avenged and 
Cuba must be free!”244 
F. RESTRAINT: “WHAT SHALL THE SENATE ALLOW THE PRESIDENT 
TO DO?” 
As a practical matter, the most essential question raised by the Foreign Relations 
Committee Report was how much power to give the President.  This was partly a 
rhetorical problem.  Precise wording could either force the chief executive to take action 
Congress desired, or prevent him from taking action Congress abhorred.  Vague language 
would effectively remove congressional preferences from the equation altogether.  This 
portion of the debates, therefore, represented the struggle within the Senate to determine 
exactly what comprised the congressional will. 
The question of should and how the executive could be retrained led directly to 
that of whether or not Congress, given its authority to declare war, should also stipulate 
the conduct and aims of the conflict.  The administration and its supporters favored 
preservation of the maximum possible latitude of executive action.245 
The opposition most strenuously disagreed.  They objected to the concept of 
neutral intervention and specifically to the precept of “hostile constraint upon both 
parties” that it incorporated.246  In an effort to influence the Senate to reject that phrasing, 
opposition senators continually pointed out that such a formulation actually constituted 
                                                 
244 Senator Butler swore “I shall not vote one dollar more or to sustain a policy that does not look to 
avenging the Maine and freeing Cuba [or] calls upon us to submit to arbitrating our national honor and the 
lives of our citizens murdered…I believe I represent every Populist and Silver Republican and Democrat in 
this sentiment.” 31 Cong. Rec. 3733 (13 April 1898). 
245 31 Cong. Rec. 3699 (11 April 1898) (William McKinley, “Message to the Congress of the United 
States”). 
246 “The forcible intervention of the United States as a neutral to stop the war…involves, however, 
hostile constraint upon both parties to the contest as well to enforce a truce and guide the eventual 
settlement.” Ibid. 
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active opposition of the Cuban cause.247  They wanted Congress to authorize intervention 
solely against Spanish forces in Cuba and eliminate the concept of “neutral intervention” 
altogether by first recognizing the Republic of Cuba.248  The vehicle for this attempt was 
the minority report from the Foreign Relations Committee.  As had been the case 
throughout the debates, the opposition sought to harry those senators least wedded to the 
pro-administration position, forcing them to consider possible consequences of uncritical 
loyalty.   
G. THE THRESHOLD OF DECISION ARRIVES 
The Senate debate approached its conclusion as the legislative week extended into 
Saturday afternoon, 16 April 1898.  The positions taken repeatedly crossed party lines but 
largely fell into two camps: those who supported administration policy and those who 
opposed it in part or in its entirety.   
Senators in favor of the language used in the War Message had argued that the 
executive branch had the sole authority to decide whether the United States would 
recognize the putative Cuban Republic.  The President did not support such recognition, 
and his supporters in the Senate clove to that line as well.  Yet the language they 
endorsed did not merely parrot the executive’s request.  The result was a very minor form 
of rebellion in the form of a resolution that went further than either the President’s War 
Message or the House’s wording in its proposed joint resolution.   
The pro-administration senators did not stray far from the President’s request in 
other matters, however.  Regarding the issue of debt, they embraced the administration’s 
concept of neutral intervention as a means to nullify the opposition’s foreboding.  They 
found the proposed actions of the executive to be in alignment with their understanding 
of both the Constitution and international law.  They joined the administration in 
impugning the legitimacy of Cuba’s revolutionary government.  They championed the 
                                                 
247 Senator Butler termed this an injustice against “the Cuban patriots, who are fighting for their 
liberty. Shall I vote to authorize him (President McKinley) to stop the Cubans?...To ‘stop war in the island’ 
without independence for Cuba means to become an ally of perfidious Spain.” 31 Cong. Rec. 3732 (12 
April 1898). 
248 31 Cong. Rec. 3785 (13 April 1898) (statement of Senator Lindsay). 
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President’s citation of duty to end the atrocities in Cuba as justification for the proposed 
actions in the War Message, and they largely agreed the President should be unfettered in 
this undertaking. 
If the senators supporting the majority report felt they had subtly forced the 
President’s hand, the senators in opposition saw the minority report as the very minimum 
expression of their objections to the War Message.  Recognition of the Cuban Republic 
as urged in the minority report directly challenged the administration’s claim to sole 
jurisdiction, and thus asserted the opposition views in sub-topics of roles, debt, and 
entitlement.  But it did nothing to advance the opposition’s stance on the issues of law, 
duty, and restraint on executive action.   
To that end, on 16 April Senator Teller offered his well-known amendment to the 
majority report.  Originally drafted as an entire replacement to the committee’s 
resolution, its final portion would become the fourth clause to the joint resolution.  It 
directly serviced the opposition’s desires to address the questions of law, duty, and 
restraint on executive action by declaring the American motivations to intervene in Cuba 
to be both “in defense of its interests and in the interest of humanity…disclaiming any 
disposition or intention to exercise jurisdiction or control over said island except for the 
pacification thereof and a determination when that is accomplished to leave the 
government and control of the island to the people thereof.”249  Incongruous to the 
outsized importance this amendment would have both for the future of Cuba and the 
shape of the eventual American empire, it passed in the Senate and appended to the draft 
joint resolution without further debate and by a simple voice vote.250 
Other than this unheralded victory, the vehemence displayed during the debates 
contrasts sharply with the omission of those topics from the final proposed legislation,  
 
 
                                                 
249 31 Cong. Rec. 3954 (16 April 1898).  
250 Ibid., 3988. For discussion of a compromise to trade recognition for preservation of the Teller 
Amendment, see John Grenville and George Berkeley Young, Politics, Strategy, and American Diplomacy: 
Studies in Foreign Policy, 1873–1917 (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1966), 264. 
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perhaps as sacrifice to the art of the possible.  What remained to be seen was the effect of 
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VI. A TEST OF WILLS: THE SENATE VOTES ON FOREIGN 
POLICY 
The first battle of American imperialism—a series of votes in the Senate directly 
affecting proposed American intervention in Cuba—was ready to commence.  In mid-
April 1898, the pro-administration and opposition forces were arrayed in the Senate not 
solely to decide which side should dictate American involvement in a Spanish colony, but 
also to determine the limits of legislative involvement in foreign policy, and eventually 
imperial policy.  The debate would be pivotal to the Senate’s transition from resistance to 
acquiescence in the imperial project and the exchange of a principled stand for a political 
gain. 
To that end, intervention in Cuba was a convenient stalking horse for larger 
issues, and the contrasting majority and minority reports of the Senate Foreign Relations 
Committee were imperfect weapons with which to fight.  The opposition proved unable 
to insert many of their more general points directly into the pending resolution, hanging 
their hope instead on recognition alone.  Across the aisle, the pro-administration cabal 
had inherited the core of their position directly from the War Message—including the 
dubious “neutral intervention” clause—and was thus not firmly planted on ground of 
their own choosing.  Both sides were aware the time for decisions was at hand, but each 
realized the shortcomings of their positions in the face of the pending votes.  But vote 
they did. 
A. THE HIGH WATER MARK OF THE OPPOSITION: TURPIE-FORAKER 
Near the end of the last day of the Senate debate, Senator John Tyler Morgan 
sought to offer some additional insight into how the resolution on which the Senate was 
about to vote had been crafted.  The former chairman and current minority leader of the 
Senate Foreign Relations Committee chose to liberally interpret the proscription against 
revealing on the floor what transpired behind committee doors by explaining only his part 
in the confidential proceedings.   
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Senator Morgan stated that the majority in the committee, including himself, had 
consistently supported a report and resolution in line with what would become known as 
the minority report.  At the time of the final vote, however, one unnamed senator made a 
motion to strike recognition from the final language.  Committee members previously 
inclined to support recognition—in spite of the president’s opinion as expressed in the 
War Message—reconsidered their position, and several aligned behind the motion to 
strike.  The motion carried, leaving a report written to support independence turned upon 
its head at the eleventh hour.   
While Senator Morgan declined to add his name to the minority report, his 
recounting of this last-ditch maneuver by the pro-administration cabal in the committee 
did help explain the discontinuity between the body of the report and its proposed 
resolution.251  One last senator then rose to urge a vote for the minority report language 
in the hope that recognition would obviate the need for American military intervention 
before the debates of the previous week gave way to a series of votes.252   
By rule, the first vote was on an amendment to the joint resolution based upon the 
minority report and named after its co-sponsors, Senators Turpie and Foraker.  By virtue 
of this amendment, if approved, the Senate would openly challenge the executive with 
respect to the conduct of foreign policy.  Senator Turpie offered the amendment, authored 
by Senator Foraker, to append the minority report’s language to the end of the first 
resolution.  To the original clause “the people of Cuba are, and of right ought to be, free 
and independent” Turpie-Foraker added the phrase “and that the government of the 
United States hereby recognizes the Republic of Cuba as the true and lawful government 
of that island.”253 
                                                 
251 31 Cong. Rec. 3986 (16 April 1898). 
252 Senator Kinney declared: “I shall vote for the resolution that has been offered from the minority of 
the committee…to prevent bloodshed of American citizens, and I believe if the resolution is 
adopted…there will be an army of insurgents able to make the fight for the complete liberty of the Cuban 
government without the aid or the sacrifice of a soldier of this country.” 31 Cong. Rec. 3987 (16 April 
1898). 
253 31 Cong. Rec. 3988 (16 April 1898). 
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The final tally of votes revealed how tenuous was the Republican claim to a 
controlling plurality in the Senate.  Eleven of the 44 Republican senators defected, while 
only five Democrats joined the anti-recognition side.  More damaging to the Republican 
cause, the 51 senators who voted to add the minority report’s language to the draft joint 
resolution included all the representatives of every minority party: five Silver 
Republicans, five Populists, and both Silverites.  Needing only one vote to turn their 
plurality into a majority, the Republicans failed to gain any of the minor party votes and 
also lost six in the exchange with the Democrats.   
The 11 Republicans who voted in favor of the amendment included both senators 
from New Hampshire, and also both from Pennsylvania, constituting clean sweeps in 
those Mid-Atlantic and New England state delegations.  Joining Senator Foraker from 
Ohio were fellow Midwestern senators from Kansas, Nebraska, Illinois, and Minnesota; 
defectors from the West came from California and Washington.254  When added to the 11 
minor party votes from the Midwest and West, it is fair to say that the Republican Party 
proved unable to enforce discipline in not only their Northern and Old Northwestern 
bastions, but also in the contested and fractured New West.   
The Democrats who joined the Republican side in the vote against the amendment 
came from essentially two camps.  Three of the five came from border-states of the old 
Confederacy, which generally exhibited less monolithic partisanship than states situated 
further north or south.255  The remaining two defectors came from the solidly Democratic 
Deep South.  Their votes were primarily to express their own deep segregationist 
convictions against rendering support to a non-white independent government.256   
                                                 
254 Ibid. 
255 Two of the three states, West Virginia and Maryland sent split delegations—one Republican and 
one Democratic—to the Senate, indicating either transitory or contested state assemblies. The other, 
Delaware, took a cyclic approach: Democratic Senator Kenney’s predecessor and successor were both 
Republicans, as was Democratic Senator Gray’s successor. “Gray, George (1840–1925),” Biographical 
Directory of the Unites States Congress, 
http://bioguide.congress.gov/scripts/biodisplay.pl?index=G000396; “Kenney, Richard Rolland (1856–
1931),” Biographical Directory of the Unites States Congress, 
http://bioguide.congress.gov/scripts/biodisplay.pl?index=K000121.  
256 The votes were cast by Senators Morgan of Alabama and Caffrey of Louisiana.  Senator Caffery 
also supported the administration position that only the executive can recognize sovereign nations, detailed 
in the previous chapter. 
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It seemed, therefore, that by a count of 51 to 37, the Senate had shown itself to be 
overwhelmingly in favor of recognizing Cuban independence.257  That this did not come 
to pass was due to the intricacies of Senate committee rules. 
Then as now, the passage of a Joint Resolution of Congress required that both 
houses agree to identical wording.  This was generally accomplished by exchanging 
amendments between houses; the sponsors in each house would then work to cajole 
adoption of conforming language.  It was only in the cases of the greatest intransigence 
that the process was forced to employ the formal mechanism of a committee of 
conference.258  The passage of Turpie-Foraker represented just such intransigence on the 
part of the Senate. 
Through this conference mechanism, the Senate would select a few delegates, 
called managers, who would meet with counterparts from the House to find common 
ground and draft language acceptable to both delegations.  When the managers all found 
agreement, or determined no agreement was possible, they would report back to their 
respective chambers.  If the committee of conference had crafted compromise language, 
the proposal would be put before the Senate and the House independently for discussion 
and adoption.  If the conference committee found no grounds for compromise, they 
would report the deadlock and seek further instructions.  
Of paramount importance was that the managers faithfully represented the views 
expressed in their own house’s version of the joint resolutions, as they were the sole 
proponents of that cause.  In the case of the joint resolution on intervention in Cuba, 
however, it was unclear exactly which faction of the split Senate the delegation would be 
expected to represent.  The choice of managers was therefore critical, since they would 
frame the coordination process in the committee of conference.  
                                                 
257 Often, votes in the Senate—especially over contentious issues—resulted in a sizeable percentage 
of “not voting” responses. In this particular vote, every senator went on record supporting one position or 
the other. Regarding Senator Walthall, see “Walthall, Edward Cary (1831–1898),” Biographical Directory 
of the Unites States Congress, http://bioguide.congress.gov/scripts/biodisplay.pl?index=W000111.  
258 “Legislative Process: How a Senate Bill Becomes a Law,” Congress, Senate, 
www.senate.gov/reference/resources/pdf/legprocessflowchart.pdf, 8. 
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Once the House called for a conference to resolve the competing resolutions—and 
named their three delegates—the contest then shifted to determining the composition of 
the Senate delegation.  Republican Senator Cushman Davis struck first.  By Senate rules, 
the delegates generally are senior senators from the committee to which the bill was 
referred, and the President of the Senate makes the formal appointments.259  Senator 
Davis, the pro-administration Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, 
instead moved that the presiding officer allow Davis himself, as Committee Chair, to 
select the Senate delegates.260   
This motion set off a firestorm of contention on the floor.  Although long-standing 
tradition had supported the practice of the committee chair suggesting delegates, it was 
quickly established that the Senate rules did not.  The rule merely affirmed the President 
of the Senate’s authority regarding standing committees.  The only other caveat in the 
rules that might have application was the statement “all other committees shall be 
appointed by ballot, unless otherwise ordered, and plurality of votes shall appoint.”261 
With the Senate Rules mute on the topic of selecting managers to a conference 
committee, several senators stood for the principle that the delegates reflect the will of 
the Senate as a whole, rather than the majority of the Foreign Relations Committee.  
Republican Senator Hoar found himself in agreement with members of the opposition, 
including the Populist Senator Allen from Nebraska, Silver Senator Stewart of Nevada, 
Silver Republican Senator Teller of Colorado, and Democratic Senator Pasco of Florida 
in asserting that in the absence of clear rules the Senate should decide for itself.  The 
difference, however, was the interpretation of the phrase “the Senate should decide for 
itself.”  Some were in favor of a general vote to choose managers, as only this method 
would reflect the will of the majority of senators.  Others supported a vote of the 
committee members as the deciding mechanism, on the grounds that the bill had been 
                                                 
259 “If the Senate does not accept the House’s position, one of the chambers may propose creation of a 
conference committee to negotiate and resolve matters in disagreement between the two …The presiding 
officer formally appoints the Senate’s conferees. Conferees are traditionally drawn from the committee of 
jurisdiction.” Ibid., 9. 
260 31 Cong. Rec. 4027 (18 April 1898). 
261 31 Cong. Rec. 4027 (18 April 1898) (statement of Senator Hoar). 
 106 
entrusted to the committee as subject matter experts and the committee should therefore 
be entrusted with the solution.262   
It was Senator Pasco who most precisely described the game.  Under majority 
rules, the will of the Foreign Relations Committee was at odds with the will of the 
Senate.  The last-minute vote to upend the meaning of the committee’s report, as revealed 
by Senator Morgan, heightened this contrast.  It foretold how the majority of the 
Committee on Foreign Relations would vote in conference to doom the minority report.  
Conversely, the recent vote by the majority in the Senate as a whole overwhelmingly 
supportted adding Turpie-Foraker language to the joint resolution.  To that end, Senator 
Pasco felt the honorable path was to follow the example set by the House: their delegates 
were in favor of the House version of the resolution, the Senate should also select 
delegates that have supported its own proposed language.  “The proposition of the Senate 
should be in the hands of its friends,” Pasco argued, “and not in the hands of its 
enemies.”263 
B. A GIANT STUMBLES, BUT WAS IT ACCIDENT OR PRATFALL? 
Ultimately, however, it was the namesake and author of the minority report that 
initiated its downfall.  Senator Foraker spoke on two occasions during this exchange, and 
both times undermined the consensus behind Turpie-Foraker.  His decision to do so 
reveals a breach in his own resolve and further illuminates the complex nature of both the 
fractured majority and the cobbled-together opposition. 
As a Republican luminary, Senator Foraker lent gravitas to the Democratic, 
Populist, Silverite, and Silver Republican campaign against the War Message.  His key 
position in the coalition opposing the president’s wishes helped to raise the tenor of the 
argument from mere partisan truculence to the appearance of a noble cause.  Dissent from 
a Democrat was to be expected, but defiance from a loyal Republican conceivably 
bespoke a principled stand.  As a perennial aspirant for higher office, however, his very 
                                                 
262 Ibid.; Senators Allen, Stewart, Teller, and Pasco 4027–9. 
263 “The majority of the (Senate Foreign Relations) committee have failed to sustain their proposition 
before the Senate, and they are not entitled to the majority of conferees.” 31 Cong. Rec. 4028 (18 April 
1898). 
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public split from the administration’s supporters was also a calculated move, a political 
gambit that included considerable risk.  
Adding to this complexity, the other players in this drama were far from idle.  The 
Cuban Junta was busy lobbying senators to support recognition while the president was 
pressuring senators to conform to his War Message language.264  With so many parties 
actively seeking to influence the process, the trick for Senator Foraker would be to avoid 
damage to future prospects by appearing high-minded and duty-bound to the nation in 
thwarting President McKinley’s plans, all without appearing self-serving and duplicitous. 
Senator Foraker’s first statement was a seemingly unprompted capitulation on the 
issue of delegate selection.  His comment came during a series of speeches by opposition 
senators in which the common sentiment was if the Chairman of the Foreign Relations 
Committee were allowed to select the managers, the resultant conference committee 
would be biased against the expressed sentiments of the Senate majority.  Senator 
Foraker interrupted to indicate that he was content leaving the selection of delegates to 
the committee chair.265  Coming shortly after Senator Stewart’s proposal that the Senate 
managers be explicitly instructed that recognition of the Cuban Republic was non-
negotiable, Foraker’s reversal stimulated the pro-administration senators, who began to 
shout for an immediate vote.266 
Careful examination of the transcripts reveals potential ulterior motivations for 
Senator Foraker’s announcement.  The most plausible was brought about by a subtle shift 
in the tactics of senators arguing in favor of letting the chairman select the managers.  In 
this late stage of deliberations, the senators who supported the majority report moved 
away from employing expressions of loyalty to the administration’s cause as reason to 
approve Senator Davis’s request.   Instead, they more frequently professed their faith in 
                                                 
264 John Offner, An Unwanted War, 188–91. 
265 “The Senator from Ohio [Mr. Foraker] was the only Republican advocate of that clause, and now it 
is gravely proposed in the Senate that a conference committee shall be appointed [without Foraker, but 
instead with] three senators every one of them whom is against the proposition for which the Senate has 
twice voted.” 31 Cong. Rec. 4030 (18 April 1898) (statement of Senator Chandler). 
266 Senator Stewart had stated: “I desire to move, before the conferees are appointed, that they be 
instructed…to consent to no report that does not recognize the republican government of Cuba.” 31 Cong. 
Rec. 4030 (18 April 1898).  
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the character of the fellow senators who would comprise the committee of conference, 
thereby implying that a vote against Senator Davis’s proposal would impugn the honor of 
the committee members.  Knowing the support of senior Republican Party leaders would 
be crucial to his career aspirations, the prospect of alienating them in this manner sorely 
tested Senator Foraker’s resolve.    
Democratic Senator White of California argued that senior committee members 
from each party—naming the venerable Senators Frye and Morgan—would serve as 
managers, and their collective decades of service on the Foreign Relations Committee 
warranted the trust of the senators assembled.  He added that should the committee of 
conference produce a compromise unacceptable to the will of the Senate, the conference 
report could simply be rejected.267  Republican Senator Thurston of Nebraska then 
followed, stating that while he would prefer that at least one committee member was 
“prepared from his heart to argue the majority position of the Senate,” he had faith in the 
“best judgment and honor” of whichever senators the Chair selected.268  Thus 
constructed, the obstacle Foraker faced was no longer disloyalty to the president.  Any 
such allegation, after all, could be massaged during future campaigns to represent brand 
differentiation within the party.  A much more politically damaging implication could 
have resulted from an overt display of a lack of faith in the character of his fellow 
committee members. 
Privy as he was to the intricacies of the Foreign Relations Committee’s 
confidential proceedings, and thus cognizant of Senators Frye and Morgan’s positions on 
the minority report, Senator Foraker would have been well aware that what Senator 
White was offering amounted to capitulation.269  Knowing that the Chair would select 
managers antithetical to the opposition cause, Senator Foraker still chose to support that 
                                                 
267 Senator White stated: “If the heads of their respective parties on that committee cannot be trusted, 
it makes me think of how little after all is service or fame.” 31 Cong. Rec. 4030 (18 April 1898). 
268 Senator Thurston continued: “I propose for my part to trust the honor of a committee that will be 
practically selected by the chairman of the Committee of Foreign Relations.” Ibid. 
269 Senator Frye was transparently in favor of the administration policy, but Senator White’s 
suggestion that Democratic Senator Morgan would provide balance and support the opposition’s position 
was specious. As shown in the preceding chapters, the pro-segregation Senator Morgan was opposed to 
recognition of the Cuban Republic, and therefore a curious choice to hold up as defender of majority will 
favoring the minority report. 
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course.  At the same time, however, he offered himself as a candidate to be one of the 
selected managers, on the grounds that he was the only member of the Republican 
plurality to support the minority report in both committee and on the Senate floor.270   
The House had already named its three delegates to the committee of conference.  
Senator Foraker found himself in accord with Senator White’s assumption that, as chair, 
Senator Davis would likely conform to precedent and choose the senior committee 
member from each party to join him as Senate managers.  Facing the prospect of a 
committee composed of Senators Davis, Frye, and Morgan, Senator Foraker placed his 
hat in the ring to replace one of those three, all of whom he knew had voted two days 
prior against the minority report. 
This is not to say that Senator Foraker altruistically desired the appointment in 
order to continue fighting the good fight.  As a committee member and a skilled political 
operative, he would have known that the votes of the remaining two senators would 
trump any opposition he could mount during the reconciliation meetings.  The conference 
committee operates under majority rule.  Unanimity is not required, and the committee 
senator in the minority could do nothing to undermine support for the administration’s 
preferred language in the conference report.  To the contrary, appointment as the third 
manager would allow the Republican leader of the opposition to retain that unique 
moniker whilst simultaneously preserving his standing in the Republican party.  Senator 
Foraker, therefore, could successfully emerge from the deliberations as a hero even if the 
minority position failed.   
As if by script, Senator Frye rose as the very next speaker and immediately 
withdrew his name from consideration.  Stating his belief that recognition was the sole 
purview of the executive, he declared himself against the minority report and 
recommended his place be given to “some senator on the committee who holds views 
diametrically opposed to mine…if I were the Presiding Officer of the Senate, I would 
                                                 
270 As the only Republican on the committee to support recognition, “it is probably in the minds of 
some of the senators, in view of this fact, to take such action here as would place me on the conference 
committee. I want to say in answer to that suggestion, for it has been made to me, that I am perfectly 
satisfied to have the Chair appoint the conference committee…I very gratefully prefer the Chair should 
make the appointment.” 31 Cong. Rec. 4030 (18 April 1898). 
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appoint Senator Foraker as one of the conferees on that committee.”271  Thus, in a bizarre 
twist, a strong supporter of the administration’s policy ceded his seat on the conference 
committee to the very senator who appeared the personification of principled opposition.  
When he next spoke, the recipient of that largess signaled a willingness to soften his 
stance on a pivotal issue.   
Senator Foraker made his second statement that negatively impacted the 
opposition cause just prior to the vote that would determine how the committee of 
conference would be selected.  Intimating that a deal was in the works, he stated that if 
the delegates were simply appointed, the whole matter could come to a swift conclusion 
“that will be far more satisfactory to many of us than are the amendments of the House of 
Representatives.”272  What exactly that meant, and details of where that potential 
conclusion lay on a scale between the two positions currently supported in the Senate, 
Senator Foraker declined to say. 
Reading the transcripts over a century later, the inference that selection of the 
candidates was an inconsequential matter, coming as it did (twice) from the leader of the 
opposition, seems odd.  Further, the tidy sequence of Senator Foraker’s bid for 
appointment as a manager, Senator Frye’s endorsement of him for the slot, and then 
intimation of negotiations occurring outside the floor debate in the Senate, all give the 
reader pause.  After a long week of entrenchment around the addition or excision of the 
minority report language, the combination of events above seems an inauspicious prelude 
to the deciding votes. 
C. WHEN A MAJORITY IS IN THE MINORITY: THE VOTES OF 18-19 
APRIL 1898 
Further amplifying that sense of confusion, or at least shifting priorities, was a 
speech by Senator Teller suggesting that time was running out.  The Silver Republican 
leader had supported the minority report language throughout the past week, including 
the vote on Saturday evening, and would remain in that camp to the bitter end.  He spoke 
                                                 
271 Senator Frye finished: “I trust that the presiding officer of this body will do so and will not appoint 
me.” 31 Cong. Rec. 3986 (18 April 1898): 4030. 
272 31 Cong. Rec. 4030-31 (18 April 1898). 
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briefly, urging his colleagues to make the best deal they could and come to a vote swiftly.  
His reasoning was that he had received intelligence that the coalition that produced a 
majority in favor of Turpie-Foraker language was crumbling.273  Again, reading the 
transcripts all these years later, it is difficult to see how both Senator Foraker’s changed 
position on delegate selection and Senator Teller’s note of panic could have been 
construed as helpful to the opposition’s cause. 
Be that as it may, the Senate, after so much deliberation—and with full 
knowledge of the voting history of the three delegates in question—agreed to allow 
Senator Davis to pick the Senate managers.  As predicted, the Chairman chose himself, 
the newly optimistic Foraker, and Democratic Senator Morgan, who had not endorsed the 
minority report.274  The fate of the Turpie-Foraker language—added to the joint 
resolution by a 14-vote margin only the previous workday—was now in the hands of two 
senators who had voted against it and one who had signaled a willingness to bargain. 
After the committee came back that evening to report deadlock with the House, 
the delegates revealed their positions: Senator Morgan steadfast in support of recognition, 
Senator Davis equally firm against, and Senator Foraker frustrated that his gamble did not 
pay off.  Senator Foraker had attempted to abandon the Turpie-Foraker amendment in 
return for assurances that “and, are” would be restored.  His reasoning was that, in light 
of Senator Teller’s premonition of opposition collapse, this tacit recognition of the 
Republic of Cuba was as much ground as could be captured.  He deemed formal 
recognition to be out of reach. To that end, Senators Foraker and Davis conspired to 
agree—Senator Morgan objecting—with the House proposal to excise Turpie-Foraker in 
exchange for restoration of “and, are.”  He reported, however, that he had been 
misinformed of the House delegates’ willingness to compromise.275 
                                                 
273 Senator Teller opined: “Those who support the administration…are not willing to act longer with 
us. It is apparent that if the vote was taken now, we shall reverse the action of Saturday…I am told the 
Republicans who voted with us would not sustain us any longer.” 31 Cong. Rec. 4031 (18 April 1898). 
274 As the motion carried by a voice vote with no recorded tally, it can be safely assumed that at least 
seven senators who voted for the minority report on Saturday now voted against placing supporters of the 
minority report on the conference committee. 31 Cong. Rec. 4032 (18 April 1898). 
275 Senator Foraker added “In order that we might have harmony and unity of action…we agreed to 
abandon the Turpie amendment provided ‘are, and’ might be restored in the first proposition.” Ibid. 
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The cycle then repeated itself.  The House called for another conference.  The 
Senate agreed but quarreled over the appropriate process for selection of the delegates.  
The issue was put to a vote; selection-by-ballot lost again to selection-by-chair.  Senator 
Davis nominated himself, plus Senators Foraker and Morgan.   
While awaiting news from the House, Senator Morgan introduced a bill that 
declared war on Cuba, but lacked any explicit recognition of the Republic of Cuba.  
When challenged on that omission, he stated that unless recognition was surrendered, the 
House and Senate versions of the joint resolution could not be reconciled.276   The bill 
was tabled, and the committee of conference left to meet with their House counterparts.  
But this time, the calculus had changed.  Senator Foraker had announced his plan to trade 
the Turpie-Foraker Amendment for “are, and,” and Senator Morgan had announced his 
intention to settle. The result was foreordained. 
At quarter past one in the morning, the conferees reported back agreement with 
the House.  The House managers had relented on returning “are, and” to the resolution in 
exchange for excising Turpie-Foraker language.  With that revision, the sole point of 
disagreement was now between the two factions in the Senate, over approval of this 
newly reconciled joint resolution.  A vote “yea” would sustain the action of the conferees 
and kill the minority report language; a vote “nay” would at best result in another round 
of conference committee meetings, likely with the same managers on both sides.277   
The past week of debates—with topics ranging from the proper roles for the 
branches of the American government, responsibility for Spain’s debt, legitimacy of the 
Cuban Republic, constitutionality and international law precedents for intervention, 
presumptions of duty, and questions of congressional control of hostilities beyond 
declaration—had come down to this vote.  
                                                 
276 Senator Morgan explained: “unless you relinquish a certain political demand in your resolution…I 
am for the same proposition, but I do not refuse half a loaf because I can not get the full loaf.” 31 Cong. 
Rec. 4038 (18 April 1898). 
277 Senator Jones provided this succinct summation of the question as the last speaker before the vote, 
emphasizing the only issue remaining was recognition. 31 Cong. Rec. 4040 (18 April 1898). 
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In the small hours of the Washington night, 42 senators cast their ballot to accept 
the conference agreement, 35 remained in dissent, and 12 chose not to vote.278  Through 
skillful manipulation of Senate procedure, pro-administration forces had overcome a 
multifaceted opposition that enjoyed support in all five political parties, an opposition 
that had boasted a 14-vote majority only two days previous.  Presidential power was 












                                                 
278 Had the 12 voted, it would not have affected the outcome as they represented pairs—one “yea” and 
one “nay” abstaining to balance missing votes of absent senators. 
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VII. AN EXCHANGE OF TACTICS: EXPANSIONISM, ANTI-
IMPERIALISM, AND THE SENATE DEBATES ON THE TREATY 
OF PARIS 
There are at this time in the Senate and nation at large two self-defined 
and distinct views, one of a policy of expansion, involving a new 
definition of our Government and the inauguration of a colonial system, 
with all the perplexing problems incident to it.  The other view opposes 
imperialism, and is based upon the governmental policy of the last 
century, and in my judgment is the only position that is in harmony with 
the Constitution and the spirit and genius of republican institutions.279 
The treaty that concluded the Spanish-American War settled the question of 
whether or not the United States would engage in imperialism.  The answer was a 
qualified “yes,” and the details of the resultant empire could have hardly been predicted 
with any precision.  A war largely justified as a noble effort to free Cubans from Spanish 
oppression did indeed result in limited freedom for that island.  It also made nearly 8 
million Filipinos wards of the United States Government.280  
The terms of the agreement placed the peoples of Puerto Rico and Guam in the 
state of arrested territorial development that endures to this day.  Unlike the grudging but 
uneventful acceptance found on those two islands, the prospect of continued colonial 
status piqued Filipino ire.  This anger eventually erupted into a bitter conflict that lasted 
much longer than the war the Treaty of Paris concluded. 
The process of ratifying the treaty highlighted notable changes within the Senate.  
The pre-war debates had been characterized by a fractured plurality on one side, facing 
oppositional forces subdivided into multi-faceted topical coalitions on the other.  In these 
post-war debates, conversely, anti-ratification senators attempted to concentrate those 
topical coalitions into a single movement, while pro-ratification forces adopted the tactic 
of division.  As a result of this tactics swap, these ratification debates repeated the pattern 
                                                 
279 32 Cong. Rec. 638 (13 January 1899) (statement of Senator McLaurin). 
280 Porto Rico at the time had nearly 800,000 inhabitants and Guam recorded no formal census. 




of the earlier debates on intervention: leveraging Senate rules and traditions in a parry-
and-thrust around competing resolutions, all leading to nail-biting votes that decided the 
matter between the nearly balanced annexationist and anti-annexationists camps. 
Similarly, if positions taken the previous spring on intervention were heavily 
influenced by domestic political considerations, the stances regarding ratification were 
animated by results from intervening mid-term elections, and anticipated challenges of 
the upcoming presidential elections.  Compared to ineffectual Republican attempts of 
April 1898 to control events in the Senate through party solidarity, the outcome of the 
ratification debate in January and February 1899 would largely be decided by Democratic 
Party solidarity focused on retaking the White House. 
This chapter will consider both the substance and outcomes of the ratification 
debate, and also the tactics swap that helped shape it.  The precursors to the contest—the 
peace protocol that suspended the war, the president’s instructions to his negotiators, the 
bargaining and stalling in Paris, and the eventual submission of the treaty to the Senate—
informed pro- and anti-ratification positions in the Senate, manifested through a series of 
resolutions and amendments proposed in open session.281   
The pro-ratification side that encouraged division of the larger issue into its 
component parts succeeded in their gambit, while the opposition that sought to corral its 
fractured membership into a cohesive bloc failed.  This led to defeat, by one vote, of an 
anti-annexationist amendment that would have prescribed limited sovereignty for Puerto 
Rico, Guam, and the Philippines similar to what the Teller Amendment had conferred on 
Cuba.   It was followed immediately by a second vote in which pro-annexation senators 
forced through an emasculated resolution that could apply no such restraint.  This 
matched set of victories enabled unfettered expansionist ambitions to set the course for 
American empire. 
                                                 
281 These open sessions occurred simultaneous to the closed proceedings of executive session and 
committee deliberations, which are not included in the Congressional Record transcripts. “Closed sessions 
of the Senate are used for deliberations during impeachment trials, as well as to discuss issues of national 
security, confidential information, and sensitive communications from the President.” Closed deliberations 
over nominations and treaties are called executive business because they are received by the Senate from 
the president, rather than introduced by senators. Senate Glossary, 
http://www.senate.gov/reference/glossary_term/closed_sessions.htm.  
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A. INTERREGNUM: TRANSFERRING ISLAND COLONIES FROM SPAIN 
TO THE UNITED STATES 
The Spanish-American War was a brief affair.  In the first major engagement, 
Commodore George Dewey defeated the Spanish fleet at Manila Bay on 1 May 1898.  
Guam was seized without struggle on 20 June.  Spanish forces in Cuba capitulated on 19 
July, only five weeks after the first American forces landed.  The Spanish on Puerto Rico 
followed suit a week later, and the Spanish government signed the armistice on 12 
August.  Unaware of the armistice, the Spanish garrison besieged in Manila surrendered 
the following day.  
The process of diplomatic settlement lasted almost exactly as long as the process 
of military conquest.  Secretary of State William R. Day, who had authored the peace 
protocol, resigned his post and was appointed to lead the delegation to negotiate a treaty 
with Spain.  While the Senate was not involved in the crafting of the armistice terms, 
three members of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee were appointed to join Day on 
the five-man peace committee.282  The senators selected represented varied positions 
within the Senate regarding expansion, and Secretary Day represented the centrist 
opinion in that he realized best the limitations of the potential agreement.  To accompany 
him, the president selected the chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee 
Senator Davis, and Senator Frye.  Both were increasingly expansionist, but paled in 
comparison to former diplomat and newspaper publisher Whitelaw Read in this regard.  
Finally, the lone Democratic Senator was Senator Gray, an “avowed foe of colonies.”  
This choice by President McKinley placed the three senators in the unusual position of 
eventually ratifying their own work.283 
Hostilities had rendered an unambiguous end state for the Spanish military.  
Destruction of her decrepit fleet in both theaters left no possibility to reinforce or 
resupply Spain’s isolated military posts; continued resistance and an offensive to reverse 
                                                 
282 The United States answered Spain’s overtures for peace, in the words of Richard Leopold, “with 
terms formulated solely by the executive.” Leopold, The Growth of American Foreign Policy, 183. 
283 Ibid., 187. Walter LaFeber is more succinct: “Senators Davis and Frye were imperialists; Senator 
Gray was an avowed anti-expansionist.” LaFeber, The New Empire, 158. 
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the American victories were equally illusory options.  For the other parties involved on 
the Spanish side, however, the war’s result was not nearly so clear.   
To the Cortes, for example, the military setbacks were a matter to be resolved by 
bargaining.  While Spain’s economic and military situation made continued warfare 
untenable, the stakes of the coming negotiations were hardly existential.  Cuba was 
certainly lost, and the Spanish aspirations for the Treaty of Paris were soon narrowed to 
two major items: evading the crushing debt incurred during the war and the fate of the 
Philippine Islands.284  Spain’s bargaining position was weak, but her goals were limited. 
For the peoples of Spain’s colonies the future was mixed.  The Chamorro in 
Guam, a small island tribe of 10 thousand or so, were unengaged in the business of 
sovereignty exchange.  The Puerto Rican response to the American defeat of Spanish 
forces on that island could be characterized as grudging acceptance.  In Cuba and the 
Philippine Islands, however, the fact negotiations were strictly between Spain and the 
United States caused much displeasure.  The Filipinos and Cubans had been actively 
resisting Spanish rule, but were sidelined both in battle and the subsequent surrender 
proceedings on their home islands.  They were both locked out of the treaty conference in 
Paris as well, where the details of the liberation they had struggled to secure would be 
determined.  
The significant difference between the two, however, was the limitations the 
United States Senate had placed upon American conduct toward one but not the other.  
The Teller Amendment had codified the American policy toward Cuba as favoring a 
rapid transition to independence.  The Filipinos had similar expectations, but nothing in 
writing to support them.  This crucial difference would soon become the crux of the 
Senate debates on ratification.  During the treaty negotiations, this important distinction 
                                                 
284 John Offner, “Treaty of Paris (1898),” in Beede, The War of 1898, 546. 
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was limited to two words: Spain was to relinquish Cuba, but cede the Philippine Islands, 
Puerto Rico, and Guam.285 
For the Americans, inclusion of the other Spanish colonies complicated the 
negotiations to end a war waged to liberate Cuba.  Since Cuba was protected by the 
Teller Amendment, keeping Puerto Rico as a base from which to protect the approaches 
to a future isthmian canal appealed to many strategic thinkers.  In the Pacific, opening a 
new theater to prevent Spanish naval concentration in support of Cuba was sound 
wartime strategy, but the resultant territorial accretion of thousands of Pacific islands 
muddied American expectations for the ensuing peace settlement.    
Acquisition of sparsely populated Guam and uninhabited Wake Island as coaling 
and cable stations in the Pacific seemed sound, a natural extension of the annexation of 
Hawaii completed a few months before.  The Philippine Islands were a different kettle of 
fish.  They were much larger and more populous than Hawaii and farther away even than 
Guam.  In addition, they were close enough to the other side of the Pacific to induce 
entanglement with European imperial interests in Asia.286  They also differed from the 
occupations in Cuba and Puerto Rico in that the American forces held only a toehold of 
one corner of one island.  The United States did not actually control the archipelago, and 
there was reason to doubt its ability to hold the islands against concerted pressure if 
seriously challenged.287 
                                                 
285 Article I: “Spain relinquishes all claim of sovereignty over and title to Cuba…to be occupied by 
the United States….” Article II: “Spain cedes to the United States the island of Porto Rico…and the island 
of Guam.” Article III: “Spain cedes to the United States the archipelago known as the Philippine Islands.” 
“Treaty of Peace between the United States and Spain,” 10 December 1898, 
http://avalon.law.yale.edu/19th_century/sp1898.asp.  
286 Regarding the likelihood that proximity of imperial America in the Philippine Islands to the 
European affairs in turbulent China would lead to choosing sides between rivals, Senator Daniel offered 
“the first rumor of war that startles our business men and that wakes America to anxiety will throw us into 
the arms of an alliance.” 32 Cong. Rec. 1431 (3 February 1898). 
287 Senator Clay summed up concerns of holding the archipelago thus: “The United States has 
heretofore been solid, compact, contiguous, and impregnable. Remaining in this condition, the naval forces 
of the world dare not attack us. When we go out into the seas beyond the Western Hemisphere and acquire 
other countries, we increase our responsibilities, weaken our defenses, and enormously increase the 
expenses of our Army and Navy.” 32 Cong. Rec. 965 (24 January 1899). For a detailed discussion of the 
development of war plans for retaining the Philippines, see Grenville and Young, Politics, Strategy, and 
American Diplomacy, 270–282. 
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The American bargaining in Paris was unusual.  While the Spanish gradually 
ceded more as the negotiations proceeded, the American delegation’s demands grew 
beyond what was limned in the August peace protocol.  Eventually its terms would 
significantly exceed those forecast in the Senate debates that initiated the war.  As a 
result, the body that would ratify the treaty would first have to accept the greatly 
increased spoils, with all their attendant responsibilities and consequences.   
The delegates received instructions from President McKinley on 16 September.  
He told his negotiators to demand all the armistice agreement cessions regarding Cuban 
and Puerto Rico.  He also directed them to stipulate Guam as the cession in the Marianas, 
to secure free American trade throughout the Philippine Islands and to obtain territorial 
cession of Luzon Island, the last being a major expansion of the armistice terms.  While 
the Senate was not asked for its advice, the president’s cabinet approved of these 
expanded terms.288 
Treaty negotiations went poorly for the Spanish from the start.  Throughout 
October, the delegation from Madrid pressed a futile attempt to shift responsibility for 
Spanish debt to either Cuba or the United States.  Desiring to delay discussion of the 
other main Spanish topic for discussion—the future of the Philippine Islands—until after 
the November elections, the American negotiators were only too pleased to prolong this 
discussion.  
Once the 1898 elections were past, however, President McKinley decided to raise 
the stakes—again without consulting the Senate—and demanded cession of all the 
Philippine Islands.  He had his instructions cabled to Paris and included a 20 million 
dollar indemnity for Spain, as compensation for peaceful infrastructure improvements, to 
ease swallowing of this bitter pill.289  The Spanish signed the treaty on 10 December, and 
it was submitted to the United States Senate for ratification on 4 January 1899.  
Throughout this period, however, relations between American and Filipino forces on 
                                                 
288 Leopold, The Growth of American Foreign Policy, 186. 
289 For expanded discussion of President McKinley’s changed negotiating demands, see Offner, 
“Treaty of Paris,” in Beede, The War of 1898, 546–47; Offner, “William McKinley and the Spanish-
American War,” Ibid., 289; and Miller, Benevolent Assimilation, 20–24. 
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Luzon continued to worsen as the latter became more agitated by the prospect of 
independence delayed or negated. 
In the final settlement, Spain only gained 10 years of trading rights in the 
Philippines, guaranteed religious freedom for island inhabitants, and the aforementioned 
indemnity.  In contrast, the American delegation secured the desired territories, forced 
Spain’s retention of all her debt, avoided extraterritoriality for Spanish nationals 
remaining in the islands, and made voluntary any transference of encumbrances to a 
future Cuban government.  Of little import to the Spanish negotiators, but most pertinent 
to the coming debates, the treaty also stipulated “the civil rights and political status of the 
native inhabitants of the territories hereby ceded to the United States shall be determined 
by Congress.”290 
B. THE TREATY ARRIVES AT THE SENATE 
Senator Alexander Clay of Georgia captured the challenge facing the Senate: 
What shall we do with the Philippine Islands?  They have been left upon 
our hands as a result of the war.  We did not need them, we did not want 
them, but we are forced to deal with them anyway.  However we may 
desire to extricate ourselves from this responsibility, we cannot escape 
it.291 
The general terms of the Treaty of Paris were widely reported in newspapers, 
giving senators waiting in Washington D.C. ample time to contemplate positions on the 
matter in advance.  Upon receipt it was referred to the Senate Foreign Relations 
Committee, where it was debated in closed session.  The treaty was reported out to the 
Senate, but that report and subsequent debates in the Senate as a committee of the whole 
were conducted in executive session, also behind closed doors.  Fortunately for modern 
scholars, the debate was brought into the public record by a series of resolutions and 
proposed amendments in open session during January and early February 1899.   
The debate on ratification of the Treaty of Paris was not much concerned with 
exacting an appropriate and satisfactory settlement from Spain.  The status of the former 
                                                 
290 Article IX. “Treaty of Peace”.  
291 32 Cong. Rec. 965 (24 January 1899). 
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Spanish colonies was more catalyst for discourse than subject.  From the beginning, the 
debate on the treaty went well beyond the details of its terms to consider its larger 
meaning for the future of the United States: would it remain a republic or would it 
become an empire? 
The six sub-topics featured in the debate on McKinley’s War Message reappeared 
in the ratification debate, in slightly altered form.  Risk of assuming Spanish debt was 
eliminated during the treaty negotiations, replaced by discussion of the indemnity agreed 
to in Paris.  The other sub-topics of entitlement, duty, law, roles, and limits are readily 
recognizable in the transcripts of January and February 1899.  What had changed, 
however, was the reason they were employed. 
During the debates on Cuba, the opposition cleverly broke the larger question into 
parts, in the hope that principled stands on individual issues would influence the overall 
outcome.  In the debates over the Philippines, however, the anti-annexation forces sought 
to meld all the sub-topics together and force a single, decisive vote.  The pro-ratification 
forces, conversely, set out to divorce the question of ratification from the determination 
of sovereignty concerning Spain’s former colonies.   
Simply stated, anti-expansionists wanted the future of the Philippines decided 
before they would agree to the treaty, and the pro-expansionists wanted the treaty ratified 
without binding language regarding the new territories.  The reasoning of the latter was 
that, in both Cuba and the Philippines, America would restore peace and support self-
government until Spain’s former colonies were able to stand alone.  Then the United 
States would leave, on terms whose details could not be realistically anticipated so far in 
advance.  Expansionist senators felt confident that the United States would act honorably 
of its own volition, while the opposition felt that, absent the restraining force of law, 
American conduct might evolve in ways that would not support larger U.S. interests, and 
might even bring discredit.292   
                                                 
292 Senator Lodge stated: “It commits us to no policy, to no course of action whatever in regard to the 
Philippines. When that treaty is ratified, we will have full power and will be absolutely free to do with 
those islands as we please; and the opposition to its ratification may be summed up in a single sentence, 
that the American people and the American Congress are not to be trusted with that power.” 32 Cong. Rec. 
959 (24 January 1899). 
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Pro-ratification senators also believed the risk in reopening negotiations with 
Spain, should this treaty fail, outweighed the measure of safety the opposition sought.293  
In contrast, anti-annexationists could see no harm in specifying in advance what the 
colonial policy of the United States would be.  Several of their proposals were unilateral 
in nature, and thus would not force renegotiation.  This disagreement was brought to a 
head by the introduction of seven resolutions that engendered wide-ranging debate in the 
Senate.  It is in the speeches that sought to ensure or derail these resolutions that the true 
import of the ratification debates is found. 
These debates asked probing questions about the United States itself.  Does the 
Constitution mandate that territories must become states?  Does the Constitution extend 
to territories automatically upon formation, or only by Congressional act?  Does the 
principle of equal taxation among states extend to territories, and if so, doesn’t equal 
application of all law so extend?  Does citizenship predate statehood?  How can there be 
one territorial standard set for Cuba, but another for the other former Spanish colonies?  
The answers posited by both sides informed not only the upcoming votes on ratification, 
but future positions on congressional rule of the American colonies. 
These seven resolutions also continued the trend of cross-party action that had 
been prominent in the debates about intervention.  Within both parties were senators who 
were pro-treaty but anti-annexation.  It is here, in the speeches of these senators operating 
outside party orthodoxy, that the sub-topics of duty, entitlement, law, roles, and limits are 
most evident.  Their reasons for wishing the treaty finalized and the status of the islands 
clarified varied tremendously, but they formed a large enough group to become pivotal in 
both the debates and the subsequent votes.  It was from this group that the seven 
resolutions sprung, and it was to influence this group that the anti- and pro-annexation 
forces swapped tactics.   
Much of the literature on the ratification debates abbreviates the story along these 
lines: neither pro- or anti-ratification forces were sure of having enough votes until the 
                                                 
293 Senator Lodge feared making significant changes to the treaty might trigger renegotiation, during 
which the president would be forced to tell Spain “I am here in obedience to the mandate of a minority of 
one-third of the Senate to tell you that we have been too victorious, and that you have yielded too much, 
and that I am very sorry we took the Philippines from you.” Ibid. 
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last minute, when a deal was struck.  The putative Democratic challenger for the 
presidency in 1900, William Jennings Bryan effectively split the resistance, convincing 
his sub-group of loyalists to adopt pro-ratification position, agreeing to ratify the peace 
treaty first, and then discuss what to do with the Philippines.  Bryan’s group provided the 
narrow margin for the required two-thirds majority.  The treaty ratification passed 57 to 
27, but the vote on independence that followed immediately after resulted in a tie, then 
defeat, when the Vice President cast his vote with the annexationist bloc.294   
This summary is complete in the essentials, but leaves important questions 
unanswered.  It omits the subtleties of how—through delay, division, and deal-making—
the pro-ratification side convinced anti-annexation senators that treaty ratification would 
further their cause.  It obscures the fact that clever employment of Senate rules doomed 
two resolutions much more favorable to the anti-annexationists’ cause.  As the only 
surviving resolution was repugnant to many pro-resolution senators, the pro-ratification 
bloc was thereby placed in the enviable position of watching its opponents fight among 
themselves to defeat the only bill left in the way of annexation.  Finally, an abbreviated 
recounting also misses an anti-annexation senator’s unexplained absence at the critical 
moment, which made all the difference.  On that one senator’s vote, extension to the 
Philippines of the protections the Teller Amendment stated for Cuba hung.   
C. SEVEN RESOLUTIONS THAT FRAMED THE DISCOURSE ON 
RATIFICATION 
Much as the arrival of McKinley’s War Message sparked the introduction of a 
series of resolutions in 1898, the signed treaty shook loose proposed amendments and 
resolutions.  In short order, there were seven on the table for consideration.  The 
                                                 
294 Walter LaFeber covers Bryan’s role affecting the ratification vote, but conflates two votes on the 
resolutions, reading the subsequent passage of the McEnery resolution as “throwing a sop to the 
opposition.” The following pages will show it was anything but. LaFeber, American Foreign Relations, 
163–4. John Offner correctly reads the passage of McEnery as a defeat for the anti-expansionists, but 
mentions only one other resolution and nothing on the tie. Offner, “Treaty of Paris,” in Beede, War of 1898, 
547. Richard Leopold covers three of the resolutions, but misses the relationship between the Bacon and 
McEnery resolutions that prevented more formidable resolutions from achieving a vote in the Senate. 
Leopold, American Foreign Policy, 191. This relationship, which will be detailed shortly, completely 
deflated the meaning of the resolutions championed by the anti-annexationists, and represented a defeat for 
their cause.  
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resolutions reflected the constitutional and precedential topics debated and served to 
identify the clauses upon which American imperialism would teeter.  
The resolutions are presented here in order of declining anti-annexationist fervor. 
This trend of ebbing vehemence is nearly chronological as well.  As the pre-arranged date 
for the deciding vote drew near, senators on both sides moderated tone in an effort to 
sway their undecided peers.  This was a natural enough process, but one that hurt the anti-
annexationists, who were more inclined to infighting and mutual recriminations than their 
opponents.  Introduction of a spread of resolutions with language from hardline to 
compromise proved doubly damaging.  The single resolution that actually made it to a 
vote displaced from consideration more relevant resolutions.  That the anti-annexationists 
were unable to modify the language of the remaining resolution to suit their cause was 
the greater defeat. 
Senators were already crafting positions and preparing arguments before the 
treaty arrived in their chamber.  On 6 December, four days before the delegations would 
sign the treaty, Senator Vest introduced a joint resolution anticipating the crux of the 
disagreement the settlement would engender: the disparity between the treaty’s 
relinquishment of Cuba but cession of the Philippines.  This short resolution stated the 
Constitution granted no power for the “federal government to acquire territory to be held 
and governed permanently as colonies.”295  This opening clause sought to extend the 
Teller Amendment’s promises for Cuba to the Philippine Islands, forestalling piecemeal 
wrangling by preemptively declaring the American occupation temporary.  The 
remaining clause went further, stipulating that other than small acquisitions such as 
coaling stations, all retained territory must become states.296   
Senator Vest’s resolution required that all overseas territory fall into one of two 
categories: either small holdings of an administrative nature or incipient states.  In neither 
case were new classifications or rules required for the residents of the territories, since 
                                                 
295 32 Cong. Rec. 20 (06 December 1898). 
296 “The colonial system of European nations can not be established under our present Constitution, 
but all territory…must be acquired and governed with the purpose of ultimately organizing such territory 
into states suitable for admission into the Union.” Ibid. 
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the existing historical record provided ample guidance in both cases.  Thus, the Guano 
Islands Act would serve as precedent for Wake Island, and the Northwest Territory Act 
and westward expansion would apply to the rest.   
Senator Vest did not seek to amend or alter the pending treaty.  This distinction 
was important to senators unwilling to delay peace by reopening negotiations.  Vest’s 
resolution merely sought to structure American governance of both the Spanish 
relinquishments and cessions after ratification.  His bill was well crafted to appeal to the 
target group in the Senate in favor of a definite end of the war but opposed to annexation.  
It proved to be the clearest enunciation of the anti-expansionist position, and also the best 
hope for their cause.   
The pro-ratification senators contested the bill only obliquely, unwilling to 
counter its assertions by openly advocating permanent imperial holdings.  Several long 
speeches made partial arguments, such as chronicling past American expansion to show 
that as a nation, the United States had a right to take and hold territory.  The gambit was 
to link the history of annexation—Louisiana Purchase, Florida, Texas, Oregon—to the 
current case without addressing the obvious difference of intent, that all those 
acquisitions had become states.297  In short, the pro-ratification senators seemed willing 
to either delay a vote on the bill or confuse the issue with tangential precedents, but not to 
debate the actual concept it challenged.  
The Vest resolution asked whether the Constitution allowed Congress to 
permanently retain territories.  The next resolution, submitted by Senator Mason on 7 
January, challenged that it permitted Congress to rule there and declared that the United 
States would not rule any people without their consent.298  The aim of Senator Mason’s 
                                                 
297 Senator Rawlins stated: “All my life has been spent in a Territory. For twenty-five years I have 
practiced law there, and never before did I hear it seriously contended that the safeguards of the 
Constitution were not a vital and living force anywhere in the Territories.” 32 Cong. Rec. 1345 (1 February 
1899). Senator Platt pointed out: “We have kept New Mexico out of the Union...the treaty of Guadalupe-
Hildalgo provided that the inhabitants should be ‘incorporated into the Union.’ That is fifty-one years 
ago…Congress has always been understood to exercise the right of determining when it is proper to admit a 
territory as a state.” 32 Cong. Rec. 296 (19 December 1898). 
298 ‘Be it resolved by the Senate…the United States will not govern the people of any other country in 
the world without the consent of the people themselves, or subject them by force to our domination against 
their will.” 32 Cong. Rec. 466 (7 January 1899). 
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resolution was to align the future status of the Philippines with that of Cuba, eliminating 
the distinction between cession and relinquishment.  He asked how one could rate 
independent self-government and the other not, a question less about the inhabitants of 
the islands than about the universality of American mores:  “Tell me why we adopt one 
plan for Cuba and another for the Philippines.  Do you say…‘we promised we would not 
steal Cuba, but did not promise not to steal the Philippines?’”299   
Senators again rejoined indirectly.  Instead of explaining how the people of the 
two former colonies could be treated differently, they offered that under the Constitution 
women and children were unrepresented, and thus gave no consent to their rule.300  In 
another attempt to deflect the force of Mason’s resolution, one speaker asked why the 
supporting arguments posed the dichotomy only between Cuba and the Philippines while 
remaining silent on Puerto Rico?301   
Four days later, Senator Bacon introduced a much longer, more complex joint 
resolution that also sought, as Senator Mason’s did, to extend the Teller Amendment to 
the Philippine Islands.  This resolution posited that as the United States did not wage “a 
war of conquest and for the acquisition of foreign territory,” the settlement for the war 
must be limited by the purposes stated in its initiating declaration.  American control of 
the Philippine Islands could not involve either permanent territorial status or citizenship 
for their inhabitants.  Like the Mason resolution, it also urged the saliency of the concept 
“consent of the governed,” and stated that people should “of a right be free and 
independent.”  The resolution closed by disclaiming any intent to “exercise sovereignty, 
                                                 
299 The remainder of Senator Mason’s quote bears citing as well: “Is there some place in the Pacific 
Ocean where we change the code of ethics and good morals as we change the calendar and the ship’s clock 
in crossing?” 32 Cong. Rec. 531 (10 January 1899). 
300 Senator Daniels stated: “Jefferson…did not mean all men were created equal in all respects” but 
“that they were equally entitled to liberty.” Regarding consent of the governed, “it is literally true that it 
means consent of the some of the governed, not all.”  32 Cong. Rec. 1425 (3 February 1899). Senator 
Spooner added: “‘government derives its just powers from the consent of the governed’ is like ‘all men are 
born equal’ philosophically true…but false in the practical life of the world…Never since the foundation of 
this government have we in the acquisition of territory paid the slightest attention to the ‘consent of the 
governed.’” 32 Cong. Rec. 1382 (2 February 1899). 
301 Ibid., 1383. 
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jurisdiction, or control over said islands” and promised to recognize the new government 
when established.302 
During a later speech explaining his resolution, Senator Bacon proposed that his 
text merely corrected a previous oversight.  The Senate had not considered the fate of 
colonies other than Cuba when debating the Teller Amendment, which passed 
unopposed.  Indeed, one senator suggested that had the stakes been known at the 
beginning, the declaration of war so popular the previous spring would not have 
passed.303  This resolution, therefore, would allow the Congress to rectify that omission 
in light of the terms in the final settlement.304 
On 14 January, Senator Hoar submitted and asked for adoption of a resolution 
stating support for Filipino independence.  The wording fell short of recognition, but did 
support the right of the people in the Philippine Islands to form their own government, 
and vowed that the United States would not stand in their way.305  Before any discussion 
could develop, Senator Davis objected without elaboration or grounds and the resolution 
was made to lie over.306 
On 3 February, Senator Lindsay introduced a joint resolution declaring that 
acquisition carried no obligation to admit a territory as a state.  Further, it declared 
admission of “other than North American territory” as states to be contrary to United 
States policy.  The third clause “accepts the cession of the Philippine Islands with the 
                                                 
302 Senator Bacon’s quotes this paragraph found in 32 Cong. Rec. 561 (11 January 1899). 
303 Senator Clay opined “if it had been declared that it was the purpose of the war was to conquer, 
acquire, and annex the Philippine Islands to the United States, I do not believe…the resolution declaring 
war against Spain would never have received a majority of the votes of the Senate.” 32 Cong. Rec. 963 (24 
January 1899). 
304 Senator Bacon stated: “What I desire…is we shall accord to the Philippine Islands exactly what we 
proposed in the beginning, when the matter was in doubt, we would accord to the Cubans. When the 
declaration of war was made the Philippine Islands were not within the contemplations of Congress. We 
were thinking only of the Cubans.” 32 Cong. Rec. 734 (18 January 1899). 
305 “That the people of the Philippine Islands of right ought to be free and independent…institute a 
new government for themselves…and that with these rights the people of the United States do not propose 
to interfere.” 32 Cong. Rec. 677 (14 January 1899). 
306 As soon as the resolution is read aloud, Mr. Hoar stated: “I should like to have the resolution 
adopted now.” The Presiding Officer: “Is there objection?” Mr. Davis: “I object.” The Presiding Officer: 
The Senator from Minnesota objects, and the resolution will lie over.” The transcript shows that the Senate 
immediately moved on to consider transportation legislation. Ibid. 
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hope that the people of those islands will demonstrate their capacity to establish and 
maintain a stable government…” at which time the United States would relinquish 
control.307  This resolution is unique in that it contested obligation to keep a territory, 
while the earlier resolutions disputed permission to keep a territory under the 
Constitution.  Similar to the preceding resolutions, it expressed no intention to hold the 
Philippines after the inhabitants demonstrated capacity for self-government. 
The next resolution treads lightly as well.  Instead of denying an obligation for 
territories to be made states, Senator Sullivan’s text simply denied that the disposition of 
the Philippine Islands would govern future policy regarding any territory.  It was intended 
to ensure that ratification would not commit the United States to colonial policy in 
general, rather than to determine American policy toward the Philippines, though it 
promised not to discourage formation of an independent Filipino government.308   
Senator Sullivan’s peers in the Senate did not share his views on the strengths of 
this resolution.  The fact that such a junior senator leapt so prominently into this long-
running and acrimonious debate was perhaps the resolution’s most noteworthy feature.309  
Given that its language was as non-threatening to the expansionists as it was unhelpful to 
the anti-expansionists, it is not surprising the resolution was hardly considered.310   
                                                 
307 Senator Lindsay introduced an earlier version on 1 February, recalled and replaced it with the final 
version two days later. The text of that version did not appear in its entirety in the Record until 6 February 
when all the pending resolutions were read and printed at the behest of Senator Clay. 32 Cong. Rec. 1484 
(6 February 1899). 
308 “Ratification of the pending treaty of peace with Spain shall in no wise determine the policy to be 
pursued by the United States in regard to the Philippines, nor shall it commit this government to a colonial 
policy; nor is it intended to embarrass the establishment of a stable, independent government.” 32 Cong. 
Rec. 1154 (27 January 1899). 
309 Senator Sullivan was the second most junior senator, having moved to the upper house just seven 
months prior to fill the vacancy left by the death of Senator Walthall. Prior to that, Sullivan was only 14 
months into his first and only term as a U.S. Representative. “Sullivan, William Van Amberg (1857–
1918),” Biographical Directory of the U.S. Congress, 
http://bioguide.congress.gov/scripts/biodisplay.pl?index=S001062.  
310 For but one example, during a summary of pending resolutions prior to the vote on treaty 
ratification, Southern Democratic Senator Clay stated, regarding the resolutions of Senators Hoar, Vest, 
Bacon, or Lindsay, “for each of these I shall cast my vote if given the opportunity [but] I will never cast my 
vote in favor of the Sullivan resolution, for in my opinion it is a mere shadow without any substance.” 32 
Cong. Rec. 1484 (6 February 1899). 
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Abetting the expansionist strategy of distraction and delay was the normal daily 
business of the Senate.  Republican senators periodically urged setting aside debate and 
voting on these resolutions, citing pressing business to be completed during the last 
month of this Congress.311  When the resolutions were discussed, a consistent 
bargaining—at times pleading—to bring one or all to debate and a vote ran throughout, 
stating it was unfair to prevent a vote on the resolutions before ratification.312  Senator 
Bacon motioned, instead of debate, to refer the resolutions to committee, and 
characterized the resolutions as “voluntary, uncalled-for, premature tying of the hands of 
this government, and a limitation upon its right and privilege to do the best thing.”313 
Senator McEnery proposed the seventh and last resolution, early on the day of the 
treaty ratification vote, requesting it come to a vote before the three o’clock executive 
session that afternoon.  In light of the constant pressure to force a vote since Senator Vest 
introduced his resolution exactly two months earlier, Senator McEnery’s late entry and 
quixotic request seemed an unlikely combination at the time.  Yet this was the only 
resolution of the seven to ever come to a vote.  It also dramatically undersold the anti-
annexationist cause. 
D. THE SEVENTH RESOLUTION EXPOSES A FATAL FLAW 
When it was introduced, only a few shrewd senators recognized the import of 
Senator McEnery’s resolution.  Ten months prior, multiple interpretations of key phrases 
had animated the Senate debates over the McKinley War Message.  Similarly, the 
disparity between what Democratic Senator McEnery’s resolution seemed to say, and 
what the words could be construed to mean, held unsuspected danger for one side of the 
                                                 
311 In addition to near daily deliberation on a prospective Nicaraguan Canal, a third of the time 
(exceeding three hours daily) was spent in executive session. Lists of promotions and appointments at the 
end of each day’s transcripts reveal the topics covered behind closed doors, and include names at times 
noteworthy. One case is brevet promotions for gallantry in battle. Among the list of hundreds of names are 
found Brevet Colonel Theodore Roosevelt and Brevet Major Allyn Capron (killed in action) of the First 
Volunteer Cavalry for gallantry in battle, La Guasima, Cuba, 24 June 1898. 32 Cong. Rec. 1250 (30 
January 1899). 
312 Senator Mason stated: “I want fair treatment…I do not ask that you to pass the resolution. Vote 
against it if you like, but give us the opportunity to vote upon the question whether that [imperialism] is or 
is not the intention of this body.” 32 Cong. Rec. 1154 (27 January 1899). 
313 32 Cong. Rec. 1242 (30 January 1899). 
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debate and great opportunity for the other.  Composed of a single sentence, it is worth 
repeating in its entirety here: 
Policy Regarding the Philippine Islands: resolved, that the ratification of 
the pending treaty of peace with Spain is not intended to incorporate the 
inhabitants of said islands into citizenship of the United States, nor is it 
intended to permanently annex said islands as an integral part of the 
territory of the United States; but it is the intention of the United States to 
establish on said islands a government suitable to the wants and conditions 
of the inhabitants of said islands, to prepare them for local self-
government, and in due time to make such disposition of said islands as 
will best promote the interests of the citizens of the United States and the 
inhabitants of said islands.314 
Much of the next seven days would be spent debating four troubling fragments of this 
single-sentence resolution: “incorporate…into citizenship,” “integral part of the 
territory,” “local self-government,” and “make such disposition of said islands.”   
The phrasing “to dispose of the islands with an eye predominantly toward the 
interests of the United States” elicited much negative reaction.  Unlike temporary 
sovereignty leading to independence, featured in Senator Bacon’s, Vest’s and Lodge’s 
texts, and in other, earlier resolutions regarding Cuban freedom, the concluding phrase of 
Senator McEnery’s resolution held no such lofty promise for the Philippines.  When 
coupled with the 20 million dollar indemnity to be paid Spain, this wording fostered 
speeches excoriating the buying and selling of a people.315   
Similarly, the troubling fragment in which “local” preceded “self-government” 
brought accusations of permanent imperialism, modeled on European examples of local 
governments created to ease the burden of colonial administration.316  Some objected to 
the implication that the Philippine Islands would become “non-integral” United States 
territory.  A goodly portion of the debate of the past month sought to establish that, other 
than coaling stations, territories were nothing other than states in the making.  The 
                                                 
314 32 Cong. Rec. 1479 (6 February 1899). 
315 32 Cong. Rec. 1837 (14 February 1899). 
316 Ibid. 
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concept of “non-integral” territory created a third category, an act many senators 
protested.317 
Particular concern fell on the resolution’s opening lines regarding citizenship.  
The presumption that the Senate could constitutionally deny citizenship to inhabitants of 
a non-integral territory, where they would enjoy only “local” government before the 
territory was sold to another great power, elicited howls of protest.318  The subtleties of 
all four phrases led one senator to label it “a most ingenious resolution.  It was evidently 
drawn by a master hand.  I will not suggest that it was intended as an annexation 
resolution in disguise, but it is so in practical effect.”319 
A pivotal exchange occurred when objection was raised to Senator McEnery’s 
proposal for a same-day vote.  The Vice President clarified that the proposal was a joint 
resolution and that the author requested unanimous consent for a vote prior to the treaty 
ratification.  At least one senator comprehended the unique distinction and opportunity.  
Stalwart Republican Senator Frye immediately repeated for the record: “and he asks 
unanimous consent that a vote may be taken on it to-day.”320  
That unsolicited comment might seem insignificant amongst the hurly-burly had it 
not come from a three-term senator and Foreign Relations Committee member.  Senator 
Frye had also served on the peace committee that negotiated the treaty—during which he 
was outspoken in his support for annexing all the Philippine Islands, preceding the 
president in that stance.321  His highlighting of Senator McEnery’s request for a vote by 
unanimous consent was duly noted in the record and would have outsize implications 
throughout the remainder of these debates. 
                                                 
317 For one example, Senator Lindsay argued: “The qualification ‘integral’…leaves the whole 
question in a state of uncertainty32 Cong. Rec. 1832 (14 February 1899). 
318 “As it stands it is a declaration under which the Filipinos can be held indefinitely as subjects, 
although not as citizens.” 32 Cong. Rec. 1835 (14 February 1899) (statement of Senator Bacon). 
319 Senator Bacon continued: “In my judgment, it is a Trojan horse and comes from the Greeks.” Ibid. 
320 32 Cong. Rec. 1479 (6 February 1899). 
321 Offner, “Treaty of Paris (1898),” in Beede, War of 1898, 546. 
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E. HOW SEVEN RESOLUTIONS BECAME ONE: WHEN THE LAST BEST 
HOPE IS REALLY NO HOPE AT ALL 
One reason the pro-ratification senators favored division and delay was that the 
Republican majorities in both houses would soon reflect the recent mid-term election 
gains.  When the new Congress was seated in March, Republicans would hold a 
supermajority in the House, and a clear majority in the Senate.322  Since the treaty 
stipulated ratification by 10 June 1899, there was little to be gained by haste.323 
Conversely, the anti-annexationist senators’ motivation for haste was intensified 
by an agreement made in executive session to bring the issue to a vote on 6 February.324  
By their calculations, success lay in avoiding division of the resolutions and treaty.  For 
these senators, the best approach was to portray their preferred sequence of events—
eliminate the difference in status between Cuba and the new territories before agreeing to 
accept ratify the treaty—as mere common sense.325  Failure to force votes on the 
resolutions before ratification would render their argument moot.  Clearly, time and 
inertia were on the side of the pro-ratification senators, who could prevail through 
inaction.    
To affect a postponement, any senator could object to discussion of a resolution at 
that time, causing the bill to carry over to subsequent days in the normal progression of 
the docket.  Time and again, resolutions regarding the status of the Philippines were 
                                                 
322 In fact, there would be twice as many Republicans as Democrats in the 56th Congress Senate. 
“Party Division in the Senate, 1789-Present,” 
http://www.senate.gov/pagelayout/history/one_item_and_teasers/partydiv.htm.  
323 “Ratifications shall be exchanged at Washington within six months of the date hereof, or earlier if 
possible.” Article XVII, “Treaty of Peace” http://avalon.law.yale.edu/19th_century/sp1898.asp. Indeed, 
opposition senators were aware of this fact, and even went so far as to credit more nefarious motives. 
Senator Money forecast that pro-ratification senators intended to stall until Congress was adjourned, 
enabling the president and his cabinet to institute a colonial government in the Philippines by fiat. 32 Cong. 
Rec. 1420 (3 February 1899). He was correct. 
324 Reference to this agreement is found in the transcripts of open session morning business: “During 
executive session the following agreement was made by unanimous consent, from which the injunction of 
secrecy was removed, and which ordered to be printed in the Record: ‘That the Senate agrees to vote on the 
treaty with Spain…on Monday 6 February…until that time the Senate shall go into executive session on 
each day at 2p.m.” 32 Cong. Rec. 1018 (25 January 1899). 
325 Senator Daniel stated: “Let us not deceive ourselves [or] the American people about this treaty. If 
we are going to take the Philippine Islands, and if a treaty is to be enacted, let us contemplate beforehand 
exactly what this means, and assume and honorably bear its inevitable consequences.” 32 Cong. Rec. 1428 
(3 February 1899). 
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delayed in this manner, thereby leading to increased usage of a waiver known as 
unanimous consent.326  This procedure was intended to streamline proceedings by 
allowing a rule to temporarily be set aside—in this case the rule that a resolution 
introduced but not yet acted on would await normal rotation in the docket before 
debate—so long as no senator objects to that expedient.   
A senator could request unanimous consent that his pending resolution be brought 
up for debate ahead of others in the queue.  A formal agreement may be made to specify 
the terms of the consent, but, in lieu of such an agreement, the process would proceed 
guided by long precedent that limited topics and amendments included.327  Barring 
objection to the request for unanimous consent, a senator would then announce his 
intention to speak on his selected topic after the morning business concluded on a 
specified day.   
It was soon clear that unanimous consent was the only effective method to bring a 
resolution to debate and vote, and the schedule began to fill quickly.  Several times in late 
January and early February, a senator who had announced his intention to bring a topic to 
the floor under unanimous consent later changed the date having discovered the requested 
slot already taken with a similar reservation.328  Republican senators took the floor to 
complain that the privilege of unanimous consent was being abused.329  While these 
discussions did nothing to further progress on the time-critical appropriation and 
confirmation legislation, they did abet the pro-ratification senators’ delaying tactic.  
                                                 
326 “A senator may request unanimous consent on the floor to set aside a specified rule of procedure so 
as to expedite proceedings. If no Senator objects, the Senate permits the action, but if any one senator 
objects, the request is rejected.” Senate Glossary of Terms, 
http://www.senate.gov/reference/glossary_term/unanimous_consent.htm.  
327 Unanimous consent agreements may “limit the time…for debate and specify who will control that 
time…permit only a list of specified amendments, or require amendments to be to the measure…or 
empower the majority leader to call up the measure at will.” Ibid., 
http://www.senate.gov/reference/glossary_term/unanimous_consent_agreement.htm.  
328 For but one example, see Senator Money, on finding his requested time to speak under unanimous 
consent was already scheduled: “I do not know what time is unoccupied. I supposed I had gone beyond the 
request of anyone.” A chorus of senators then shouted out possible open slots. 32 Cong. Rec. 1155 (27 
January 1899). 
329 32 Cong. Rec. 1782 (13 February 1899) (statement of Senator Platt). 
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Precious time was slipping away for the opposition, and the fatal flaw of reliance on 
unanimous consent was about to be revealed. 
Unable to advance the resolutions ahead of the treaty, the clock ran out on 6 
February and the motion raise ratification for a vote 14 February passed during executive 
session by the smallest possible margin.  Even the outbreak of hostilities between Filipino 
and American forces around Manila two days prior did not upset the schedule, though 
this development was reflected in the summation speeches offered by both sides.  The 
expansionists had won the first battle; their tactic of splitting ratification from 
determination of the future status of the American accessions had succeeded.  The only 
course remaining for the anti-annexationists was to emphasize the dichotomy between 
“cede” and “relinquish” in the treaty in order to pass after-the-fact legislation providing 
Teller Amendment protections to the new colonies.  
A deal made in that afternoon’s executive session would frustrate those plans.  In 
an appeal to senators who favored ratification but supported the anti-annexation 
resolutions, the expansionists had offered to allow vote on the McEnery resolution—the 
one least constraining to their plans—in exchange for ratification.330  The ploy worked.  
The anti-expansionists, down to their last play, placed all their hopes in amending the 
McEnery resolution with more favorable language.  To achieve this goal, anti-
annexationist senators heaped criticism on the McEnery resolution: 
The joint resolution by the Senator from Louisiana can be construed to 
mean that this Government shall hold permanent and indefinite control 
and dominion in the Philippine Islands, and that it will hold them in 
subjection for all time…this resolution is so adroitly worded that whatever 
it may seem to the casual reader, it is in fact imperialism, and authorizes 
distinctly a colonial government in the Philippine Islands, to be 
maintained by the United States until we see proper to sell them and their 
people.331 
                                                 
330 Senator Mason had witnessed the agreement and later revealed it to the Senate: “[It was] agreed to 
by the gentleman who led the fight for this treaty, and who, in my presence, agreed to call it up 
immediately upon the ratification of the treaty.” 32 Cong. Rec. 1843 (14 February 1899). 
331 32 Cong. Rec. 1837 (14 February 1899) (statement of Senator Bacon). 
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After the executive session, Senator Bacon offered an amendment to the McEnery 
resolution—essentially the concluding paragraph of the joint resolution Bacon had 
offered 11 January.332  The intent, he stated, was to append a paragraph that would 
capture all the anti-annexationist desires, and thereby negate the harm to be done by 
McEnery’s resolution.333  The challenge then was to bring the McEnery resolution with 
Senator Bacon’s amendments up for a vote.   
On 11 February, an opportunity arose.  Moments after multiple motions he had 
made to bring the resolution to a vote the following week were rebuffed, Senator Mason 
set his trap.  Before proceeding, he first requested a roll call to establish a quorum was 
present.  He then proceeded to give a long, rambling speech in which he quoted poetry, 
commented on an old speech by Gladstone, and recounted the effect of music played 
during the Battle of Vicksburg.  Sensing the time was ripe, in mid-paragraph Senator 
Mason abruptly requested unanimous consent for a vote on McEnery’s resolution and 
amendments the following Tuesday afternoon at half past two o’clock.334   
The Vice President, as per the rules, asked if there were any objections, and as 
none heard, so ordered.  Subsequently, objection was made with complaints the speaker 
intentionally waited until the three senators most likely to object were temporarily not in 
the chamber, but too late.335  The die was cast.  Senator Bacon had craftily forced his 
amendment to be inextricably linked to the only resolution remaining.  After months of 
Republican obstruction, a vital tenet of the anti-annexationist agenda—eliminating the 
disparity between “cede” and “relinquish” in the treaty by extending the Teller 
Amendment to the Philippines—would come up for a vote by the Senate. 
                                                 
332 Disclaim “intention to exercise permanent sovereignty, jurisdiction, or control over said 
islands…when a stable and independent government shall have been erected…to transfer to said 
government…all rights secured under the cession by Spain, and to thereupon leave the government and 
control of the islands to their people.” Ibid. 
333 “If the Senate will adopt this amendment it makes no difference about what comes before it…and 
it is in language so plan that nobody can misunderstand it…no permanent annexation or indefinite control 
of those islands.” 32 Cong. Rec. 1489 (6 February 1899). 
334 32 Cong. Rec. 1740–43 (11 February 1899). 
335 The three senators had objected to Senator Mason’s motions earlier in the day. Ibid. (statement of 
Senator Hawley). The complaints were raised again days later. 32 Cong. Rec. 1845 (14 February 1899) 
(statement of Senator Hawley). 
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This partial victory was severely limited by the means by which it was achieved, 
and the danger of reliance on unanimous consent quickly became apparent.  Throughout 
the following week, examination of Senate rules and precedents verified consent only 
applied to Senator McEnery’s resolution, finalizing the elimination of the other six.336  
While it was also determined that Senator Bacon’s amendment to McEnery’s resolution 
was still pending when that Senate business day had ended, and was therefore still viable, 
further discussion brought bad news.337  The amendment could not, by established 
precedent, be debated under unanimous consent, merely voted upon.  Worse, it could not 
be modified—the vote would strictly be on the exact wording already in the amendment.  
The lone anti-annexationist hope remaining—that Bacon’s amendment could neuter 
McEnery’s language—would come to a vote with no possibility for revision or addition, 
and supported only by whatever ad hoc speeches presented during the few business hours 
remaining before the time appointed. 
F. THE ANTI-ANNEXATION CAUSE UNDONE BY AN UNEXPLAINED 
ABSENCE 
On the morning of 14 February—the date scheduled to finally bring the McEnery 
resolution and associated Bacon amendment to a vote by unanimous consent—the Senate 
met an hour early, at 11 o’clock.  The extra time proved insufficient as the next three and 
a half hours were completely consumed in debate that left many senators without an 
opportunity to speak.  The major players in the drama of the past nine weeks had 
managed to be heard, and pro-amendment Senators Stewart, Bacon, and Mason each 
made lengthy speeches.338   
Disagreement was evident, however, among senators arrayed against McEnery’s 
resolution.  They spent as much time recalling the virtues of now-obviated alternate 
                                                 
336 Senator Platt promised to object to a vote on any other resolution but McEnery’s. 32 Cong. Rec. 
1834 (14 February 1899). 
337 “The amendment…can not be cut off by reason of what occurred afterwards…it was already 
pending at the time unanimous consent was given.” 32 Cong. Rec. 1833 (14 February 1899) (statement by 
Senator Berry).  
338 Prominent in support of the Bacon amendment were Senators Berry, Stewart, Lindsay, Hoar, Hale, 
Bacon, and Mason; Senators Platt of Connecticut, Lodge, Allison, and Wolcott spoke in support of the 
McEnery resolution.  
 138 
resolutions as they did rallying support for the amendment actually pending.339  At the 
appointed hour, debate was still in progress. An hour and a half extension of the debate 
was suggested, but two Republicans senators immediately rose to object.340  Time for 
debate was over, the joint resolution and amendment were both read, and the yeas and 
nays requested.  
As any pending amendment, by Senate rules, would have to be disposed of prior 
to its associated resolution, the Bacon Amendment was immediately brought up for a 
vote without discussion.341  Roll was called and abstaining members announced their 
counterparts.  Senator Mason of Mississippi stated he had “a general pair with the 
Senator from Mississippi [Mr. Sullivan].  I do not see him in his seat, and withhold my 
vote.”342  Over the next page of the transcripts, the roll proceeds, pairs announced and 
transferred.  At the end, Senator Mason again asked “I desire to inquire if the junior 
senator from Mississippi [Mr. Sullivan] has voted?”343  The Vice President responded he 
had not.  The missing senator’s delegation mate offered “was here a few moments ago” to 
which Senator Mason stated that though he and Sullivan agreed on the amendment, he 
felt “then, that I should withhold my vote, the Senator from Mississippi not having 
declared...”344   
In those few moments, two months of anti-annexationist maneuvering to 
eliminate the difference under American law between the status of the “ceded” 
Philippines and the “relinquished” Cuba came to naught.  The votes of two senators, both 
against permanent retention of colonies, were made to cancel each other out and hand 
victory to the other side.  The Vice President broke the 29 to 29 tie, and thereby killed the 
Bacon amendment to the McEnery resolution.   
                                                 
339 One example was Senator Mason’s lamenting of his own now-defunct resolution: “my own 
resolution is a dear, sweet thing, and I had hoped to put it upon its passage…[but there was] no chance of 
getting a vote on it.” 32 Cong. Rec. 1833 (14 February 1899). 
340 32 Cong. Rec. 1845 (14 February 1899) (statements of Senators Burrows and Chandler).  
341 Senator Berry stated: “an amendment pending under our rules must be disposed of before the bill 
or resolution to which it is offered is voted upon.” 32 Cong. Rec. 1834 (14 February 1899). 
342 32 Cong. Rec. 1845 (14 February 1899). 
343 Ibid., 1846. 
344 Ibid. 
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Of the 32 senators not voting, most cited alignment on the issue opposite a 
colleague—most often absent due to official business, illness, or weather—who had pre-
arranged a pair agreement.  30 are thereby accounted for in the Record as offsetting pairs; 
each absent senator’s vote would have been canceled by that of his declared counterpart 
and thus both are irrelevant to the result.  The only two remaining were both authors of 
anti-colonial resolutions, although representing alternate ends of the spectrum; Senator 
Mason had previously made clear his support for the amendment, the lone variable is 
therefore Senator Sullivan’s vote.   
Since introducing his resolution two weeks earlier, Senator Sullivan was scarcely 
engaged in either side of the running debates.  While the language of his resolution less 
ardently anti-imperial than that used by Senators Vest, Mason, or Bacon, there was 
certainly nothing in his proposal to indicate intention to scuttle the amendment or the 
anti-annexation cause.  And while more senior senators dismissed his resolution, their 
patronizing tenor reflected more to his inexperience than represented a personal attack.  
Unlike the senators who had earlier complained about unanimous consent being granted 
in their absence, there is no similar entry in the Record upon Senator Sullivan’s return, 
nor was his absence noted in a detailed newspaper accounting of the vote.345  
By way of epilogue, with Bacon’s amendment defeated the anti-annexationists 
were unable to achieve even a Pyrrhic victory and stop adoption of the resolution they 
detested.  In a last ditch effort, they moved to divide the resolution into its two related 
clauses, hoping to defeat the resolution in detail.  The Vice President ruled against this 
proposal, using unanimous consent against its past proponents.346  He maintained this 
position, despite rather clear evidence in the Senate Rules to the contrary presented in a 
                                                 
345 “Our Philippine Policy: Senate Declares that Permanent Annexation Is Not Contemplated. 
McEnery Resolution Passed Yeas 26, Nays 22, Several Democrats Not Participating -- Mr. Bacon's 
Amendment Defeated,” New York Times, February 15 1899, 
http://select.nytimes.com/gst/abstract.html?res=F20615F73D5911738DDDAC0994DA405B8985F0D3.  
346 The Vice President ruled: “The resolution can not be divided because of the unanimous consent 
that the joint resolution should be voted upon at this hour.” 32 Cong. Rec. 1847 (14 February 1899). 
 140 
spirited defense, and called for the yeas and nays.347  The resolution passed 26 to 22.  Of 
note, Senator Sullivan, with no other comment or mention in the transcript, is recorded as 
a vote for McEnery’s resolution.348 
                                                 
347 If a resolution is written as to be divisible “unanimous consent does not dispense with the ordinary 
right to have a separate vote on each.” After having the Senate rules on Division of a Question read aloud, 
Senator Hoar was again rebuffed, and stated “the right for division exists. I desire, with great respect to the 
Chair, to enter my solemn protest against his ruling, and I hope the excitement of this hour will not lead to a 
precedent which will be mischievous hereafter.” 32 Cong. Rec. 1847 (14 February 1899). 
348 When Walthall’s term expired in 1901, Sullivan was not considered for reelection. He retired from 
public life and was subsequently noted mostly for his public comments regarding a 1908 lynching he led in 
Oxford, Mississippi. “Glad He Led Lynchers: Ex-Senator Sullivan Will Stand Consequences for Directing 




VIII. HOW THE PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION OF 1900 AFFECTED 
BILLS FOR COLONIAL GOVERNMENT OF PUERTO RICO AND 
THE PHILIPPINES  
Today when this bill passes we will have enacted the first law, so far as 
the Senate is concerned, ever enacted in the United States by which those 
under the authority and jurisdiction of the United States are solemnly 
declared not to be citizens of the United States…It will not simply be the 
specter of imperialism which we have been recognizing in our midst for 
eighteen months past, but it will be here in the substance and in the 
reality.349 
The ratification of the Treaty of Paris and the defeat of Senator Bacon’s 
amendment by the 55th Congress Senate closed the territorial acquisition phase of 
American imperialism.  Thereafter, the 56th Congress Senate turned to the problem of 
how to administer colonies.  From early 1900 to mid-1902, senators debated Organic 
Acts—first for Puerto Rico, then for the Philippines—that codified the plans for civil 
government on the islands.  This process of conversion from military to civilian rule 
solidified the legal differentiation between territories destined never to become states, to 
be called both unincorporated organized and unorganized territories, and territories of the 
traditional sort for which increasing economic and political integration, culminating in 
eventual statehood, was tentatively envisioned.350   
This distinction was brought into stark relief during this period by the 
contemporaneous debates to organize civil government in the future states of Hawaii and 
Alaska.351  The disparity between the plans laid for imperial territories and those for 
traditional territories thus animated the definitional characteristic of imperialism 
advanced in Chapter II: political domination of a people held apart as “the other” with no 
                                                 
349 33 Cong. Rec. 3686 (3 April 1900) (statement of Senator Bacon). 
350 While both types are unincorporated (held outside the concept of states in a republic), there is a 
distinction regarding organization. Guam, Porto Rico, and the U.S. Virgin islands are organized by an 
Organic Act of Congress, American Samoa and the uninhabited island territories of the United States lack 
an Organic Act and are thus unorganized. 
351 The debates on Organic Acts for Hawaii and Alaska were conducted while the Senate was 
contemplating a different path for Porto Rico and the Philippines, often occurring on the same days. During 
these debates, senators also drew direct comparison to the established territorial governments in the three 
traditional territories still awaiting statehood: Oklahoma, New Mexico, and Arizona. 
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expectation of future absorption into the fabric of American society.  These debates, later 
affirmed by the a series of Supreme Court decisions in the Insular Cases, begat the 
concept of partial constitutional application in the territories.352  It was this new legal 
construction that provided the solution to how the republic could both hold imperial 
possessions and uphold the concept of rule based on consent of the governed. 
A. CRAFTING A GOVERNMENT FOR PUERTO RICO 
The establishment of civil government in Puerto Rico occurred first, and more 
quickly than in the Philippines, due in part to a lack of substantial military resistance to 
American military occupation and associated military government.  To a much larger 
degree, however, the unitary nature of Puerto Rican political society—as compared to the 
social and cultural heterogeneity of the Philippine Islands—and the recent institution of 
autonomous government there made the process of instituting civil rule swift and 
relatively smooth. 
Like Cuba, Puerto Rico had contested Spanish colonization and agitated for self-
rule.  While ultimately unsuccessful, the September 1868 Grito de Lares marked the first 
concerted effort to attain Puerto Rican independence from Spain.353  For the next three 
decades political effort was focused on attaining autonomy for the island instead of 
independence.  In November 1897, autonomists achieved limited success.  The 
conversion to insular government was instituted in February 1898 by empowering local 
governments and by opening trade with Europe and the United States.  A Puerto Rican 
government was selected the following month and commenced operations on 17 July 
1898.  This was to prove unfortunate timing, as the victorious American Army in Cuba 
was ordered to sail for Puerto Rico the very next day.   
                                                 
352 Historian LaFeber wrote: “In a series of landmark decisions between 1901 and 1910, known as the 
Insular Cases, the Supreme Court’s majority ruled that the peoples of territories such as Porto Rico, which 
had been obtained by conquest, did not have full citizenship rights. They enjoyed only certain ‘fundamental 
rights’ because they were in ‘unincorporated territory’ subject to congressional authority.” LaFeber, The 
Cambridge History of American Foreign Relations, 153. 
353 Militia forces loyal to the royal governor quickly put down the armed rebellion, but the ideological 
component proved much more long-lived. “The Grito de Lares: The Rebellion of 1868,” Library of 
Congress, http://memory.loc.gov/ammem/collections/puertorico/bras5.html.  
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American forces landed a week later and quickly took control of the entire island.  
Less than a month after its institution, the Puerto Rican autonomous government found its 
place subsumed by an army of occupation, and then by a military government.  In short 
order, the United States Senate began deliberations on what form a more permanent civil 
government would take in Puerto Rico.  The product of these deliberations was the 
Foraker Act of 1900, and with it the official commencement of American colonial 
governance. 
While skilled at forming territories that would become states, America in 1900 
was ill equipped to administer an empire.  Conceptually, the United States lacked a 
political frame of reference apart from the process of gradual assimilation that had guided 
westward expansion.  It also lacked the bureaucracy tailored to the needs of imperial 
governance.  Eschewing the British commitment to empire that led to a separate colonial 
secretariat, the American government chose instead to stand up an insular affairs bureau 
inside the War Department.  As the Treaty of Paris stipulated congressional governance 
of the colonies, military rule would eventually give way to military implementation of 
civilian rule.  The concept of congressional authority on colonial policy unchallenged by 
constitutional protections afforded states led Senator Culberson to state: 
The junior senator from Indiana [Mr. Beveridge] only a few days ago 
declared in effect that our Constitution…was unsuited to the new policies 
and the new career upon which we are entering…For myself, a limited 
government with unlimited powers is a constitutional 
absurdity…unrestricted authority in Congress over the Territories is 
inherently and radically unsound…and the power over the Territories is 
not broader than over any other subjects.354 
Throughout the American imperial experience the administration of imperialism by the 
Bureau of Insular Affairs would remain under the oversight of the Senate committees on 
the colonies. 
Further segregating the administration of empire, the Senate stood up three 
separate colonial committees, each of which would play a pivotal role in framing the 
upcoming debates on empire.  Senator Platt of Connecticut was selected to chair the 
                                                 
354 33 Cong. Rec. 3679 (3 April 1900). 
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Committee on Cuban Relations, and he would sponsor the eponymous amendment to the 
Cuban Constitution that limited Cuban independence, the subject of the following 
chapter.  Senator Lodge of Massachusetts chaired the Committee on the Philippines for 
the next decade, during which time the committee conducted its most significant 
proceeding: an investigation of the Philippine-American War.  Finally, Senator Foraker 
led the Committee on the Pacific Islands and Puerto Rico.355 
When the first session of the 56th Congress began in December 1899, Senator 
Foraker introduced a bill proposing a structure of territorial government for Puerto Rico, 
which was referred to the committee he chaired.356  That committee deliberated for over 
a month and returned the bill to the Senate on 5 February.  The favorable report was 
accompanied by two substantial documents.  The first was a compilation of all Organic 
Acts, beginning with the Northwest Ordinance of 1787 through the Organic Act for the 
Territory of Oklahoma in 1890.357  This document comprised the corporate knowledge of 
the legislature on establishing territorial governments aligned with the federal 
government. 
The second attached document was over 200 pages of testimony before the 
committee detailing the conduct of American military government in Puerto Rico, the 
economic condition of the island, and postulating short- and long-term solutions.  As the 
centerpiece of the collection, the military governor, General George Davis, described all 
the significant General Orders he had issued regarding territorial governance.  In 
addition, various expatriate American and English bankers and planters, residing in 
Puerto Rico for extended periods, offered their appraisals of the island economy’s 
performance and potential.358   
                                                 
355 Leopold, The Growth of American Foreign Policy, 198. 
356 33 Cong. Rec. 630 (3 January 1900). 
357 Senate Committee on Pacific Islands and Porto Rico, “Organic Acts for the Territories of the 
United States, Compiled from the Statutes at Large of the United States,” S. Doc No. 56–148 (5 February 
1900). 
358 Senate Committee on Pacific Islands and Porto Rico, “Industrial and Other Conditions of the 
Island of Porto Rico, and the Form of Government Which Should be Adopted for It,” S. Doc. No. 56–147 
(5 February 1900). 
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The report ends with thoughtful testimony by a successful planter who had 
represented Puerto Rico in the Spanish Cortes.  Enrique Gonzales provided details on the 
Puerto Rican economy and agricultural industry, but his insights on territorial governance 
and associated funding formed a persuasive conclusion to his testimony.  The details and 
suggestions found in the testimony are clearly discernible in the original version of the 
Foraker Act, from the composition of the two legislative houses to the salubrious effect 
of free trade with the colonial power.  Other points in this testimony, all but ignored at 
the time—dealing with reconstruction of the economy after a recent hurricane and 
emergency measures to affect the recovery—resurfaced, however, with greater force and 
caused a significant modification of the Foraker Act.359 
The report was intended to substantiate the recommendations made in the original 
Foraker Act.  Under its terms the proposed government for Puerto Rico had much in 
common with the territorial governments established previously to accommodate 
westward expansion.  Notably, the people of Puerto Rico were to be granted United 
States citizenship, would enjoy free trade with the United States, and would enjoy the 
legal protections of American courts as they drafted a Puerto Rican constitution.  In these 
respects the plan paralleled arrangements another committee was drafting for governance 
in Hawaii.360  Shortly, however, the original Foraker Act’s prescription for a territorial 
government for Puerto Rico would be completely upended by an associated bill regarding 
the funding of said territorial government. 
The ancillary portions of the testimony by Enrique Gonzales regarding the impact 
of the previous year’s hurricane on the Puerto Rican agricultural industry instigated 
several relief bills.  Legislators were concerned that undue economic hardship on the 
island would delay the return of business stability there, and they proposed to address 
Gonzales’s request for federal funds and to authorize insular debt.361  The most 
successful bill determined that, since occupation in mid-1898, the Army had been 
                                                 
359 Ibid, 217–226. 
360 “An Act to Provide a Government for the Territory of Hawaii,” Pub. L. No. 339, 1900 Stat. (30 
April 1900). 
361 33 Cong. Rec. 3165 (22 March 1900) (statement of Senator Cockrell). 
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collecting tariffs in lieu of the defunct Spanish customs authority, and proposed those 
monies be redirected to fund Puerto Rican reconstruction.  This bill later passed both 
houses of Congress as a temporary measure with a one-time reallocation of existing 
funds.362 
But first, another House bill regarding future funding of a territorial government 
came up for debate and brought forth the larger conflicts inherent to this topic.  
Anticipating that the scheme central to the bill just passed by both houses—the pending 
release of impounded Spanish customs in a one-time bailout—would prove insufficient to 
ensure enduring funding for a territorial government, this House bill further concluded 
that the impoverished populace could not endure direct taxation.  The surest way to 
provide the required funds without burdening the United States Treasury, the bill 
suggested, was to extend the existing tariff system establishing the rate at 25 percent of 
the current American tariff.  It was introduced on 1 March by Senator Foraker and 
referred to his committee.363   
In a very unusual sequence, the bill was then reported back out of committee less 
than one half hour later.  Committee deliberations measured in days are often deemed 
hasty, the more usual units of measure being weeks or months.  In this case, the favorable 
report of the bill by the Committee on the Pacific Islands and Puerto Rico is found on the 
same page of the Congressional Record as its referral.  Questioned if the committee had 
met to consider the bill, the chairman responded they had met informally in the 
cloakroom but had considered the topic constantly over the preceding three weeks.364 
What had made this dispatch possible was the breadth of the amendment the 
committee proposed: wholesale replacement of the House language on governance by a 
modified version of the Senate terms proscribed in the committee report, and amendment 
                                                 
362 The committee of conference was agreed to in the Senate 35 yeas, 15 nays, with 37 not voting. 33 
Cong. Rec. 3224 (23 March 1900).  
363 33 Cong. Rec. 2437 (1 March 1900). 
364 Learning of the cloakroom conference, the protest continued, Senator Allen: “They could have met 
on a street corner and consider it…” Senator Foraker: “That would be almost as comfortable as it is in the 
room provided for our committee.” Ibid. “There is not a line or a word in the amendment proposed which 
has not had the most careful consideration.” Senator Foraker, Ibid. 
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of the tariff rate to 15 percent.  The result was a hybrid bill in which the funding stream 
for territorial government greatly resembled the House proposal, but one in which the 
Senate plans for Puerto Rican government necessarily underwent significant alteration 
from the original in order to legally accommodate a tariff.  The ramifications of these 
changes were to occupy the Senate for the next month. 
B. AN ORGANIC ACT UNLIKE ALL THAT HAD COME BEFORE 
Of greater significance than speed, however, was the new Foraker Act’s content.  
Important changes were to be found throughout the governance formulations for the 
territory.  United States citizenship for the island’s people had been replaced by 
declaration of Puerto Rican citizenship, a phrase without international legal meaning as 
Puerto Rico was a possession of, and “entitled to the protection of the United States.”365  
Further distinguishing the residents and the island from the norm of western expansion, 
the modified Foraker Act labeled the inhabitants as “a body politic under the name of The 
People of Porto Rico, with governmental powers as hereinafter conferred.”366 
Plans for a representative legislature in both houses gave way to an appointed 
upper chamber—called the executive council—with six of the 11 members being 
Americans.  More indicative of Puerto Rico’s unique status, those six would be the 
cabinet members of the executive branch, thereby voiding the precept of separation of 
powers.367  Puerto Rico would not send a non-voting delegate to Congress—as was the 
case with all the other territories—but instead a resident commissioner.368  
By way of comparison, the 56th Congress Senate also debated the Hawaiian 
Organic Act throughout March and April 1900.  That act established territorial status 
through incorporation, called for a legislature patterned directly on the United States 
Senate and House, and explicitly conferred citizenship on all former citizens of the 
                                                 
365 “An Act Temporarily to provide revenues and a civil government for Porto Rico, and for other 
purposes,” Pub. L. No. 191, 1900 Stat., Sect. 7 (12 April 1900). 
366 Ibid. 
367 The six cabinet positions with dual duties in the executive council were secretary, attorney general, 
treasurer, auditor, commissioner of the interior, and commissioner of education. Ibid., Sect. 18. 
368 Ibid, Sect. 39. 
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Republic of Hawaii.  More in line with the precepts of federalism, the Hawaiian act 
dictated the president would appoint the Supreme and District courts, but delegated to the 
Governor appointment of his cabinet officers.   
In addition the Hawaiian Organic Act provided for an elected upper and lower 
house, sending a Delegate to Congress, and created an internal revenue district.369  That 
the same senators supported such traditional measures for Hawaii while they crafted an 
unprecedented scheme of governance for Puerto Rico is indicative of how differently 
they perceived what would become of these two overseas island territories. 
The debates on the modified version of the Foraker Act were featured 
prominently in the Senate debates of the weeks preceding the agreed-on 3 April vote.  As 
with the debates on intervention in Cuba and annexation of the Philippines that had 
preceded them, the Foraker Act debates were less about establishing the optimal colonial 
government in Puerto Rico than about squaring the circle of a republic administering an 
empire while remaining within the constraints of the Constitution.  As a result, the 
transcripts show debates centered on the ramifications each decision would hold for the 
United States, with limited attention paid to the effects on Puerto Rico. 
C. ARGUMENTS FOR AND AGAINST THE MODIFIED ORGANIC ACT 
Greatly simplified, the supporters of the altered Foraker Act made three cases: we 
shall alter the plan for governing the territory because we can, that stability was more 
important than free trade for a colony that cannot rule itself, and that the measure in 
question was a temporary and focused expedient.  By themselves or in combination, these 
lines of argument clearly relate to the six sub-topics so prevalent in the debates over 
Cuban intervention.  The first case stated above was justified by the Treaty of Paris 
stipulation that Congress would decide the political status and rights of the inhabitants of 
territories ceded by Spain to the United States.  This aegis, said Senator Teller, afforded  
 
 
                                                 
369 “An Act to Provide a Government for the Territory of Hawaii,” Pub. L. No. 339, 1900 Stat. (30 
April 1900). 
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the Senate wide latitude in crafting a scheme of governance there, latitude it would be 
unwise not to utilize and that made Puerto Rico different than other supposed territorial 
precedents.370 
Beyond simply having the authority to act, the second case Foraker Act 
supporters crafted was reminiscent of the sub-topic during the Senate debates on 
intervention in Cuba related to the worthiness of inhabitants of the islands to assume the 
responsibility for self-administration.  In this case, some senators argued that the Puerto 
Ricans were unsuited to provide effective local government in the model of the American 
western territories.  The exemplar of this line of reasoning was Republican Senator 
Depew of New York; several senators later identified his speech on the topic as the 
clearest expression of the case.371  According to supporters of this case, the path to 
attaining that capability was through prosperity, fostered by stability, leading to political 
competence.  Thus the esoteric benefits of citizenship and free trade were less in demand 
in Puerto Rico than the tangible benefits of investment, infrastructure, and rule of law, all 
of which would directly support growth of the insular economy.372   
The third case was built on the quality of temporary expedients.  It differed from 
the preceding two by the fact it acknowledged the unconventionality of Puerto Rican 
status under this version of the Foraker Act but stressed that the condition was less dire 
than the opposition depicted.  This argument was built around two contentions: any tariff 
legislation was temporary and it was focused on addressing Puerto Rican needs. The 
tariff in Senator Foraker’s revised bill would expire after two years, and could be undone 
                                                 
370 Senator Teller argued: “The treaty might have made citizens of the Porto Ricans; the treaty might 
have put us under obligations to them; but the treaty [specified] the political status of those people shall be 
determined by Congress. That leaves us absolute control over them.” He continued that we should not 
“treat those people as we treat the people of our Territories…make the relation between the people of Porto 
Rico and us of the same character as that which exists between us and the people of Oklahoma.” 33 Cong. 
Rec. 3684 (3 April 1900). 
371 Senator Depew stated that Porto Rico was about two-thirds the size of Connecticut, but more 
densely populated with a million inhabitants. 900,000 were illiterate, ignorant of politics, and engaged in 
subsistence living. As there was no way they could pay taxes, impost was the only chance to fund 
government. 33 Cong. Rec. 3619 (2 April 1900). 
372 33 Cong. Rec. 3272 (24 March 1900); and 33 Cong. Rec. 3692 (3 April 1900). 
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by the Puerto Rican government after it was established.373  Unlike the permanent tariff 
in the House version that Foraker’s language replaced, this was a measure to fund the 
Puerto Rican government until it could fund itself. Furthermore, the three cases were 
independent in that senators mildly opposed to the first found solace in the third.374 
Regarding the focused nature of the tariff, supporters argued that it was unlike 
direct taxation, which would send taxes paid by Puerto Ricans to the United States 
Treasury, a portion of which, in exchange, would fund the government in San Juan.375  
This bill’s tariff scheme would immediately improve the lot of the producing portion of 
the economy.  By making access to American markets official, a tariff would increase the 
profits of struggling producers, thereby alleviating the economic disruptions caused by 
hurricane damage and loss of Spanish markets. Coupled with its temporary nature, the 
good in the Foraker Act—access to American courts, free trade in two years, all tariff 
funds returned to Puerto Rico, and a measure of self-government—outweighed the 
bad.376 
In turn, the opposition made three cases: constitutionality, precedent, and politics.  
The constitutional issue revolved around the choice of revenue generation to be instituted 
for the territory, either some form of direct taxation or tariff.  The former was the position 
stated in the original Foraker Act, and the latter one of the major alterations evident in the 
revised Foraker Act.  Direct taxation worked well for territories on track to someday 
becoming states—a precursor to their revenue role following statehood—whereas a tariff 
                                                 
373 “Whenever the legislative assembly of Porto Rico shall have enacted and put into operation a 
system of local taxation to meet the necessities of government…and so notify the President, he shall make 
proclamation thereof, and thereupon all tariff duties…shall cease…and in no event shall any duties be 
collected after the first day of March, 1902.” “An Act Temporarily to provide revenues and a civil 
government for Porto Rico, and for other purposes,” Pub. L. No. 191, 1900 Stat., Sect. 7 (12 April 1900). 
374 33 Cong. Rec. 3683 and 3692 (3 April 1900) (statements of Senators Ross and Stewart). 
375 Senator Foraker argued that “Instead of bringing the money here to Washington we turn it over to 
them…so that they pay no tax whatever under this bill except only the 15 percent, which is a very light tax, 
not at all burdensome, and which is imposed in their own interest…” 33 Cong. Rec. 3271 (24 March 1900). 
376 Senator Stewart pointed out that “A temporary tariff, to be collected and given back to Porto Rico, 
without internal-revenue taxes and without other charges, is a trifling evil in view of the good that may 
ultimately be accomplished.” 33 Cong. Rec. 3692 (3 April 1900). 
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on interstate commerce was forbidden.377  More importantly, the Constitution directs that 
all duties must be uniform, so imposing a tariff on one American colony but not another 
was, on its face, unconstitutional.  Finally, the Constitution stipulates that tariffs be used 
for the common treasury and defense, so the idea of dedicating Puerto Rican tariffs solely 
for maintenance of the Puerto Rican government was not supported in law.378 
Opponents of the new Foraker Act identified constitutional shortcomings not only 
in the bill itself, but also in the motivations behind it.  They asserted that the supporters of 
the changed act had decided to institute a tariff, and were forced to modify the 
governance of Puerto Rico in order to do so.  These opponents believed that if a scheme 
for funding a territorial government was found to be incompatible with the rights inherent 
in territorial status for Puerto Rico, the correct response was to alter the tariff proposal, 
not to create a special constitutional category for the island.379 
This line of argument directly supported the second case, made when the act’s 
opponents spoke of precedent.  Throughout the month senators compared the proposed 
Organic Act for Porto Rico with every other act debated since 1787, and they continually 
highlighted the common threads that ran through all the others but were omitted in the 
Foraker Act.  Most days also included debate on pending Organic Acts for Alaska and 
Hawaii, adding contemporaneous examples of conformity to precedent.   
                                                 
377 Senator Bacon stated that if on track to statehood, Puerto Rico would pay direct tax to the U.S. 
Treasury, which would in turn pay to run the government there. The decision, instead, to exempt direct tax 
and to shunt tariff funds directly to run the insular government indicated permanent separation from a 
normal territorial relationship: “the government to which Porto Rico is entitled is a territorial 
government…on the same basis as Oklahoma or Alaska or New Mexico or Arizona…it should enjoy the 
unlimited right of free trade with the other parts of the United States.” 33 Cong. Rec. 3164 (22 March 
1900). 
378 Senator Mason argued: “While it might be possible to have a different plan of taxation in Porto 
Rico and Alaska, when the government goes into the realm of impost duties, those duties must be uniform 
throughout the United States…we have no more right to put an impost duty between Porto Rico and the 
United States than we have to put a duty between Washington and New York.” 33 Cong. Rec. 3668 (3 
April 1900). 
379 Senator Bacon stated that the committee had added the tariff to the bill, ascertained it would be 
inconsistent to keep citizenship and Delegate in Congress, and altered the bill to accommodate the tariff: 
“All these features have been stricken, necessitated by the fact that is was necessary to do so in order that a 
tariff should be established…every feature of a free Territorial government has been sacrificed.” 33 Cong. 
Rec. 3685 (3 April 1900). 
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Additionally, the precedent line of argument was extended beyond juxtaposing 
this Organic Act with others.  For example, the opponents of the new Foraker bill 
unfavorably compared conformity to established territorial procedure found in the 
original Foraker bill with the non-conformity of the modified version.380  The point was 
made repeatedly that the modified Foraker Act would deprive Puerto Rico of the self-
government and free trade that had already been in place under Spanish rule.  Finally, 
Senator Mason argued the new bill’s tariff scheme was unprecedented, stating: 
I challenge anyone to show where, in all these territorial expansions, from 
the Louisiana purchase to Alaska, there has ever been an attempt of the 
lawmakers of the United States to levy an impost duty between the United 
States and the newly acquired territory.381 
The final case erected by the opponents of the modified Foraker Act was that the 
bill’s supporters had subordinated an act of great importance to partisan politics.  This 
assertion was made mainly in two ways.  The first was that the Republican Party was 
beholden to commercial interests threatened by free trade, and its members were 
pressured to modify the bill to include a protective tariff.382  The second was that the 
Republican Party was posturing for the presidential elections scheduled for that fall.  
They were thus eager to avoid any binding or controversial decisions on colonies before 
then, as: 
The status quo is to prevail.  It is to go on until after the election.  The 
Republican Party to-day in both branches of Congress is looking more to 
the election than to the interests of the country.383   
                                                 
380 Senator Clay argued the original bill featured free trade and mirrored previous territorial 
governments, but the modified version added 15 percent tariff, made no provisions for a constitution or 
citizenship, and “is an entirely new departure from all Territorial governments heretofore organized since 
we became an nation.” 33 Cong. Rec. 3681 (3 April 1900). 
381 33 Cong. Rec. 3670 (3 April 1900). 
382 Senator Bacon stated that free trade bills in both houses were replaced by tariff measures once 
“certain protected industries and interests came to this Capitol and represented that free trade with Porto 
Rico would be detrimental to those interests that the administration and the dominant party…awoke to the 
necessity of establishing a tariff wall. They soon claimed that the purpose in imposing a tariff…was to raise 
revenue for Porto Rico.” 33 Cong. Rec. 3162 (22 March 1900). 
383 33 Cong. Rec. 3170 (22 March 1900) (statement of Senator Allen). 
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In both cases, the opposition senators were asserting that their Republican counterparts 
placed the fortunes of party above the interests of their country, or of Puerto Rico.384 
In response to charges of influence by commercial interests and domestic politics, 
Republican senators countered that the changes were the result of careful deliberation.  
Senator Foraker, the bill’s sponsor, averred that he was not pressured but wrote the 
original bill in ignorance of the suffering in Puerto Rico, and later changed the language 
when testimony in committee made the need for change plain.385  Those testimonies, and 
the decision to include a tariff, were best described the day prior by Senator Depew.386  
Far from a devious scheme, they declared the new Foraker Act was more sympathetic to 
the Puerto Rican needs than its predecessor had been. 
D. THE SENATE VOTE ON THE FORAKER ACT 
As agreed to by unanimous consent, at four in the afternoon of 3 April the time 
for decision arrived.  Like the votes a year earlier on acquisition of the Philippines, the 
pending amendments to the Foraker Act were to be dealt with before consideration of the 
bill itself.   The committee chair and sponsor of the bill, Senator Foraker, was given 
precedence and formalized a series of administrative changes suggested by the 
committee; they all passed in order without contention.   
Formalities thus settled, the next six amendments brought to a vote in rapid 
succession were contentious indeed.  First, Republican Senator Davis—Chairman of the 
Foreign Relations Committee and lead negotiator of the Treaty of Paris—offered an 
amendment that replaced paragraphs of tariff language in the Foraker Act with text that 
                                                 
384 Senator Lindsay opined: “At the outset this bill was intended to be a beneficent measure. Time 
progressed, and the necessity arose for converting it into a partisan measure, and to-day…the bill is to be 
put on its passage as a party measure, and the test for party loyalty is to be the votes that Senators shall cast 
on the final roll call.” 33 Cong. Rec. 3693 (3 April 1900). 
385 33 Cong. Rec. 3690 (3 April 1900). 
386 Senator DePew explained that “it was when these conditions had become familiar to our 
committee that we changed our bill from free trade to the tariff measure…not a Chinese wall, not an 
oppressive act of arbitrary power, but the most generous and beneficent revenue system ever adopted, 
because it gives the island of Porto Rico not only the duties collected in her own ports, but the duties 
collected at our ports upon products coming from that island.” 33 Cong. Rec. 3620 (2 April 1900). 
 154 
instead established an internal revenue district in Puerto Rico to collect at full rate.  The 
amendment was defeated 30 to 40 with 17 not voting, mostly in pairs.387   
Undeterred, Senator Davis immediately offered a second amendment, this time 
replacing full rate with 15 percent direct tax rate, and offering increased rates on tobacco 
and rum.  The amendment was defeated by voice vote.388 Senator Davis then offered a 
final amendment, omitting the tariff language and substituting a strict prohibition of 
tariffs.389  It, too, was defeated by voice vote.  A fourth amendment was then offered by 
Republican Senator Nelson, who similarly attempted to replace tariff language in the bill 
with direct tax stamps.  This measure was defeated by a nearly identical vote—28 to 41 
with 18 not voting—as Senator Davis’s first bill.390 
The final two amendments were both introduced by a Democratic senator who 
had been one of the more vocal opponents of the Foraker Act during the debates of the 
previous weeks.  Senator Bacon first offered an amendment that would replace tariff 
language in the bill with a customs collection district.  Immediately after this was 
rejected, he proposed replacing the entire current version of the Foraker Act with its 
original version, reported out of committee four months previous.  This amendment met 
the fate of all the previous opposition amendments; that all six were rejected with such 
dispatch suggests they were doomed enterprises from the start.   
In light of the partisan nature of the upcoming vote heralded by speakers the 
weeks prior, the opposition would need significant Republican support to prevail.  In 
addition to all the senators in the Democratic caucus—Democrats of all stripes plus 
Populists—defection of 12 Republicans, Silver Republicans, and Silverites would be 
                                                 
387 33 Cong. Rec. 3694 (03 April 1900). 
388 Not a single word is recorded between the rejection of Senator Davis’s first motion and his 
proposal of the second. Ibid. 
389 This third amendment appears on the following page of the transcript due only to the length of the 
text. Ibid, 3695. 
390 33 Cong. Rec. 3695 (3 April 1900). 
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required to gain a bare majority.391  In the end, they received only five while losing one 
Populist in the bargain. 
The roll call vote on the Foraker Act yielded 40 in favor, 31 against, and 16 not 
voting.  As with earlier votes on Philippine acquisition, the latter category was perfectly 
balanced and thus of no consequence to the outcome.392  All of the senators supporting 
approval of the Foraker Act were in the Republican caucus.393   
Voting “nay” were 21 Democrats, four Populists, and one Silver Republican; the 
other Populist and Silver Republican each having both announced nay not voting due to 
pairs.394  Of significance, the remaining five nays came from Republicans, and all had 
expressed profound opposition to the tariff provisions of the Foraker Act.395  The cause 
of free trade for Puerto Rico was the popular face of the argument, but the 
constitutionality of placing a tariff barrier between the United States and its territory, 
even if only to support the territorial government, was sufficiently repugnant to lead these 
senators away from their party.  Had Senator Foraker followed through on his proposal to 
                                                 
391 On 3 April 1900, there were 87 senators seated. Delaware and Utah had one vacancy each, and the 
qualifications of Mr. Quay to represent Pennsylvania were to be hotly contested for another year. 
Coincidently, the latest in a long line of attempts to debate Mr. Quay’s qualifications would be the next 
item discussed minutes after the vote on Government for Porto Rico was concluded. 33 Cong. Rec. 3698–
3701 (3 April 1900). 
392 Of the 16 senators not voting, 12 were in announced pairs. The remainder was composed of two 
Republicans and two Democrats, each of which had previously made their positions clear. Thus the 16 not 
voting were eight each for and against the Foraker Act. 
393 The 37 Republicans and two Silverites formally caucused Republican, and the lone Populist 
defector was in the process of switching allegiance. Senator Kyle of South Dakota was initially appointed 
in 1891 as an Independent but switched to Populist shortly thereafter. After successfully winning reelection 
in 1897, he began to drift from the People’s Party and would finalize the transition to the Republican Party 
months after this vote. “Kyle, James Henderson (1854–1901),” Biographical Directory of the United States 
Senate, http://bioguide.congress.gov/scripts/biodisplay.pl?index=K000353.  
394 The minor party decline alluded to in earlier chapters was well underway, and the Silver 
Republicans in the Senate had been reduced from five to two. By the beginning of the next Congress there 
would be no Silver senators, and by the end no Populists either. 
395 For a sampling of these senators opposition to the tariff, specifically in this case evoking the 
memories of the American revolt from British rule, see 33 Cong. Rec. 3688 (3 April 1900) (statement of 
Senator Wellington). 
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separate the governance issue from the tariff issue it is likely these five senators would 
have also supported the governance portion of the Foraker Act.396 
Therefore, by statement and by ballot, the Republicans and Silverites had 
announced their support for the unique form of colonial government created by the 
Foraker Act.  Gone were the high-minded qualms about unequal representation and 
constitutionality of imperialism that some had voiced during the debates on Cuba.  To the 
contrary, the only Republican opposition to the Foraker Act was based not on questions 
of rights or principles but rather preference for direct tax or tariff, and the unintended 
consequences associated with different funding options.   
The Republican caucus had been willing to accept citizenship for Puerto Ricans 
and free trade with the United States that the original bill featured.  Once the House bill 
advanced the proposal for a tariff, however, the Senate Republicans were equally willing 
to withdraw those offers of citizenship and free trade in order to justify the tariff and 
avoid legal entanglements.  In short, high ideals were all well and good, but plainly 
trumped by revenue considerations.   
While some may say that the damage done was temporary—the tariff expired on 
schedule and left free trade in its wake—the Foraker Act established Puerto Rico as a 
distinct “other,” separate from the rest of the republic.  By exempting Puerto Rico from 
direct tax, by constructing a government there unaligned with previous territorial 
governments, and by creating the internationally unrecognized status of Puerto Rican 
citizenship, the United States Senate established the first civil institutions of American 
imperialism.  As will be shown in the last chapter, small alterations would later modify 
the meaning of this limited membership in the American republic.397  These later 
alterations, however, would never change the fact that a special category—
                                                 
396 Senator Simon’s statement represents the views also expressed by the other four Republican 
senators who voted against the Foraker Act: “I have no fault to find with those features of the bill which 
provide for a civil government for Porto Rico. These provisions have my hearty approval, and I regret that 
they are so connected with the tariff legislation that I am compelled to vote against the civil government 
features of the bill in order to make my opposition to the tariff provisions effective.” 33 Cong. Rec. 3641 (2 
April 1900). 
397 The Olmstead Amendment of 1909 instituted small changes after the Porto Rican legislature failed 
to pass a budget. The Jones-Shafroth Act of 1916, which made major alterations that endured until the 1952 
Constitution, is dealt with in depth in Chapter 10.  
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unincorporated organized territory—was created to hold Puerto Rico, and would shortly 
be utilized to establish a new government for the Philippines as well. 
E. DEBATES ON A GOVERNMENT FOR THE PHILIPPINES: THE 
COMMITTEE ON THE PHILIPPINES REPORT AND SPOONER ACT  
 Regarding the Philippine Islands, the process of crafting, debating, and approving 
an Organic Act was slowed by protracted armed struggle.  Unlike the generally peaceable 
yet grudging acceptance of American occupation found in the Caribbean islands, 
hostilities in the Philippines erupted even before the archipelago was officially ceded to 
the United States and continued long after a unilateral announcement of war termination 
on 4 July 1902.398   
In addition, the political condition in the two colonies was markedly different.  
Puerto Rico had enjoyed organized local government for decades, including the 
development of political parties and representation in the Cortes, and it was on the cusp 
of autonomy when the American forces invaded and occupied.  Conversely, the 8,000 
islands of the Philippine Archipelago featured a great variety of different cultures, 
religions, languages, and economies, and lacked any cohesive governance or sense of 
mutual belonging.  At the end of the nineteenth century Puerto Rico was a social as well 
as geographical entity, while the Philippines were an island chain organized only by 
proclaimed colonial suzerainty.   
The debates on colonial governance in the Philippines were comprised of two 
separate and distinct parts.  The first session began in December of 1899 and continued 
through June of 1900; the second session was from December 1900 to March 1901.  The 
Senate debates on imperialism in the first session were cautious and non-committal, 
while the debates in the second session were impassioned yet futile.  Between the two 
sessions, occurred the presidential election of 1900. 
                                                 
398 The first shots were fired between American and Filipino forces around Manila just prior to the 
Senate vote to approve ratification of the Treaty of Paris, well before the documents were actually signed 
by both governments. While President Roosevelt declared the war in the Philippines over on 4 July 1902, 
fighting continued in the southern islands against Muslim separatists for more than another decade. Stuart 
Creighton Miller, Benevolent Assimilation, 30. 
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The process of selecting a pattern on which to build a colonial government for the 
Philippines began in January 1899 when President McKinley established the First 
Philippines Commission to gather facts and make suggestions.  It should be noted that a 
parallel process was occurring simultaneously for Puerto Rico.  The report the 
commission submitted one year later recommended a switch from military to civil 
government with a bicameral legislature and a federal structure to prepare the islands for 
eventual independence.399 The president then established, in March 1900, the Second 
Philippines Commission, chaired by William Howard Taft, to implement the proposed 
transition to civilian rule over the following 16 months.  Coincident with these executive 
actions, the Senate began to debate the structure it would approve to establish more 
permanent colonial governance in the Philippines. 
First seated 4 March 1899, the Senate did not begin deliberations for the first 
session until nine months later, putting the legislative branch well behind the executive in 
terms of formulating colonial policy.  Once the Senate convened, the issues of colonial 
governance became the order of business and would continue to dominate the agenda 
throughout the first session.  In mid-December, the Committee for the Philippines was 
formed and began to consider the moves that the executive had made to craft a civil 
government during the months of congressional adjournment.400  Two bills were 
introduced in the Senate—one just before and the other following Christmas break—that 
illustrate the developing positions of the majority and the opposition.   
The first bill, sponsored by Democratic (and former Populist) Senator Benjamin 
Tillman of South Carolina, neatly presented the anti-annexationist case.  The bill cited the 
Declaration of Independence on consent of the governed, then offered three resolving 
clauses: that “the federal government has no power to rule over colonial dependencies;” 
that commercial expansion would be harmed by “the adoption of a policy of imperialism, 
                                                 
399 “Philippines: The First Phase of United States Rule 1898–1935,” June 1991, Library of Congress 
Country Studies, http://memory.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/r?frd/cstdy:@field%28DOCID+ph0026%29.  
400 Committee for the Philippines was chaired by Senator Lodge and included Senators Allison, Hale, 
Davis, Proctor, McBride, Beveridge, Rawlins, Turley, Culberson and Allen. Several of these names would 
loom large in the subsequent floor proceedings, indicating the depth of division on the committee. 33 Cong. 
Rec. 441 (15 December 1899). 
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involving the subjugation and annexation of Asiatic colonies;” and that the federal 
government would assist in establishing stable government in the islands with a view to 
eventual independence.401  Interestingly, Senator Tillman’s bill painted the hostilities that 
had broken out in the islands as a catalyst to engender support for an equitable and just 
result for the Philippines.   
Similar to the opposition position in the debates to follow, this bill denied the 
right of the United States to impose rule in the Philippines.  It only included discussion of 
the form of government proposed on the grounds that whatever measures were taken 
would lead to independence.  Supporters of Senator Tillman’s proposition were also 
uninterested in rushing through any bill that featured stopgap fixes that would later have 
to be undone.   
The second bill, sponsored by Republican Senator Spooner of Wisconsin, 
included little beyond a stopgap fix.  This bill held the executive branch preeminent in 
colonial policy, essentially codifying the declaration of power included in the instituting 
documents of the Second Philippine Commission.402  Senator Spooner’s bill granted the 
executive wide latitude until such time as peace was restored in the islands—thereby 
directly opposing Senator Tillman’s view of hostilities as a catalyst—stating that 
“suppression of insurrection and the government of the Philippine Islands” were to be 
dealt with in that order.  Further, the bill provided that once the uprising was put down: 
all military, civil, and judicial powers necessary to govern said islands 
shall, unless otherwise provided by Congress, be vested in such person 
and persons and shall be exercised in such a manner as the President of the 
United States shall direct.403 
Supporters of Senator Spooner’s bill were perfectly willing to delay decisions on 
long-term civil governance for the Philippines.   In their view, the president had been on 
                                                 
401 The day the second bill was referred to committee, Senator Tillman stated his bill was in direct 
opposition and should also be referred. 33 Cong. Rec. 1255 (29 January 1900). 
402 The complete text of the president’s instructions to the “Taft Commission” was reported in major 
newspapers during the months after the Commission’s institution, during the congressional recess. 
“President’s Policy in the Philippines: His Instructions to Members of the Second Commission,” New York 
Times, 18 September 1900. 
403 33 Cong. Rec. 763 (11 January 1900). 
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the correct course administering the islands with military government under his powers as 
commander in chief.  This bill was merely intended to shift those actions to rest under his 
powers as chief executive.  A more permanent solution could be crafted later. 
Unlike the Senate deliberations over the Organic Act for Porto Rico, 
consideration of these two very different prescriptions for governance in the Philippines 
was conducted at a leisurely pace.404  Senator Spooner requested his bill be referred to 
the Committee on the Philippines, which in turn reported it out favorably without 
amendments two months later. The bill’s return to the Senate was supported by a major 
speech on 7 March by that committee’s chairman, Senator Lodge, who characterized 
Senator Spooner’s position as a commonsensical approach to a complex problem.405  He 
contrasted this with the opposition’s bill, which “presents no policy, but invites us to 
make promises.”406  Finally, he dismissed the assumption of consent of the governed as a 
necessary basis for governance in the Philippines by reviving the limited consent 
arguments discussed in earlier chapters.407 
Several opposition senators challenged small misquotes or generalities, but none 
engaged in direct debate with Senator Lodge that day or for most of the rest of the 
session.  Seconds after the Porto Rico Organic Act was settled on 3 April, Senator Lodge 
tried to bring up Senator Spooner’s bill on government for the Philippines but was 
stymied by Democrats pleading they were not yet ready for debate.408  This pattern 
                                                 
404 The disruption of commerce in Puerto Rico in the aftermath of a hurricane, and by markets closed 
as a result of Spain’s defeat, motivated senators to act swiftly in the debates over the Foraker Act, as shown 
earlier in this chapter. There were no such motivations to haste in regards to passing an organic act for the 
Philippines. 
405 “This bill, Mr. President, is simple but all sufficient. It makes no declarations and offers no 
promises as to a future we cannot yet predict. It meets the need of the present and stops there.” Senator 
Lodge’s speech, however, does not. It continues over fifteen large, two-column pages of the transcripts, 
taking nearly three hours to deliver. 33 Cong. Rec. 2617 (7 March 1900). 
406 Senator Lodge stated: “I should be glad, as a preliminary, to state the policy proposed by our 
opponents…but I have thus far been unable to discover what their policy is. No doubt it exists, no doubt it 
is beautiful, but, like many beautiful things, is seems to the average searcher after the truth as both 
diaphanous and elusive.” Ibid., 2617–18. 
407 Consent of the governed as envisioned by the founders was not universal, as white men underage, 
women, the simple, and slaves did not have a vote. In the Philippines, therefore, consent of the elite would 
suffice, and conform to precedent. Ibid.  
408 33 Cong. Rec. 3699 (3 April 1900) (statements of Senators Pettus, Jones, and Carter). 
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would continue until late May, when the looming 7 June end of session spurred efforts to 
clean up the pending calendar.409   
As shown with previous decisions on imperial policy, the final weeks of the 
session were crammed full of appropriations bills and pending legislation demanding 
attention before recess.  Despite the packed calendar, Senator Spooner rose on 22 May to 
make a few comments in support of his bill.  What followed amounted to an informal 
filibuster; he spoke over three days for hours on end, filling a third of each day’s 
transcripts.  As with the lengthy speeches made earlier on the subject, Senator Spooner 
dealt mostly in the abstract with nary a word on prospective forms of government for the 
Philippines.410  Far from espousing one form or government over the other with those 
tens of thousands of words, his most salient passage explained that his bill was superior 
to that offered by Senator Tillman precisely because his own was open-ended, vague, and 
sought only to codify the course on which the executive had already embarked.411 
Not to be outdone, the opposition took the bait, and Senator Mason launched a 
mini filibuster of his own, stating the time had come for debate:  
I have been waiting here for fifty days to get an opportunity to express 
some views…two speeches have been delivered by distinguished senators 
in favor of the bill, covering four days of time, and no word has as yet 
been heard from anyone who is opposed to it, as I am.412   
                                                 
409 The bill remained in unfinished business, dismissed daily until Senator Morgan offered an 
amendment guaranteeing Filipino rights and establishing currency exchange and customs collecting on the 
islands. The amendment was tabled. 33 Cong. Rec. 5895 (23 May 1900). 
410 For example, pages were spent debating if any promises were indeed made to Aguinaldo prior to 
the invasion, or in vicious back and forth with Senator Tillman on the parallels between colonial 
government and the carpetbaggers that infested the South after the Civil War. Senator Spooner’s speeches 
covered over 10 pages of the transcript in the Record each day. 33 Cong. Rec. 5843–52, 5895–5904, and 
5950-61 (22–25 May 1900). 
411 Senator Spooner argued: “We have not the information as to the conditions over there to enable us 
to pass a government bill now…Congress ought to put this measure of authority behind the President…to 
leave it all to his war powers seemed to me unjust. That was all. It was no play for politics…there is no 
issue here of imperialism or anti-imperialism.” Ibid., 5960. 
412 Republican Senator Mason of Illinois, leading a handful of other rogue Republicans, continued to 
act against the wishes of his party on imperial policy and fed concern that the Spooner bill would not attract 
the required 44 votes, even with 52 Republicans seated. It was this uncertainty that informed the tactic of 
delay. 33 Cong. Rec. 5962 (24 May 1900).  
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He decried the power of railroad and shipping syndicates over the Republican 
Party, and how those interests were dictating that pending legislation would be a topic for 
the presidential election.413  Once again, pages of transcript roll by without actual debate 
on either the bill itself or prospective governmental schemes for the Philippines.   
Senator Mason attacked the bill favored by the other side not for its specifics, but 
rather for its provenance and ideals.  In this case, he pointed out that Senator Spooner’s 
bill repeated nearly verbatim the 31 October 1803 congressional act empowering the 
president to administer the newly acquired Louisiana Purchase.  The relevant difference, 
however, was that the act for Louisiana deliberately limited its life to the session of 
Congress in which it was approved, while the Spooner bill suffered no such limits.414  
Senator Mason then offered a tidy summation of the loftiest ideals advanced in resisting 
the Spooner bill: 
The Constitution of the United States cuts off all imperialism and 
absolutism…This bill is the supreme expression and crown jewel of 
absolutism.  It confounds and abolishes the distinctions and destroys the 
boundaries that separate the legislative, executive, and judicial…and 
concentrates all the powers of the government in the hands of the 
President, to be exerted by him, in his own discretion, and without 
responsibility…taking away from the Senate the power to confirm or 
reject his nominations to office.415 
After these two massive speeches neatly circumnavigated the topic of government 
for the Philippines, further discussion was delayed until 5 June, two days prior to 
adjournment.416  Starting in the afternoon session and continuing through the evening, 
Senator Spooner’s bill was again debated only in the abstract.  Again, the most effective 
voice of the opposition came from the Republican caucus.   
                                                 
413 Senator Mason continued: “It is, however, the assertion of the political friends of the president that 
his desire is to prevent a vote on that measure at this session of Congress…I believe that the railroad and 
the canal syndicate are more influential with the managers of the Republican party in the Senate than any 
wishes of the President.”  33 Cong. Rec. 6029 (25 May 1900). 
414 Ibid., 6020. 
415 Ibid. 
416 One of the other topics that took priority was nearly 50 pages devoted solely to the allegations of 
impropriety in the election of Senator Hanna, who was in attendance during the deliberations. The 
transcripts for this day ran 214 pages, more than tripling the recent average. 
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Silver Republican Senator Pettigrew showed the seeds of the present discord were 
planted over a year earlier by those who had supported the McEnery resolution following 
the ratification of the Treaty of Paris.  He specifically identified the clauses that denied 
Filipinos citizenship and denied intent to incorporate the territory as central to Senator 
Spooner’s position.417  He closed by showing that expansionist claims of beneficial trade 
with the Philippines were false.418   
Well into the night subsequent speakers had much to say, but little of substance.  
The next two days were largely consumed by discussion of the sundry appropriations and 
naval appropriations bills and legislative housekeeping.  The bills crafting a government 
for the Philippines were not brought up again, and the Senate adjourned until December, 
ending the first session.  The task of passing law to guide transition to civil government 
in the Philippines was thus willfully avoided until the second session of the 56th 









                                                 
417 “There is your doctrine of imperialism. By it we propose to hold a people against their will as a 
colony of this Republic—one man power, absolute despotism government under the resolution [and] the 
Senator from Wisconsin [Spooner] complains that we raise the issue of imperialism?” 33 Cong. Rec. 6647 
(5 June 1900).  
418 Senator Pettigrew refuted Republican claims of a profitable relationship with the Philippines by 
showing customs returns for three months in 1899, with all imports into the Philippines totaling 7million, 
but only $331,000 from the United States. He also pointed out one third of the American trades was liquor; 
his point being the commercial benefits were low, and to some extent tawdry. Ibid., 6648. 
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IX. HOW THE PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION OF 1900 AFFECTED 
SENATE DECISIONS ON THE PERMANENT STATUS OF THE 
PHILIPPINES AND CUBA 
The returns from the election of 1900 did not change the composition of the 
returning 56th Congress Senate and would have negligible effect on its successor.  Gains 
by the two major parties reflected the implosion of two minor parties and not electoral 
gains in the state assemblies.419  Of great import, however, were presidential returns that 
revealed the relative strengths of the two platforms.  The party of the incumbent, 
empowered by voters’ response displaying acceptance of monetary and imperial policy 
decisions thus far, proceeded to craft governing documents for the new territories unlike 
any that had come before.  The debates on these governance schemes illuminate the 
intersection between imperial policy and domestic politics, and would have outsize 
implications for America in the century just begun.420 
William Jennings Bryan was the fusion candidate of both the Populist and 
Democratic Parties in the 1896 election, but a schism within the People’s Party led 
Populists to nominate a separate candidate in 1900.   Potential support for Bryan was 
further splintered by the candidate’s decision to champion two major platform planks 
during his campaign: bi-metallism and anti-expansionism.  Had he successfully advanced 
both issues, Bryan may have enjoyed increased appeal to a larger audience.   The 
Republican Party, however, countered by repurposing high public support for the Spanish 
American War to deflect their opponent’s critique on expansionism while emphasizing 
                                                 
419 The seven-Populist contingent of the 56th Congress Senate withered to two in the 57th Congress, 
four of which became Democrats. In addition, the Silver Party disintegrated; one each of its two Senators 
shifted to the Democratic and Republican Parties. The Silver Republicans enjoyed the only increase of a 
minor party as former Republican Senator Foster of Washington swelled the cadre to three. As a result of 
the election and subsequent appointments to seats left vacant years previous, the 57th Congress Senate 
stabilized at 56 Republicans, 28 Democrats, three Silver Republicans, two Populists, and one remaining 
vacancy (Delaware, since 4 March 1899). Given the split voting records of the Silver and Silver Republican 
senators in the previous Senate, the balance between the Republican and Democratic caucuses remained 
essentially unchanged. 
420 Historians Grenville and Young called the American actions relative to the Philippines “a 
fascinating illustration of the impact of strategic decisions on the relations of the great powers. The 
occupation of the islands has profoundly influenced American diplomacy in the twentieth century.” 
Grenville and Young, Politics, Strategy, and American Diplomacy, 267. 
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returned prosperity to undermine the lingering appeal of bi-metallism.  As a result, 
Bryan’s exhortations alienated both anti-expansionists who backed the gold standard, and 
proponents of silver who thrilled to America’s military successes.421   
The outcome of these decisions was a solid re-election victory for President 
McKinley.  Expansionist senators contemplating popular reception of pending bills 
regarding Cuba, Puerto Rico, and the Philippine Islands well noted the failure of Bryan’s 
campaign gamble.  The Democratic candidate’s invective railings against overseas 
acquisition did not resonate sufficiently with the American voters to give pause.  While 
by no means a mandate in favor of imperialism, the returns clearly demonstrated this 
topic did not warrant continued avoidance that had been the rule in the last session.  One 
important by-product of the elections, therefore, was a dramatically different approach to 
colonial governance when the Senate returned to Washington for the three-month long 
second session preceding the inauguration. 
A. INDUCEMENT TO ACTION: THE PRESIDENT’S ANNUAL ADDRESS 
AND A BILL FOR REORGANIZATION OF THE ARMY  
On 3 December 1900, the second session of the 56th Congress Senate got under 
way.  Minus Senators Gear and Davis, who had died during recess, the same senators that 
had so ably circumnavigated the topic of governance in the Philippines during the debates 
of the previous spring again met to grapple with the grand problems of the republic.  If 
the 56th Congress Senate’s first session had been characterized by voluminous speeches 
calculated to avoid bringing the issue to bear, its second session began with six weeks of 
deliberations during which the topic of colonial government was not brought up once.   
The issue, in fact, was first broached by the executive.  Nearly one-third of 
President McKinley’s December 1900 Annual Message to Congress was dedicated to 
four topics central to the upcoming debates on colonial government: detailed description 
                                                 
421 Senator Bacon stated it would be a mistake to believe the people weighed in on imperialism, 
“whether or not this country should be converted from a free Republic into an imperialistic government, 
holding colonies,” and that the issue is now decided because the Republicans won the election. There was 
no such mandate precisely because the Republican Party “studiously avoided those issues and studiously 
endeavoured to make the American people believe that they were not involved in the contest…they won 
the election on the financial question and a full dinner pail.” 34 Cong. Rec. 1021 (14 January 1901). 
 167 
of the proposed structure of government for the Philippines, a report on successes in the 
nascent Puerto Rican legislature, announcement the Cuban Constitutional Convention 
convened the same day, and entreaties to increase the authorized end strength and 
restructure the army.   
While naval might was a requirement to keep overseas territories, this focus on 
land forces legislation makes sense in context.  In his address the president praised and 
supported the ongoing building program for the navy and then concentrated on army 
restructuring for two reasons.  First, the former represented a policy of protecting 
incremental gains while the latter called for a major change in policy.  Secondly, as will 
be shown, expiration of contracts and funding deadlines were bringing the army to a 
critical juncture that provided an auspicious opportunity for sweeping reform. 
The president introduced this section by pointing out that his last annual message 
had urged the Senate to act on crafting a government for the Philippines, a reference to 
the stalled Spooner bill.  Since no legislation had emerged by the end of the first session, 
the executive moved boldly during recess and empowered the five-man commission to 
implement a civil government there.422  Executive direction later increased the authority 
of the commission, first by transferring some powers from the military government to the 
civil commission, and then in September by authorizing the commission to make laws, 
raise revenue, and expend public funds.423  
While President McKinley had acted decisively and unilaterally during recess, 
constitutional limitations necessitated congressional authorization to progress further.  
                                                 
422 “In my last message…seeking to impress upon you that the grave responsibilities of the future 
government of those islands rests with the Congress of the United States, I abstained from recommending 
at that time a specific and formal form of government for the territory…No contrary will of the Congress 
having been made, I have steadfastly pursued the purpose so declared, employing the civil arm…and the 
institution of local governments within the lines of authority and law. Progress in the hoped-for direction 
has been favorable.” William McKinley, “Annual Message of the President to the Senate and the House of 
Representatives,” Journal of the Senate of the United States, Second Session of the Fifty-Sixth Congress, 
1901, 10. 
423 “Beginning with the 1st day of September 1900, the authority to exercise, subject to my approval, 
through the Secretary of War, that part of the power of government in the Philippine Islands which is of a 
legislative nature is to be transferred from the military governor of the islands to this commission, to be 
thereafter exercised by them…until the establishment of the civil central government for the islands.” The 
committee was also empowered to establish an educational system, civil service, courts, government 
departments, and to make appointments those bodies. Ibid, 11. 
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The exigencies of occupation and the ongoing armed conflict in the Philippines had 
sanctioned the president’s actions under his powers as commander in chief of the 
military.  Pacification and extension of the commission’s authority into activities less 
directly associated with crisis, however, such as establishment of systems of public 
education and a civil judiciary, pushed the limits of his wartime powers.   
To build institutions of a more permanent nature in the Philippines, as had been 
the case in Puerto Rico the previous year, required an organic act from Congress, or at 
least that body’s authorization for the executive branch to pursue those ends.  Avoiding 
the formality of an organic act, the president decided to pursue endorsement of his recess 
actions along the lines of the authorization included in last session’s Spooner bill.  If 
successful, this option would provide the president the legislative backing to solidify the 
sort of territorial government he intended to put in place without actually handing over 
control to the Senate. 
The Senate, however, did not address the president’s request directly.  In fact, 
unlike the sessions discussed previously, no major issue dominated the discussion until 
mid-January.  Instead, the Senate engaged on dozens of topics at near equal frequency, 
with modernization of the army the most commonly debated by a slight margin.  Initially, 
these early army debates concentrated more on promotions and structure than the 
requested increase in end strength.424  As many of these smaller issues were decided, 
however, the discussion increasingly turned to restructuring the army and determining its 
permanent size. 
The two topics were interrelated and equally urgent.  At the time the Senate 
considered the question, end strength was swelled artificially by virtue of an 1899 act that 
had temporarily increased maximum size of the army to 65,000 regulars and 35,000 
volunteers.  Following precedent that limited army authorization acts to two-year 
duration, that expansion act was scheduled to expire during the rapidly approaching 
                                                 
424 The president’s annual message relayed concerns over sustaining the effort in the newly acquired 
colonies, but the debates in the Senate instead covered the number of corporals allotted to cavalry troops, 
the promotion track of surgeons, awarding of medals, and issues of equipage. This diverse dialog 
eventually came around to the end strength and regularization issues as a result of discussions on 
imperialism. 
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recess.  As a result, manpower would shrink dramatically at the end of June, reducing the 
regular army to the statutory limit of approximately 32,500, and returning all the 
volunteers to civilian life.  Adequately manning contingents posted to Cuba, Puerto Rico, 
the Philippines, China, as well as the array of new domestic coastal artillery defense sites, 
was calculated to require approximately three times the number of soldiers that would be 
available as of 1 July 1901.   
The perceived urgency of army manning to stabilize the newly acquired colonies 
had changed considerably during those two years.  With Cuba and Puerto Rico peaceful, 
to senators opposed to maintaining a large standing army retaining volunteers for 
whatever time was required to pacify the Philippines seemed the sensible solution.  To 
senators heeding the president’s call to modernize and regularize the army, however, 
ongoing pacification efforts in the Philippines no longer constituted the crisis necessary 
to justify continued mobilization of the volunteers.  They proposed to increase the regular 
component to match the required manning.  The issue of regularizing the army was 
thereby married to the question of how, and whether, to sustain the end strength 
necessary to service the demands of empire.   
During this phase of the debates in January 1901, senators who favored a larger 
army cited the uncertain progress of pacification, and the need to fully man coastal 
artillery sites, to support their cause.  They also made the case that timing offered an 
opportunity to reduce shipping costs.  If the bill were passed during the current session, 
newly authorized regular army replacements could be sent to the Philippines in the same 
ships used to repatriate the demobilized volunteers.425  Including authorization for both 
in the pending army appropriations bill was the surest way to reduce both cost and risk.  
If Congress could not address the issue before adjourning, a special session would be 
                                                 
425 For example of senators engaged in a running dialog either airing their discontent with 
empowering the president to make end strength increases or disarming such concerns, see 34 Cong. Rec. 
963–79 (14 January 1901) (statements of Senators Bacon, Foraker, Proctor, Caffery, Allen, Spooner, and 
Mallory). 
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necessary immediately to pass legislation before the temporary increased manning act 
expired in June.426 
The resistance to these measures featured three main points.  Several senators 
argued that maintaining a large standing army was dangerous to any republic.  Others 
argued that important military virtues would be lost by decreased reliance on volunteers.  
These senators complained that the traditional role of state militias in national defense 
would be undermined, as would the associated patronage dispensed by governors and 
assemblies.427   
The third point advanced was both the most discussed and also the link that led 
the debates to bind imperialism tightly to army appropriations.  At its heart was the 
proposal to allow the authorized size of the army to remain at 100,000 not for a specified 
period, but for a period contingent upon the president’s appraisal of progress in pacifying 
the Filipino insurrectionists.428  This contemplated latitude generated in the Senate a 
foreboding aspect of permanence inconsistent with a tradition of army funding only two 
years at a time.  Senator Money pointed out wisdom of the British Parliament that limited 
army appropriations by enacting the mutiny act annually: The English have never yet 
consented that the Queen shall maintain an army nor support it at its maximum strength 
or any other strength, and they never will.  Oh, it comes to the democratic and republican 
Americans to have such great faith in the executive [to contemplate such a folly].429 
In addition to the enduring nature of such allowances was added senators’ 
ongoing concerns over executive and legislative branch roles.  Democratic, Populist, and 
                                                 
426 The incoming Congress was not scheduled to meet until December 1901. The current and 
projected manning numbers for the army were listed in the president’s address, and later would be affirmed 
by many senators supporting the measure. William McKinley, “Annual Message,” 15. 
427 Democratic Senator Bate offered but one example: “it transfers the vast patronage that belongs to 
the organization of troops from the governors of the States to the President of the United States. That is the 
milk in the coconut…it centers strength in one man, the head of the central government.” 34 Cong. Rec. 
1129 (17 January 1901). 
428 Senator Teller predicted the president would consider this latitude a one-way ratchet. If the 
Congress granted discretion on end strength and “let the president increase it and decrease it as he chooses. 
I want to say he will never decrease it. He declares that we want 60,000 men in the Philippines, and that we 
will want them there for a number of years.” 34 Cong. Rec. 1026 (20 January 1901). 
429 34 Cong. Rec. 1120 (17 January 1901). 
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some Republican senators expressed concern that replacing an explicit expiration date in 
the act with presidential latitude to determine its duration would also cede de facto 
control over appropriations.430  When concerns over a similar lack of expiration date in 
the president’s plans for government in the Philippines emerged, the parallels in army 
funding, size, and patronage uncontrolled outside of the executive branch added fuel to 
the fire fanned by anti-imperialists. 
B. HOW A DISCUSSION ABOUT THE ARMY BECAME DEBATE ON 
IMPERIALISM 
On 14 January 1901, the tenor of the conversation changed from strictly army 
matters to a broader discourse on colonial administration.  The story of how the 
permanent structure of the government of the Philippines came to be muddled together in 
an appropriations bill with the reorganization of land forces offers a revealing exposition 
on how American imperial policy was crafted, and a careful reading of the final bill 
offers unique contextual insight into the process.431 
While the Spooner Amendment authorizing presidential establishment of a civil 
government in the Philippines, and the Platt Amendment codifying presidential desires 
for limited independence in Cuba, would eventually both be tailored for grafting to the 
army authorization bill by their Republican sponsors, it was a Democratic senator that 
first tied colonial governance and army funding together.  On 14 January, Senator Berry 
offered an amendment intended to force the president to set the Philippines on the course 
                                                 
430 Senator Bacon argued: “It is not simply a question of the legislative branch of this government 
abdicating its power to determine what shall be the size of the Army…but it is a question of putting it in to 
the power of the executive to increase the expenditures from thirty to fifty million dollars in the course of 
one year, and compelling Congress to appropriate without any suggestion from Congress in the way of 
initiation of that expenditure.” 34 Cong. Rec. 963 (14 January 1901). 
431 There was no effort spent in segregating the colonial governance amendments from the 
appropriations bill. Reading the final document is a jarring experience: in the midst of a paragraph on 
reporting of erroneous pay and clarification of terms of enlistment, the preamble of the Platt Amendment 
begins without even a full stop separating it from the previous sentence. After that amendment’s eight 
articles, the next paragraph appropriates funding for engineer battalions. Twelve pages later, under the 
heading “Ordnance Department” and immediately following discussion of appointments to the Board of 
Ordnance is found the two-paragraph Spooner Amendment. As the amendments and topics are clearly 
labeled in the margins, however, the presentation seems less subterfuge than careless certitude. 
 172 
to independence within 10 days of signing the army appropriations bill.432  With this 
connection established, the Army Appropriations Act of 1901 became the vehicle of 
choice not only to force army restructuring, but also to pass into law schemes for 
governing Cuba and the Philippines. 
The debates on colonial governance during three weeks following Senator Berry’s 
amendment were characterized by highly idealistic arguments that made no progress 
toward resolution.  Senators tied army appropriations ever tighter to imperialism, in one 
instance completely: “A standing army for an indefinite period of time of 100,000 men 
for the sole purpose of keeping a lot of Filipinos in subjection.  That is the sole object of 
this proposed law.  It has no other purpose.”433  Both sides stated their positions on 
optimizing the military establishment to address the long-term requirements of colonial 
pacification.  Neither side, however, was ready to put its favored prescription to a vote, 
and often supported idealistic positions with concerns regarding the financial costs of the 
enterprise:  
The vital, overshadowing question that immediately and necessarily arises 
is, ‘Does the present necessity for 100,000 men require that there should 
be the permanent organization of an army of that magnitude?’  If the 
Philippines are to be permanently retained, and if their retention will 
require for all time that the United States shall keep up a regular army of 
100,000 men, then the advocates of this bill should say so frankly…the 
people of the United States could look the situation squarely in the face 
and determine whether they wished to dominate a colony in Asia at the 
annual cost of…over $100,000,000.434 
In addition, these topics were only sporadically addressed.  As had often 
happened in the past, critical legislation was habitually delayed by routine matters, 
                                                 
432 Senator Berry proposed “to disclaim sovereignty, jurisdiction or control over the Philippine Islands 
except for the role of pacification thereof, and asserts its determination, when that is accomplished, to leave 
the government and control of the islands to its people.” 34 Cong. Rec. 979 (14 January 1901). 
433 Senator Money continued: “It comes from the policy of expansion…it was a wild fury of a great, 
rich, populous nation drunken with its success to extend its domination over somebody else, and I hope the 
nation will have a lucid interval pretty soon and see that the policy does not continue.” 34 Cong. Rec. 1120 
(17 January 1901).  
434 34 Cong. Rec. 1018 (15 January 1901) (statement of Senator Bacon). 
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resulting in a familiar a pre-recess logjam of pending appropriations bills.435  This pattern 
was especially evident at the end of a Congress, because unlike adjournments for 
holidays or end of first session, pending legislation not acted on before adjournment sine 
die would simply expire.436   
When the discussion did turn to matters in the colonies, it was conducted largely 
on two levels.  On a higher plane, discussion revolved around the twin concerns of 
absolute power and permanence.437  The senators in opposition generally pointed to the 
lack of self-expiration clause, in both the army end strength increase and the powers that 
would have been granted by last session’s Spooner bill, as manifestation of those 
dangers, with one stating that “the limitations put on the exercise of unlimited power are 
not imposed for good men, but for bad men.  Unrestricted power is tyranny, whether it is 
exercised or not.”438  In response, senators in favor or granting wide presidential latitude 
listed precedents of the Senate ceding such powers.439 
On a lower plane, debate over the justice inherent in a policy of common 
treatment for Cuba, Puerto Rico, and the Philippines dominated the conversation.  In 
general, Populist and Democratic senators championed establishment of civilian rule in 
the Philippines at least as liberal as that recently inaugurated in Puerto Rico, and they 
expressed hope that the limited independence being discussed for Cuba would pave the 
                                                 
435 A partial list of acts that feature prominently in the transcript includes a Transportation and 
Commerce Subsidy bill, as well as Bridges, Naval, Rivers and Ports, Indian, and Fortifications 
appropriation bills.  Also, general legislation dominating several days’ debate included the Nicaraguan 
Canal bill, Oleomargarine bill, and pension increases or extensions too numerous to track. 
436 “Glossary of Terms,” Senate, 
http://www.senate.gov/reference/glossary_term/adjournment_sine_die.htm.  
437 Senator Money offered one example regarding permanence: “for the first time in our history the 
House bill does not put in a limit to the term for which the Army is to be raised, an indication that, in their 
opinion, this exigency or emergency instead of merely being an epoch is to become an era.” 34 Cong. Rec. 
1116 (17 January 1901). 
438 Senator Teller continued: “It is contrary to the principles of a free government that there should not 
be limitations of some kind upon executive acts.” 34 Cong. Rec. 1023 (15 January 1901). 
439 Republican Senator Sewell listed 10 instances in the first half of the nineteenth century that the 
president was authorized such latitude. 34 Cong. Rec. 1013 (15 January 1901).  
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way for a similar arrangement in the archipelago.440  Most Republican senators, however, 
opined that each colony warranted a solution tailored to its unique circumstances.441  
Again avoiding a decisive vote, however, both sides turned to accusations of politicizing 
these important topics and pointed to earlier attempts to do so during the presidential 
elections.442 
Entering the final month of the 56th Congress, both sides seemed clear on where 
they stood, but less certain on how to advance.  To support the president’s initiatives, the 
pro-administration Republican senators knew they had to fund the Army, replace 
volunteers with expiring terms, rotate occupation forces, and maintain high troop levels. 
To offset their opponents’ fears regarding end strength, they softened the picture by 
pointing out that the president could choose to make the force smaller than the maximum 
authorized.  Regarding permanence they suggested that Congress would meet again in 
December, free to alter the legislation to suit interim developments.443  Their counsel was 
to approve legislation that would place the correct force in the Philippines as soon as 
possible. 
While searching for a way to resist the president’s initiatives, the Democratic, 
Populist, Silver Republican, and dissident Republican senators stumbled upon a strategy 
that would not require them to vote against army appropriations during wartime.  
 
 
                                                 
440 Populist Senator Allen supported administering the Philippines just like Cuba “acting more in the 
nature of a trustee of an express trust than in the nature of a proprietor of these so-called new 
possessions…and that no attempt whatever would be made upon the part of this government to reduce 
those islands to colonies of the United States, or to hold them in subjection any further or any longer than 
was necessary to enable them to set up a government of their own.” 34 Cong. Rec. 1069 (16 January 1901). 
441 Senator McCumber cited from President McKinley’s instructions to the Philippine Commission to 
show that they established “a local self-government as free…as is the government of Canada or that of any 
country which is not absolutely independent in itself.” 34 Cong. Rec. 1077 (16 January 1901). 
442 For one example Senator Money stated: “During the campaign, I know that this question of 
imperialism was scoffed at and jeered at and whistled down the wind by Republican orators. They were all 
the time trying to divert public attention from that question to the silver question.” 34 Cong. Rec. 1116 (17 
January 1901). 
443 Senator McCumber remarked on the bill’s end strength proposal: “I cannot see anything in it to 
prevent the President of the United States from making it less…We do not surrender our authority. We 
meet here again on the first Monday of next December. We can modify the bill. We can create an army 
greater or less at that time, according to our views.” 34 Cong. Rec. 1077 (16 January 1901). 
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Ironically, it was a pro-expansion Republican senator who first expressed what would 
shortly become the opposition position: colloquially, that the pudding was not yet 
cooked.   
Republican Senator Carter of Montana made a speech intended to assert that the 
Philippine Commission was well suited to run the Philippines and that, by virtue of being 
on the scene, it was more competent than the Senate.444  He then spoke at length on the 
fact that the Senate itself was unsure of what sort of government should be created for the 
Philippines, which made it premature to make any permanent plans.445  Senator Carter 
viewed this argument as supporting the policy of allowing the president latitude, but his 
speech would empower Democrats to make the opposite point: that allowing the 
president to decide on revenue generation, courts, and education while conditions 
remained so obscure and unsettled was ill-advised.  
Opposition Democrats also adopted a sentiment from President McKinley’s 
recent Annual Message to Congress.  Citing the successes in the Cuban elections for 
constitutional convention delegates and the first meeting of that body, the president had 
promised to forward to Congress the product of the convention for consideration during 
deliberations over colonial governance.446  Until that document was received and 
digested by the Senate, however, the opposition argued that any decisions on the Cuban 
question would also be premature. 
                                                 
444 Senator Carter argued: “Taking the character of the commission into consideration, we are justified 
in assuming that the gentlemen charged with the authority and conversant with the facts are more likely to 
act wisely and well…than the Congress of the United States, possessed of only fragmentary information…” 
34 Cong. Rec. 1165 (18 January 1901). 
445 Senator Carter added: “The Congress of the United States has not reached any conclusion with 
reference to the extent to which its legislative power will be extended in the Philippine Islands… These 
questions might be multiplied indefinitely, and the only answer that could be made would be that the mind 
of Congress has not yet reached a conclusion with reference to the elementary principles that are to govern 
its action in relation to legislation controlling affairs and people in the Philippine Islands.” Ibid. 
446 President McKinley had directed election of delegates to the constitutional convention for Cuba in 
September 1900, and that body met in November: “when the convention concludes its labors I will transmit 
to the Congress the constitution as framed by the convention for its consideration and for such action as it 
may deem advisable.” William McKinley, “Annual Message,” (1901), 13. 
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C. IT IS DIFFICULT FOR THE PLAYER TO WIN IF THE DEALER MAY 
CHANGE THE FACE VALUE OF THE CARDS 
Positions thus established, the topic of colonial governance emerged less 
frequently as debate on other pressing questions consumed the Senate’s time.447  Ending 
the three weeks of higher-level discussions of imperialism and more routine development 
of strategic approaches, the game changed again on 8 February.  The focus switched from 
esoteric discourse to the practical question of implementation when Senator Spooner 
proposed a modified version of his eponymous bill from the previous session, but this 
time as an amendment to the pending army appropriations bill.  The amendment was 
referred to the Committee on the Philippines en route to the Committee on Military 
Affairs.448  While the committees perfected the amendment, pressure to complete 
deliberations on the army appropriations bill before session’s end continued to build: 
That is what we wish.  Within the days that remain of this session we 
might give to those people a government.  If that is not time enough, then 
we say it is the duty of the President of the United States to call Congress 
together, so that we may give to those people the advantage of a civil 
government, not at the hands of the Executive, but at the hands of the 
constitutional authorities of this government in legislation—Congress 
itself.449 
Senator Lodge favorably reported the Spooner amendment out of the Committee 
on the Philippines on 11 February, without comment or changes.  It was then referred to 
the Committee on Military Affairs, the committee having jurisdiction over the army 
appropriations bill.  By this time, that bill had acquired dozens of amendments and 
hundreds of clarifications, and the committee incorporated the changes daily as they 
came off the floor.  The next time the bill would be read through in updated form to the 
Senate would be as the vote was conducted.  
                                                 
447 A few of the major topics displacing colonial governance in late January and early February 1901 
were continued debate over the Indian bill, the Naval Appropriations bill, the Trade and Commerce bill, 
transportation bills, and transmission of Senate condolences to the Parliament on the occasion of Queen 
Victoria’s death, 22 January. 
448 34 Cong. Rec. 2117 (8 February 1901). 
449 34 Cong. Rec. 2014 (6 February 1901) (statement of Senator Teller). 
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The Senate returned to consideration of the colonial aspect of the army bill with a 
vengeance on 25 February, and the topic dominated the extra-long sessions of the next 
two days.450  In a parallel development, Senator Platt favorably reported his amendment 
out of the Committee on Cuba, which he chaired, and recommended it be referred to the 
Committee on Military Affairs to also be included as an amendment to the army 
appropriations bill.  Unlike the Spooner amendment, which featured broad approval for 
the detailed plan of action spelled out in the president’s Message to Congress, the Platt 
amendment read like classic general legislation.  Its format of title, preamble, resolution, 
articles, and nullification of all previous conflicting legislation were clearly out of place 
when inserted verbatim into an appropriations bill.  
Immediately, Democratic Senator Pettus rose to a point of order, citing the Senate 
standing rule against inserting general legislation into an appropriations bill.451  In a 
dismissive response, the Presiding Officer declined to rule.  Far from being a neutral 
observer, the President pro tempore during the 54th through 62nd Congresses was 
Republican Senator Frye of Maine.  Senator Frye—who, notably, had been an 
expansionist member of the Paris Peace committee—was the sole leadership in the 
Senate; Vice President Hobart had died in November 1899 and the position remained 
vacant.452   
Shortly thereafter, the Spooner amendment was also reported favorably and 
accepted as an amendment to the appropriations bill.  Senator Pettus again objected, 
leading to a most unusual application of senate rules.  Betting even Republican senators 
who opposed overseas expansion would vote with the party line over a question of order, 
                                                 
450 As was characteristic in the final weeks of Congresses described previously, the Senate met daily 
other than Sunday, beginning an hour earlier than customary and continuing beyond midnight. The 
transcripts for those days are two or even three times the usual daily length. This schedule is doubly 
impressive considering that many senators also sat on committees that continued to meet in this period to 
perfect pending legislation. 
451 Standing Senate rule of order, Amendments and Motions, “5. It shall not be in order to consider 
any proposed committee amendment (other than a technical, clerical, or conforming amendment) which 
contains any significant matter not within the jurisdiction of the committee proposing such amendment.” 
“Rules of the Senate,” Committee on Rules and Administration, 
http://www.rules.senate.gov/public/index.cfm?p=RuleXV.  
452 “Frye, William Pierce (1830–1911),” Biographical Guide of the U.S. Senate, 
http://bioguide.congress.gov/scripts/biodisplay.pl?index=F000398. 
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or at least decline to vote, Senator Frye pounced.  Once both the Spooner and Platt 
amendments had been accepted, the President pro tempore submitted both objections to 
Senate, asking, “are the amendments in order?”453  The motion passed on a near-party 
line vote, thus allowing the majority party to subvert a clearly written prohibition on 
attaching general legislation amendments to appropriations bills.454  The expansionist 
senators, led by Senator Frye, had succeeded by interpreting one rule to contradict itself, 
and a second rule to obviate the first.455 
This move proved doubly crucial in preparation for the subsequent votes on the 
army bill.  First, submitting the question of order to the Senate as a whole served as a 
low-stakes litmus test to gauge the strength of opposition.  Floor comments on the issue 
by a few Republican senators had caused their votes to come into question.  By virtue of 
Senator Frye’s gamble, the fidelity of this small group was confirmed; only one 
Republican voted against allowing the amendments.  More importantly—and more in line 
with the bundling-of-issues approach employed by the Republicans in the votes on 
intervention in Cuba—the threat that high-minded, idealistic senators would support an 
isolated issue was reduced by entangling the Spooner and Platt amendments in a wartime 
funding measure.   
                                                 
453 “A question of order may be raised at any stage of the proceedings, except when the Senate is 
voting or ascertaining the presence of a quorum, and, unless submitted to the Senate, shall be decided by 
the Presiding Officer without debate... 2. The Presiding Officer may submit any question of order for the 
decision of the Senate [emphasis added].” “Rules of the Senate,” Committee on Rules and Administration, 
http://www.rules.senate.gov/public/index.cfm?p=RuleXX.  
454 The amendments were accepted as in order by a vote of 39 yeas, 23 nays, and 26 not voting. The 
yeas were all Republicans plus one Silver Party senator switching to Republican and no Democrats, Silver 
Republicans, or Populists. The 23 nay were 17 Democrats, four Populists, one Silver Republican, and one 
lonely Republican, Senator Pettigrew of South Dakota. Of the 26 not voting, the 10 not accounted for in 
pairs were seven GOP and three Democrat/Populists; no chance their votes would have made a difference. 
455 The Senate rules do support the decision in theory, but the internal inconsistency forced by the 
application seems to controvert the spirit of the rule. The first underlined section clearly shows the 
amendment is not in order, and the second underlined section was more likely written to protect against re-
interpretation, but poor wording makes Senator Frye’s application technically valid. Rules of the Senate, 
Appropriations and Amendments to General Appropriations Bills, 4. “On a point of order made by any 
Senator, no amendment offered by any other Senator which proposes general legislation shall be received 
to any general appropriation bill, nor shall any amendment not germane or relevant to the subject matter 
contained in the bill be received; nor shall any amendment to any item or clause of such bill be received 
which does not directly relate thereto…and all questions of relevancy of amendments under this rule, when 
raised, shall be submitted to the Senate and be decided without debate [emphasis added].” “Rules of the 
Senate,” Committee on Rules and Administration, 
http://www.rules.senate.gov/public/index.cfm?p=RuleXVI.  
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In addition, the reduced costs of restructuring the army in concert with the 
demobilization of its volunteer contingent made the 1901 Army Appropriations Act 
difficult to vote against.  Even with the addition of the Platt and Spooner amendments, 
this bill would be more perilous to contest than was the president’s proposed civil 
government for the Philippines, as endorsed by the stand-alone Spooner bill of the 
previous year.  The best hope remaining for the opposition was to force excision of the 
colonial governance amendments by exposure of dangerous flaws or improprieties 
within.  A cable from the Philippines Commission to Secretary of State provided just the 
thing. 
Shortly after the vote to admit the two amendments, Senator Tillman read to the 
Senate excerpts of the cable to Secretary Olney from the Chairman of the Philippines 
Commission, Judge Taft.  The portion of the cable read aloud urged passage of the 
Spooner amendment broadening the commission’s powers.  Specifically, Chairman Taft 
pointed out that until such a measure was passed, the commission could not sell public 
property or franchises such as mining rights.456   
One after the other, Democratic and Populist senators rose to make speeches 
attacking this new vulnerability.  Several of the southern senators reanimated memories 
of post-Civil War carpet bagging.457  Most, however, concentrated on forecasting scandal 
that would result should the legislature not erect barriers and remove opportunities for 
malfeasance in advance, as one senator cautioned: “All that we can do from this distant 
standpoint is to withhold all the opportunities of temptation that we can.”458  The remedy, 
                                                 
456 Judge Taft wrote: “Passage of the Spooner bill at present session greatly needed…until its passage 
no purely central government can be established, no public franchised granted, and no substantial 
investment of private capital in internal improvements possible… Hundreds of American miners on ground 
awaiting law to perfect claims. More coming…Urgently recommend amendment Spooner bill so that its 
operation be not postponed.” 34 Cong. Rec. 2958 (25 February 1901). 
457 Senator Tillman provided the first example of speeches decrying potential carpet bagging in the 
Philippines: “we have this vast public domain, and we have the request from the commission that they be 
allowed to sell this land and to sell those mines. There is no limitation whatever upon them or upon any and 
every scheme that might be hatched by a carpetbag government to be set up there.” Ibid.  
458 Senator Daniel offered one example: “Those who seek honor and wealth in new lands where they 
go with armies and banners, and where the population is helpless…” who may do “his best under condition 
of constant temptation and relaxation, far remote from the seat of power, is apt to do bad, for the 
opportunity of the bad is so great…sure to yield to it and produce much oppression.” 34 Cong. Rec. 2961 
(25 February 1901).  
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they advised, was for the Senate to proceed slowly and not cede too much authority, as 
that path might lead to nefarious deeds.459  For the remainder of the debates on this bill, 
the opposition pursued this approach. 
Several senators, sensing fear of potential scandal over land and franchise sale 
might defeat the entire appropriations bill, sought a middle course.  Two proposed similar 
amendments to limit the sale of land and franchises in case the Spooner amendment could 
not be excised from the appropriations bill.460  A third pointed out that Senator Spooner 
had lifted his text verbatim from the 1803 Louisiana Purchase act, except for a clause that 
caused the bill to self-expire with the Congress in which it passed.  He suggested that 
restoring the missing clause would make the Spooner amendment palatable.461   
With these last refinements to the arguments of both sides, the Senate lurched into 
the final two days of debate on governance in the Philippines and Cuba.  Holding the 
superior hand, the position of the Republican senators supporting the Spooner and Platt 
amendments had remained constant over the previous month.  The Democratic, Populist, 
and Silver Republican senators of the opposition, however, had seen their goals 
continuously reduced in scale.  They had all but abandoned trying to defeat the army bill.  
Excising the Spooner and Platt amendments had been the first fallback position, but even 
that became impossible after the Senate voted to allow general legislation to be inserted 
into an appropriations bill.   
Under the circumstances, the opposition’s best hope regarding the Philippines was 
to try to attach mitigating language to the Spooner amendment.  Regarding Cuba, the 
most feasible tack was to isolate and delay consideration of the Platt amendment.  Unlike 
                                                 
459 Senator Rawlins was one to advise going slowly. He offered that nearly 20 years had elapsed after 
taking the territories from Mexico before provisions for land ownership and mining franchises were 
established, and stated “it was a wise provision, because in the chaotic and disorganized state of society 
necessarily the new Territories are infested by speculators and people who have little regard for the rights 
of others or for the orderly processes of society, and corruption and plunder of the public resources will 
necessarily ensue.” 34 Cong. Rec. 2964 (25 February 1901). 
460 The first was an amendment to make the franchise and land sale portion of the authorization bill 
match that the Senate previously approved for Puerto Rico. 34 Cong. Rec. 2966 (25 February 1901). The 
second was a more stringent amendment that prohibited all franchise sales and limited public land sales to 
that certified by the president as “necessary for the immediate government of the islands and indispensible 
for the interests of the people thereof.” 34 Cong. Rec. 3025 (26 February 1901). 
461 34 Cong. Rec. 2962 (25 February 1901) (statement of Senator Daniel). 
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in the Philippines, the American occupation force in Cuba was very small and thus not 
much entangled in the plans for army restructuring.   
More to the point, the sense of haste driving resolution of the Philippine question 
was largely absent in regard to Cuba.  The approaching deadline for wholesale 
demobilization of the volunteer force had no purchase there, and the Cuban 
Constitutional Convention had not yet reported.  In the limited time remaining in the 56th 
Congress Senate, the opposition should have concentrated on limiting the damage done 
by the near-certain passage of the Spooner amendment, then prevented a vote on the Platt 
amendment citing incomplete information.  The pro-administration senators offered a 
solid reason to rush army restructuring and, by extension, the Spooner amendment.  The 
senators in opposition could have offered a similarly solid case for the Platt amendment 
for Cuba to wait until the next Congress.   
D. THE FINAL VOTES ON ARMY APPROPRIATIONS AND OVERSEAS 
TERRITORIAL GOVERNMENTS 
Instead of attempting to get what they could regarding the Spooner amendment 
and forcing deferment of the Platt amendment to the new Congress, the opposition spent 
the last two days of debate in three unproductive pursuits.  First, in what could be 
considered the last hurrah of the high-minded, they continued their diatribe against the 
dangers of unchecked authority and cession of legislative responsibilities.  Many 
speeches were offered along the lines of Senator Bacon’s comments on the wisdom of 
limiting presidential authority: 
According to the Constitution of the United States the President of the 
United States can not appoint even a second lieutenant in the Army 
without the consent of this body.  He can not appoint a marshal or a 
postmaster without the consent of the Senate.  Yet here is a proposition 
that there shall be a government where, over this vast territory of a 
hundred and fifty thousand square miles, with ten or twelve million 
people, one man shall be utterly, absolutely supreme…the man never lived 
who was good enough and wise enough to exercise such imperial power, 
and the man never will live who ought to be entrusted with it.462 
                                                 
462 34 Cong. Rec. 3121 (27 February 1901). 
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These addresses were not intended to sway the undecided with new considerations just 
prior to a vote.  Instead, these speeches plowed well-furrowed fields. 
Democratic and minor party senators also engaged in a staple of political theater 
favored by the soon-to-be-defeated: declaiming responsibility and shifting blame.  Some 
made the case that the only course left to block this legislation was to filibuster.  They 
counseled, however, that the majority should be allowed to force the vote through in hope 
the Republicans would suffer the blame when colonial government in Cuba and the 
Philippines failed, and when a large standing army became the norm rather than a 
wartime exception.463 
In a similar vein, several senators used their remaining floor time prior to the vote 
to complain about the unfair tactics the administration and its Senate supporters had 
employed.  Many of these speeches sought to accuse the majority of muddying necessary 
support for the military during wartime by appending contentious political legislation.464  
Another complaint was that the Platt amendment had circumvented debate on content and 
unjustly dictated terms to the Cubans.465  Additionally, several senators chafed at the 
heavy-handed parliamentary tactics that had allowed the amendments to be considered 
and attached to the army bill, leading one to ask “Am I using too strong a word when I 
                                                 
463 None, however, made the crucial distinction between filibustering both amendments, and only 
filibustering the Platt amendment, a less politically perilous course. Senator Jones stated “I am not willing 
to resort to filibustering for the purpose of preventing the majority voting on these questions. If they choose 
to adopt these propositions, they have the responsibility and they have the power; let them take the 
responsibility and the accountability to the American people for what they do.” 34 Cong. Rec. 3126 (27 
February 1901). Also, Senator Teller suggested to “debate them now, expressing our objections to them in 
a proper manner, and then allow the dominant party to take the vote and become responsible to the country 
for this legislation.” 34 Cong. Rec. 3107 (27 February 1901). 
464 Senator Morgan complained the president, knowing the army would be unfunded 1 July and that a 
special session would be required, intentionally frustrated the army bill. He continued “we stand ready to 
vote them, anxious to supply the Army, he comes in at the very last hour of this Congress and loads these 
bills down with two propositions to increase his power in Cuba and in the Philippines.” 34 Cong. Rec. 3027 
(26 February 1901).  
465 “This is an ultimatum, a legislative ultimatum to Cuba. Take this or die, for they cannot resist. 
Take this and abandon your hopes of an independent, sovereign, autonomous government.” Ibid., 3038. 
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say coercion?”466  While all factual, these assertions would also likely have no impact on 
the votes of undecided senators and were thus an unprofitable use of the time that 
remained for debate. 
Finally, a subset of opposition senators used their last few moments not to berate 
their opponents or sway the uncommitted, but rather to console their compatriots.  One 
Democratic senator, from the sub-committee of four that drafted the amendment, gave 
qualified support to the Platt amendment as an imperfect, but acceptable means to an 
end.467  Thus resigned to their fate, the ineffectual protestations of the opposition then 
ceased, and the bill, preceded by the ranks of amendments, came up for a vote. 
Similar to earlier culminating votes, amendments and changes were to be dealt 
with before the bill itself.  One by one, the series of the Democratic and Populist 
amendments were brought up and voted down along party lines.468  The Spooner 
amendment was next in queue.  After it was read through once to the assembled senators, 
and as much to create a pause in the proceedings as to achieve anything substantial, 
Populist Senator Allen interrupted the process with a long speech renewing the call to 
filibuster, ending with an appeal Democratic, Silver Republican, and Populist senators: 
“few though we are, to stand here to-night, tomorrow, tomorrow night, and until 12 
o’clock on the 4th of March antagonizing this bill, so that the Constitution of the United 
States may be preserved and the right of these weak people may not be overcome and 
                                                 
466 Senator Bacon continued: “For what purpose was it put upon an appropriations bill in the closing 
days of the Congress, not simply of the session, but of Congress; for what purpose was it put upon the great 
Army appropriations bill known to be necessary for the support of our troops in the field, but for the 
purpose of coercing its passage…an unconstitutional measure, one they dared not attempt to defend, might 
be forced through the Senate, but they put it upon the bill in utter violation of the rules of the Senate.” 34 
Cong. Rec. 3118 (27 February 1901). 
467 Senator Money explained that he did not support Article III, the right of the United States to 
intervene in Cuba, but had become resigned to that article as an acceptable cost to achieve passage of the 
army bill and returning occupation troops from Cuba. 34 Cong. Rec. 3132 (27 February 1901). 
468 Senator Vest’s modification to the Spooner amendment with “no judgment or act…shall conflict 
with the Constitution…” failed 25 yea, 45 nay, and 18 not voting. Senator Rawlins’s amendment stating 
intent to free Philippines also failed 25/45/19. Senator Bacon’s amendment to limit to the duration of the 
army bill by adding, “expires 4 March 1903” failed 20/43/19. Senator Pettus’s amendment requiring 
appointed territorial officials to swear an oath to the Constitution failed 25/41/22. Senator Teller’s two 
amendments also failed: the first mandating Filipino participation in the territorial government, 23/39/26; 
and the second extending Filipinos coverage similar to the Bill of Rights, 23/41/24. 34 Cong. Rec. 3137–39 
(27 February 1901). 
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overridden.”469  This stirring speech resonated about the chamber to no effect; the voting 
process recommenced. 
Senator Hoar, who had opposed the conflation of executive and legislative powers 
inherent in both the president’s structuring of the Philippine Commission and his 
proposed territorial government, offered an amendment to force separation of powers.470  
It met with a swift defeat, bringing the Spooner amendment up for a vote.  With the will 
to filibuster depleted and all opposition amendments defeated, the Spooner amendment to 
the army appropriation bill finally came to a vote and passed roughly along party lines, 
without further discussion.471 
The Spooner amendment’s provision to extend legislative authority to the 
executive without finite term was the most reviled sub-component of the army 
appropriation bill.  After it had passed, the Platt amendment’s third article was either tied 
or ever so slightly behind the main bill’s concept of a permanently authorized large 
standing army in a contest for most obnoxious remaining resolution.472  Immediately 
following the Spooner amendment acceptance, Senator Platt offered his amendment, and 
received support from an unexpected quarter.   
Senator Hoar, who had just proposed a last-ditch amendment to thwart the 
Spooner amendment, offered an endorsement of the Platt amendment, stating, “studying 
this amendment as well as I can, it seems to me eminently wise and satisfactory.”473  
                                                 
469 Senator Allen also suggested the lack of a quorum, necessitating a time-consuming roll call. This 
was revealed to be a stalling technique as 75 senators were in attendance. 34 Cong. Rec. 3144 (27 February 
1901). 
470 “In the government of the Philippine Islands no person vested with legislative powers shall ever 
exercise the executive or judicial powers…with executive shall ever exercise the legislative or judicial 
powers…with judicial shall ever exercise legislative or executive powers…” It was also defeated along 
party lines 26/43/19. 34 Cong. Rec. 3144 (27 February 1901). 
471 The result of the vote on the Spooner amendment was 45/27/16. Only one Democrat (Senator 
McLaurin of South Carolina) and one Populist (Senator Kyle) joined the Republicans in supporting the 
amendment. Two Republicans (Senators Pettigrew and Hoar) joined the remaining Democrats, three 
Populists, two Silver Republicans and one Silver against. 34 Cong. Rec. 3145 (27 February 1901). 
472 Excoriated in debates covered earlier, the Platt amendment’s third article gave the United States 
the right to intervene in Cuba to protect independence, sustain the government, and ensure an independent 
Cuba fulfilled the obligations assigned in the Treaty of Paris. 34 Cong. Rec. 3145 (27 February 1901).  
473 Regarding Article III, “It seems to me to be, in substance, a proper and necessary stipulation for 
the application of the Monroe doctrine to the nearest outlying country.” Ibid. 
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Disagreeing with that characterization, one Democratic senator moved to strike out 
Article III.474  In defense, Senator Hoar portrayed the article as a necessary evil, an 
interesting predicament for an avid anti-imperialist, much to the pleasure of the 
expansionist Republicans.   
Returning to the earlier theme that any proposal for government in Cuba was 
premature, Republican Senator Morgan pointed out that, while his party brethren may 
very well force the measure through with a bare majority, he forecast that future woes 
awaited.  The eighth and final provision of the Platt amendment stipulated its terms 
would be formalized in a treaty.  Senator Morgan predicted the pro-administration 
senators would not be able to muster the two-thirds Senate approval required for 
ratification.475  His warning was dismissed, however, and the Platt amendment was also 
passed on a near party line vote.476  
Finally, after several less contentious administrative amendments also passed, the 
measure itself came up for a vote.  Controversy largely played out and the hour late, the 
army appropriations bill passed with 43 in favor, 18 against, and 27 not voting.  Spent, 
the Senate adjourned at 1 o’clock in the morning.  During the evening session of 1 
March, the Senate received word that the House agreed to Senate amendments on the 
appropriation bill without comment; it was signed by the president the next day. 
In exchange for the removal of American occupation forces from Cuba, the Platt 
Amendment was successfully forced on the Cuban Constitutional Convention and 
                                                 
474 Senator Jones disliked that article reserved “to the United States the right to overturn the 
government of Cuba whenever it saw fit.” 34 Cong. Rec. 3146 (27 February 1901). 
475 Senator Morgan continued, stating “we are in great haste about this business” and that dictating the 
terms of a treaty before the Senate had even read the draft Cuban Constitution, added to this push to pass 
the Platt amendment by a bare majority in the dying hours of a Congress, was no way to legislate. 34 Cong. 
Rec. 3146 (27 February 1901). 
476 The amendment was approved 43/20/25. One Populist (Senator Kyle) and one Silver (Senator 
Stewart) voted in favor. One Republican (Senator Pettigrew), one Populist (Senator Butler), and two Silver 
Republicans (Senators Teller and Turner) voted against. Announced pairs neutralized any potential effect 
of the 25 senators who did not vote. 34 Cong. Rec. 3152 (27 February 1901). 
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included verbatim in the 1902 constitution.477  As stipulated by its eighth article, it was 
formalized in the 1903 Treaty of Relations Cuba-United States, which achieved the 
required two-thirds majority for ratification, despite Senator Morgan’s predictions.  Thus 
the Platt amendment language that had had undergone negligible debate by the Senate as 
a committee of the whole appears in both the Cuban Constitution and in the Treaty of 
relations relatively unchanged from its first draft version. 
Similarly, the Spooner Amendment extended Senate approval to the territorial 
government established by the president while Congress was not in session.  Hundreds of 
pages of the Congressional Record are filled with discussion on whether or not the 
president should have that power, but almost none on the actual composition of the 
territorial government he proposed.  As a result, the opposition not only lost the vote to 
approve the amendment granting the executive power to craft the government, but also 
the opportunity to influence that crafting.  Overall, the opposition in the 56th Congress 
Senate was faced with the choice of blocking the army reorganization legislation entirely, 
or negotiating changes in the margins.  It is clear that they eschewed the former because 
of the vital nature of the appropriations bill, but less clear why they put so little effort into 
the latter. 
As the physical laws of motion imply, the advantage in this example of law 
regarding territorial governance belongs to the object in motion, which will remain 
constant unless acted upon by an external force.  In this case, the executive’s unilateral 
transformation of the military government in the Philippines into a quasi-civil 
government under the Philippine Commission, accomplished during a congressional 
summer adjournment, let slip the juggernaut.  The Commission’s power was then 
enlarged by executive grants of revenue and judicial authority and endorsed by the 
Spooner Amendment.  The final product was the 1902 Organic Act for the Philippines, 
                                                 
477 The ultimatum was discussed even before the Platt amendment passed: “here is an amendment 
reported by the committee that, either as a part of that constitution or as an ordinance to accompany it of 
equal power and force, we shall demand of that convention that they shall put this programme into 
effect…it is perfectly well understood that they will simply be held under military rule until they do it.” 34 
Cong. Rec. 2967 (25 February 1901) (statement of Senator Morgan). 
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which, instead of crafting a form of territorial government, simply codified a system that 
was already placed in operation by executive fiat.   
For a later Congress to rescind the authority granted by the Spooner amendment 
would have required a two-thirds majority, further underlining why the temporary 
measure permitting the president to put everything in place was so important.  In addition 
to the difficulty in reversing the legislation, once the public lands were sold, the assembly 
instituted, and franchises awarded in the Philippines, the effect of the executive rule in 
the archipelago would also be much harder to undo.  By getting a nose under the tent, 
military government became the civil government under commander-in-chief authority; 
the Spooner bill became Spooner amendment became Organic Act, all seamlessly.   
To students of the period, the Platt amendment has gained renown both because of 
its dictatorial terms and because it was inserted into the constitution of another country.   
It also plays an important part in the Latin American remonstration of the boorish 
behavior by the United States in the hemisphere during the twentieth century.478  The 
story of the 56th Congress Senate decisions on imperialism is incomplete, however, 
without the context provided by the Spooner amendment and associated debates over 
army reorganization, of which the Platt amendment played but a minor part. 
E. AN EMPIRE ESTABLISHED 
Except for Guam, by July 1902 the disposition of Spain’s former colonies was 
settled and the framework for American colonial governance was in place.  Cuba would 
remain in a state of quasi-suzerainty until a new Cuban-United States Treaty of Relations 
in 1934 superseded the Platt Amendment restrictions.  The island would continue to 
struggle with overbearing American interference until its most recent revolution severed 
those ties in 1958.  More important to the American imperial enterprise, however, the 56th 
Congress Senate created a limbo for Puerto Rico and the Philippines that would 
                                                 
478 Louis Perez Jr. offers a Cuban perspective on the Platt Amendment on how it was perceived there, 
and echoes sentiments expressed in other Central and South American countries as well. Louis Perez, Jr., 
Cuba Under the Platt Amendment, 1902–1934 (Pittsburg: University of Pittsburg Press, 1986), 336–38. 
Conversely, the European great powers expected the United States to keep Cuba as legitimate spoils of war. 
Ernest May, Imperial Democracy, 263. 
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eventually become the classification of “unincorporated organized territories.”  This 
unique category made explicit their distinct status: held apart from the union, but more 
tightly and permanently bound than was Cuba.   
Thus the debates surrounding the Army Appropriations Bill of 1901 resulted in a 
constitutional fissure that had been pried open between the incorporated territories 
destined to become states and the unclaimed lands from which they were hewn.  This 
fissure had never existed prior, and into the void fell the new territories, two to remain 
permanently and one other for nearly a half century.   
The next, and final, round of debates on American imperialism would not occur 
until a decade and a half later.  With the retrospect afforded by sustained imperial 
administration, in 1916-1917 the Senate would place Puerto Rico and the Philippines on 
divergent paths, each toward their own permanent status.  These final debates to modify 
the Organic Acts for the two territories also posed and answered the question of how the 
United States could start the process of extracting itself from colonial endeavors.   
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X. SENATE DECISIONS ON THE PERMANENT STATUS OF 
THE PHILIPPINES AND PUERTO RICO 
The 55th Congress Senate had initiated the American imperial period by 
authorizing the conquest of the former Spanish colonies in 1898 and confirming retention 
of the spoils the following year.  Its successor, the 56th Congress Senate, then codified the 
enterprise by creating the special category—unincorporated territories—to bind the 
former Spanish colonies to the Republic as possessions but not participants.  More than a 
decade later the 64th Congress Senate would seek to resolve this lingering ambiguity by 
placing the Philippines on the road to independence, while preventing Puerto Rico from 
following that same path. 
Over the course of that decade American domestic politics had changed a good 
deal.  The Republican Party, which had controlled both houses of Congress as well as the 
White House since the end of the second Cleveland Administration, lost its majority in 
the House of Representatives following the 1910 elections.  By the end of that session 
appointments to fill seats, either long vacant or created by addition of new states, had 
nearly balanced the Senate with 47 Democrats, 48 Republicans, and one vacancy.479  The 
Democrats completed the transformation with the presidential election in 1912, winning 
50 seats in the Senate and installing Woodrow Wilson as president.480  The mid-term 
election of 1914 further cemented this configuration, maintaining the House majority and 
increasing the Democratic representation in the 64th Congress Senate to 56.  To all 
appearances, the long Republican ascendency that had followed the Civil War was at an 
end. 
                                                 
479 Oklahoma had become a state in 1907; Arizona and New Mexico became states in 1912 swelling 
the Senate to 96 seats. At the end of the previous session, with 92 seats, the Senate had been divided 32 
Democrats and 60 Republicans. 
480 Republicans split the vote, with Conservatives supporting the incumbent Taft, and bolting 
Progressives the returning Roosevelt, making Wilson the first Democratic president since Cleveland’s 
second win in 1892. The final Progressive senator would, by the end of the session, revert to the 
Republican Party. Also in 1912, 17th Amendment, instituting direct election of senators, passed in Congress 
and was ratified the following spring. The first senators elected directly took their seats in the 64th Congress 
Senate. 
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In control of both houses, the Democratic majority in the 63rd and 64th Congresses 
set an ambitious schedule.  The 63rd met all but nine weeks of its two-year session, and 
the first session of the 64th ran a full six months beyond the customary spring suspension 
date.481  The pressing issues in the former were mostly related to tariff and tax revenue 
legislation and the outbreak of the European War.482  The latter, however, was dominated 
by discussion of the National Defense Bill for the first month—with frequent 
interjections of the Mexican situation—and the next month was completely dedicated to 
debate on the Philippines Bill.483 
A. 64TH CONGRESS SENATE, FIRST SESSION: THE JONES BILL ON THE 
PHILIPPINES 
As with every first session of a new Congress, the initial week of this Senate was 
consumed with the business of presenting credentials of new senators, introducing bills 
drafted during summer adjournment, and assigning committee responsibilities.484  After 
those administrative tasks were completed, the Senate launched directly into sustained 
debate on national defense, carried out against the background of the Great War then 
raging in Europe.  The National Defense Act of 1916 sought to build upon the Army 
Appropriations Act of 1901.  It continued the project of reorganizing the Army and 
adjusting its permanent end strength.  The 1916 Act swelled the regular army to 175,000 
enlisted plus officers, the National Guard to 450,000, established the Reserve Officer 
                                                 
481 A more typical schedule featured Congress meeting approximately 17 weeks per year, or roughly 
one-third of the time the 63rd Congress met. This pace endured through the first session of the 64th 
Congress, which ran from early December to mid-September without break.  
482 The prime product of the 63rd Congress special session and long first session was the first 
successful tariff reform since before the Civil War. The Sixteenth Amendment had paved the way for the 
Revenue Act of 1913, which essentially replaced tariff income with an income tax as the primary revenue 
generator for the federal government. Also, in the summer of 1914, the First World War and Panama Canal 
both opened two weeks apart. 
483 During this session, American troops occupied Haiti, invaded the Dominican Republic, and chased 
Pancho Villa around Mexico for a year.  
484 Senator Stone was named the Chairman of the Committee on Foreign Relations, on which Senators 
Hitchcock, Lodge, and Borah served. Senator Shafroth was named the Chairman of the Committee on the 
Pacific Islands and Porto Rico. Senator Hitchcock was named the Chairman of the Committee on the 
Philippines, on which Senators Shafroth and Kenyon served. 53 Cong. Rec. 716 (13 December 1915). 
Shafroth would replace Hitchcock as Chairman in 1918, and would in turn be replaced by Senator Harding, 
the committee’s last chairman. All these senators played large roles in the upcoming debates. 
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Training Corps, instituted a modern Reserve Force, and gave the president authority to 
nationalize the Guard in times of emergency.485   
Given the war in Europe, it is suggestive that so much of the discussion justifying 
various end strength calculations employed scenarios featuring war with Japan, 
envisioned as being fought in the Pacific and in the Philippines.486  The relevance of 
National Defense deliberations lay largely in establishing both the cost and vulnerability 
associated with America’s presence in the Pacific.  To an extent that can only be 
surprising in retrospect, the Senate remained determined to keep its head down and mind 
that nation’s business as it had already defined it, even while the rest of the world was 
setting itself on fire elsewhere. 
During the morning business on 17 December 1915, in the midst of the heated 
debates on preparedness Senator Hitchcock reported Senate bill 381 back from the 
Committee on the Philippines, with amendment and comments.  A version of the bill had 
been sponsored through the House by Representative William Jones in October 1913, but 
had been sidelined in the Senate committee.  The bill had been resubmitted in the 64th 
Congress Senate and retained the name “Jones Bill” although it had been significantly 
modified by the committee and was now a creature of the Senate.  Its aim was to make 
the government of the islands more representative.   
Among the 30 sections, several stand out as significant changes to the Organic 
Act of 1902.  Noteworthy improvements included a bill of rights; an expanded bi-cameral 
legislature elected and modeled on the United States Congress; and judicial appointments 
and regulations transferred to the Philippine government.  Other notable modifications 
were the transfer of all public lands to the government; popular election of the Resident 
Commissioner; and dissolution of the Philippine Commission.  Most importantly, the 
preamble stated that the intent of the bill was to pass increasing control of domestic 
affairs to the Philippine people, so they will be “better prepared to fully assume the 
                                                 
485 The 1901 Act and subsequent modifications allowed for end strength totals of 100,000 and 
112,000, respectively. “The National Defense Act of 1916,” Pub. L. No. 134, 39 Stat. (1917). 
486 For but one example, see Senator Works’ 10-page speech on the threat not only from Japan, but 
also from Japanese in America. 53 Cong. Rec. 556 (16 December 1915). 
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responsibilities and enjoy all the privileges of complete independence, which it is the 
purpose of the United States to grant” when the United States deemed the Filipinos 
ready.487  These were, collectively, bold measures—too bold, given the distractions of 
the National Defense debate already in progress.  As a consequence the bill, having 
finally escaped from committee, was now tabled in the Senate itself. 
It briefly reemerged as unfinished business on 5 January 1916, but was delayed 
again to accommodate an absent senator who desired to participate, and the Senate turned 
instead to discussion of Affairs in Mexico.  The following day the bill’s sponsor, Senator 
Hitchcock, opened with a clear statement of the bill’s purpose: “This bill contains two 
essential features.  In the first place, it grants to the people of the Philippine Islands a 
larger degree of self-government than they have heretofore enjoyed.  Secondly, it 
promises ultimate independence.”488  With that statement, the Senate switched its focus 
to the bill—increasingly over the next few days, and from 11 January to 4 February, 
almost exclusively.489 
As was the case with the earlier debates over the Organic Acts for Porto Rico and 
the Philippine Islands, the general plan for governance at the core of this bill was lightly 
debated and generally accepted.  The House version of the Jones Bill had been perfected 
by the Senate Committee on the Philippines and was now largely modeled on the United 
States governmental scheme.  In addition, the earlier Organic Acts already established 
such unique territorial governance features as a Resident Commissioner instead of a non-
voting Representative to Congress, and these precedents served here to smooth the 
process.   
That is not to say the minutiae in the bill were ignored—nearly every clause was 
discussed—but the contentious issues were all to be found at a higher level, as the 
comments of one senator allude: 
                                                 
487 53 Cong. Rec. 502 (17 December 1915). 
488 53 Cong. Rec. 603 (6 January 1916).  
489 The Senate devoted itself almost exclusively to this issue. At 2pm daily, the Senate resumed 
consideration of S 381 as the unfinished business, and continued without interruption until adjournment. 
On 31 January, Senator Hitchcock asked for daily recess instead of adjournment thereby keeping the bill 
constantly before the Senate for deliberation in the mornings as well.  
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If it were presented to me as a matter of original voting whether or not we 
were (to go in to the Philippines) at all, I would vote against ever going 
there…But we are there; that is not the question that is pending in the 
Senate now.  Being there, it is a question of performing our duty; it is not a 
question of voluntary assumption of power on our part.  We are there.  
How can we honorably get out?490 
In short, the month-long debate centered instead on the issues of timing, 
vulnerability, worthiness, feasibility, and promise.  These larger concerns were not the 
province of the body of the bill, but rather were embodied by the bill’s preamble and 
several eventual amendments crafted to elicit these points.  It was, therefore, these 
ancillary documents that were to be the focus of the heated debates to come. 
B. TIMING 
As is true for any major legislation, the Senate debate on the future of the 
Philippines was colored by the results of the last presidential election, which swept the 
Democrats into power, and by the competing hopes of both parties with respect to the 
upcoming presidential election of 1916, for which the campaign was about to begin.491  
The Democratic Party had championed independence for the Philippines in every 
platform since the Spanish American War, and it was now in a position to make that 
pledge good: 
President Wilson and both houses of Congress were elected according to 
the Constitution of the United States, and they are now all Democratic.  
The declaration of the party in 1912 was to this effect: “We favor an 
immediate declaration of the nation’s purpose to recognize the 
independence of the Philippine Islands as soon as a stable government can 
be established, such independence to be guaranteed by us until the 
neutralization of the islands can be secured by treaty with other powers.492 
Finally able to force through legislation to set the Philippines on a course toward 
independence, and then take credit for the achievement in the fall elections, Democratic 
                                                 
490 53 Cong. Rec. 716 (8 January 1916) (statement of Senator Sherman).  
491 Senator Chilton opined that both sides were again politicizing the issue in preparation for the 
upcoming elections. 53 Cong. Rec. 1078 (14 January 1916). 
492 53 Cong. Rec. 1149 (17 January 1916) (statement of Senator Simmons). As a rejoinder, Senator 
Poindexter pointed out that the combined votes of Roosevelt and Taft showed a plurality over Wilson of 
1.3 million, thus a repudiation of Democratic mandate.  
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senators soon found themselves in a sticky situation.  They discovered that the changed 
international environment militated against bold action.  Setting the islands free in 1904 
or 1908 would have been a significantly less complicated act than doing so in the midst 
of a world war involving all the powers with major imperial interests in Asia, not to 
mention an ascendant Japan, a belligerent in the war by virtue of its alliance with Great 
Britain, and eager to make the most of the victory, when it came.   
As a result, once in power the Democrats had softened their party line, moving 
away from immediate independence for the Philippines, and toward increased self-
government consonant with a more gradual ceding of power to the Filipinos.  
Republicans characterized this not as progress toward independence, however, but as: 
steps away from any immediate grant of that gift…as this subject has 
come closer to home, the gentlemen who now have the responsibility of 
deciding it have not grown more enthusiastic about…their platform 
declarations.493 
In response, Democratic senators argued that their more gradual policy 
recognized the need for the consent and participation of other great powers in sustaining 
an independent Philippines, whose creation, if done properly, would actually serve to 
ease international tensions in Asia.  Such a move would also add weight to the claim that 
America was different: “it is calculated to have an excellent moral effect on world 
politics, and will materially aid in the peaceful and proper solution of the very difficult 
problems now confronting this government.”494 
C. VULNERABILITY 
Both sides in the Senate recognized that retaining the Philippines as a quasi-
colonial outpost in the Far East increased America’s military vulnerability in a region of 
intense imperial rivalries.  The archipelago was the first place the United States had 
attacked the Spanish Empire, after all, and would be as difficult for the Americans to 
                                                 
493 Senator Lippett continued: “I am in sympathy…it seems to me that they have been gradually 
themselves growing doubtful of the advisability of doing the thing which there were somewhat eager and 
enthusiastic about in the beginning and before they had responsibility.” 53 Cong. Rec. 866 (11 January 
1916). 
494 53 Cong. Rec. 1503 (25 January 1916) (statement of Senator Robinson). 
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defend as it had proved for the Spanish.  It was also generally agreed that the commercial 
benefits of retaining territorial control paled in comparison to the costs of administering, 
not to mention defending, the islands.495  Both sides agreed that quitting the Philippines 
was the appropriate action to take.  The question was how to go about it. 
Further, senators of both parties felt that the Filipinos, once granted independence, 
would be unable to defend their independent state on their own.  There was also general 
agreement that, if the United States were to guarantee Philippine independence in the 
process of granting it, the likelihood of having to support that guarantee with military 
force was high.  For the Republicans, this simplified the available policy choices 
dramatically:  
The policy…should be one of two things.  It should either positively grant 
their independence on a day certain, or it should positively state that it is 
the purpose of the United States to carry on the policy that for the last 15 
years has been such unchallenged and unparalleled success…a half and 
half policy in connection with the Philippines is the most indefensible 
position that this body can take.496   
If the Senate were to choose the former, the Republicans would advocate 
terminating American protection of the islands coincident with releasing control.497 If the 
Senate chose the latter, however, the Republican senators would advocate continuing to 
assist the Filipinos in strengthening institutions favorable to local governance while 
maintaining a strong defense.  They believed it was likely the Philippine government was 
bound to go wrong or attract predators, “as it seems to me the situation is inevitable; and  
 
 
                                                 
495 One example of many, Senator Shafroth, offered that promised benefits of transshipment income 
and settlement proved illusory: shipping rates were unfavorably against ports in the Philippines, and in 17 
years, only one colony of 56 ex-servicemen had succeeded at farming there. He also cited military experts: 
“it would be impossible for us to defend the Philippines against any nation having large armies and an 
efficient navy, that in case of war our best policy would be not to attempt to defend the islands, but to rely 
on the outcome of the war to recover them.” 53 Cong. Rec. 665 (7 January 1916).  
496 53 Cong. Rec. 1503 (25 January 1916) (statement of Senator Lippitt). 
497 Newly seated senator Harding stated “the United States has no right and has no reason to extend a 
benevolent protectorate over the Philippine Islands without control, and I for one, Mr. President and 
Senators, mean to vote against this bill.” 53 Cong. Rec. 1679 (28 January 1916). 
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being inevitable, the only wise thing for us to do is to stay there and prevent the condition 
from arising.”498  This is the gist of Senator Poindexter’s critique of the Democratic 
position: 
The Senator (Shafroth) does not believe in the traditional policy of his 
country to keep out of entangling alliances and treaties with foreign 
countries, and confine ourselves to our own affairs and let Europe and 
Asia alone.  I think myself that we cut off a pretty big slice of the world’s 
affairs when we undertake to be the leader of the Western Hemisphere, 
without going into Asia…we ought not to retain all the dangers, all the 
responsibilities after surrendering any power of control over their 
action…if we are to maintain our honor and protect our sovereignty we 
shall have to go to war about the Philippine Islands and expend the 
treasure and lives of our country know all the time it was for nothing, that 
we had pledged ourselves in advance to abandon the islands…I think the 
most unreasonable proposition in this whole issue is to go on there after 
we have made up our minds to get out.499 
The Democrats, now in power and thus responsible, electorally and otherwise, for 
whatever policy was adopted, were less inclined to see things so starkly.500  Having 
acknowledged the difficulties inherent in defending an archipelago 7,000 miles away and 
the inability of the Filipinos to provide for their own protection, they searched for another 
option.  The choice they made presaged one that would soon become familiar on a much 
larger stage, during negotiations over the Treaty of Versailles and League of Nations: the 
independence of the islands could be guaranteed by the cooperative action of all the 
leading nations.  Such a course would reduce the costs of providing for distant defense.  It 
would also lessen the likelihood that a serious defense would be called for by involving 
competitors in preventing interference with Philippine independence.  It was thus a have-
your-cake-and-eat-it sort of policy beloved of politicians everywhere. 
Discussion over this proposal developed along two distinct lines.  On the one 
hand, there was concern about the potential implications that the pursuit of cooperative 
                                                 
498 53 Cong. Rec. 1800 (31 January 1916) (statement of Senator Sutherland). 
499 53 Cong. Rec. 1153 (17 January 1916). 
500 Senator Lippitt identified the Democrats’ 1910 gain of the House majority as the point where they 
turned their opposition to imperialism (since 1898) into policy, a stance from which they were now 
retreating. 53 Cong. Rec. 865 (11 January 1916). 
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guarantee of Philippine sovereignty would have on the more general debate over national 
defense and preparedness.501  Thus, a Democratic senator favoring reduced military 
expenditures tried to bait a preparedness proponent into agreeing that if the Philippines 
were set free, the navy planned in the National Defense bill would be too large.  The pro-
navy Republican senator retorted that without the Philippines, the planned navy would be 
about right, but that with the Philippines retained both the navy and the army would need 
to be much larger.  “That,” he added,  
is one of the principal reasons why I would like to get rid of the Philippine 
Islands and withdraw our Monroe Doctrine from Asiatic waters.  We will 
have enough to do to take care of our Monroe Doctrine right here at home 
without attempting to enforce it all over the world.502   
The second line of discussion revolved around the general wisdom of 
“entangling” multilateralism, an issue that would arise in much more serious form in 
connection with the creation of the League of Nations a few years later.  Republican 
senators made frequent reference to the success of unilateral protection of Cuba under the 
Platt amendment to support their claim that international agreements were unwise and 
unnecessary.503  Democratic senators recognized the force of this, particularly since, even 
if an international agreement was possible, the resultant treaty would still come to the 
Senate for ratification, where a mere one-third in dissent could unravel the whole 
project.504   
Thus the preferred prescriptions were established: the Democrats urging a 
finessed protectorate and the Republicans taking the two extremes of abandonment 
without entanglement or retention in perpetuity.  This disagreement continued beyond 
discussion of the bill itself, and eventually spawned competing amendments. 
                                                 
501 Democratic Senator Lewis tied independence to national defense as “the very first question in this 
discussion is whether we shall keep the Philippine Islands or not…if our responsibility is to cease, then that 
much of the calculation of preparedness has been solved.” 53 Cong. Rec. 1257 (19 January 1916). 
502 53 Cong. Rec. 1565 (26 January 1916) (statement of Senator McCumber). 
503 53 Cong. Rec. 1938 (1 February 1916) (statement of Senator Cummins). 
504 53 Cong. Rec. 1990 (2 February 1916) (statement of Senator Shafroth). 
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D. WORTHINESS 
Seventeen years into the American imperial experiment, the terms of the 
argument over the potential for indigenous self-rule in the territories remained similar to 
those advanced during the debates over intervention in Cuba and ratification of the Treaty 
of Paris.  Whereas the debates of 1898–99 had been framed mainly in terms of principle 
and moral speculation, and often in ignorance of the realities on the ground, the 
intervening years had allowed both sides to gather mountains of data calculated to prove 
or disprove the worthiness of the Filipinos to govern the islands. 
One example of the old arguments employing new facts dealt with literacy.  Prior 
to annexation the two sides had disagreed over this issue with one side extolling the 
erudition of Aguinaldo and the other painting images of a Stone Age society.  What had 
changed by 1916 was a continuing program of mandatory, universal education and 
enforcement English as a sole official language in the Philippines.  Literacy rates could 
now be measured with a modicum of precision, and projected future progress mapped.   
Senators selected from this pool of common information to best suit their chosen 
line of argument.  Given a 10 percent fluency rate in English, Democratic senators 
compared this favorably with Feudal England, Revolutionary America, and Latin 
American republics.505  They also hailed the promise of continued progress in the form 
of new school construction and rising attendance rates.  Republicans countered by 
claiming that such projected advancements depended on American stewardship, and 
would be generational.  Senator McLean forecast “ten to fifteen years more of generous 
treatment on our part would find them with a generation of mature men whose influence 
would leaven the whole lump.”506  They also contended that literacy was only part of the 
challenge, and should not be the sole criterion on which to judge a nation’s democratic 
                                                 
505 Senator Shafroth stated that the incidence of illiteracy in the Philippines was lower than in each of 
the Latin American republics. 53 Cong. Rec. 714 (8 January 1916). Also, Senator Vardaman showed the 
rate there corresponded to 1787 America, and the ruling class in Manila at least as prepared as “the average 
illiterate, sane, sound-minded Anglo-Saxon living in the rural districts of this Republic. Why, the majority 
of men who extorted the Magna Charta from King John could not read.” 53 Cong. Rec. 1500 (25 January 
1916). 
506 53 Cong. Rec. 1751 (29 January 1916). Also, Senator Sterling opined that the school system was 
only 14 years old, and even with admirable advancement; it would long be insufficient to grow the literate 
population needed for democracy. 53 Cong. Rec. 714 (8 January 1916).  
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potential.  Thus Senator Borah drew comparison to another former Spanish colony, 
Mexico, where, he argued, current events demonstrated that 300 years of local self-rule 
had not produced a functioning republic.  Further, he forecast at least 200 years would be 
required for the Philippines to make such progress.507 
Regardless, the Democrats emphasized progress to date.  To show Filipino 
political institutions maturing, Senator Shafroth explained that, since the popularly 
elected lower house opened in 1907, two political parties had developed and the pro-
independence party was now dominant.508  Senator Hitchcock, chairman of the 
Committee on the Philippines, noted that, while the 1901 Organic Act provided for 
American domination of an appointed upper house, President Wilson had instead 
appointed a majority of Filipinos.  As a consequence both houses of the legislature had 
been under local control for the past two years, demonstrating the suitability of Filipinos 
to rule their own affairs.509  Filipinos had increasingly replaced Americans in the 
bureaucracy as well, a trend greatly accelerated by the liberal Governor General 
appointed by President Wilson in 1913.510 
Exhibiting a pragmatism emblematic of their newfound role in the minority, the 
Republicans portrayed the proposed changes to the governance of the Philippines as a 
relatively low-stakes game.  They found little in the general bill to contest.  Should the 
Senate decide to set free the archipelago, these republican senators declared that they 
would press for no special treatment or protection from the United States, in which case, 
they claimed, the form of government there was of no concern.   
                                                 
507 53 Cong. Rec. 608 (6 January 1916). 
508 The National Party supported independence, and the Federal or Progressive party statehood. The 
National Party soon captured the majority. After the House passed the Jones bill in October 1914, the 
Filipino joint assembly sent their thanks, and asked Senate and president for the same. 53 Cong. Rec. 658 
(7 January 1916). 
509 53 Cong. Rec. 604 (6 January 1916). 
510 President Wilson had appointed Governor General Harrison in 1913, beginning process of 
Filipinization. In 1913 nearly a third of the 9,000 employed by the Philippine Government were American; 
by 1921, only 624 Americans shared administration duties with over 13,000 Filipinos. “The Philippines,” 
Library of Congress Country Studies, http://countrystudies.us/philippines/18.htm. 
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Should the Senate decide to retain the islands, on the other hand, any errant 
decisions could be undone by either the Governor General or the President, both of whom 
had veto authority over territorial governance.511  In short, the Republican senators were 
willing to concede the changes proposed within the bill, and would reserve their ire for 
the preamble. 
The Democratic position was more adamant about coupling popular rule with 
independence.  In general, they felt the Filipinos were adequately prepared for the 
increased responsibility proposed in the bill, and with American protection could govern 
the islands effectively.  As Senator Chilton remarked: 
There is nothing that we have done that will ever shine so brightly as the 
final act when we, as a free people, say to the Filipinos ‘Go and work out 
your own salvation, free and untrammeled by any foreign government on 
earth.’  The Democratic Party is now hastening to that consummation.512 
E. FEASIBILITY 
How exactly to hasten it remained a question.   The proposals and counter-
proposals advance in response quickly became entangled, and the subtle distinctions 
between each of little relevance here.  There were, however three general groups of 
answers, of varying practicality, that were proposed.  
The first, and arguably the most obviously impractical, was put forward by a 
minority of Democrats.  They proposed sharing the burden of defending the islands with 
all the leading powers having interests in the region.  In this conception, the United States 
would free the islands and then host a conference to work out the details of ensuring that 
freedom.  The product of the conference would be an international agreement by the 
participating countries to contribute military and naval units to patrol the Philippines with 
a larger force held in reserve to repel an invasion.   
The feasibility of this plan was immediately attacked by senators from both 
parties, who pointed out that even in peaceful times the great nations of the world would 
                                                 
511 Senator McLean added “I prefer to give them an elective senate and hold them entirely 
responsible.” 53 Cong. Rec. 720 (8 January 1916) (statements of Senators McLean and Sterling). 
512 53 Cong. Rec. 1078 (14 January 1916). 
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have no reason to pledge forces to keep the Philippines independent.  The year 1916, 
moreover, was not ordinary peaceful times.  On the contrary, a host of recent events had 
demonstrated just how hollow international guarantees could be.513 
The second group was comprised of a larger sampling of Democratic, and some 
Republican, senators.  They proposed that successful resolution of an international 
conference should be a precondition of Philippine independence, rather than an ex post 
facto means of guaranteeing it.  This group also thought that seeking an agreement of 
mutual defense for the newly independent islands would go too far, and that a wiser 
course would be to simply seek agreement not to interfere.514 
Inevitably, however, a number of senators argued that an agreement on mutual 
non-interference might prove just as worthless as one for mutual defense.  Supporters of 
the first proposition also countered that their plan to free the islands first would 
demonstrate both the uniqueness of American values and the good faith of its policies, 
thus garnering more support from traditional imperial governments.515 
Finally, a third group advocated a unilateral American guarantee of Philippine 
sovereignty, effectively reversing the arguments above.  Recognizing that the great 
powers, already embroiled in a grueling war, were preoccupied and disinterested in the 
peripheral politics of Asia, this group felt it would be safe to extend American protection.   
Some senators who supported a plan for unilateral guarantee were willing to bet 
the bluff—for that, militarily speaking, is what it was—would not be called, especially if 
the promised protection was limited to a finite duration.  Others believed that the 
Filipinos themselves would see the danger in complete freedom and instead opt for 
limited autonomy along the lines of Canada’s permanent affiliation with Great Britain.516  
Many believed this plan to be not only the most feasible, but also the least disturbing to 
                                                 
513 53 Cong. Rec. 1070 (14 January 1916) (statement of Senator Colt). 
514 53 Cong. Rec. 1507 (25 January 1916). 
515 Ibid. (statement of Senator Clapp). 
516 Senator Nelson stated the Boers are better off under British rule than they were under their own, 
and that he would support self-government, but only under the American flag, like Cuba under Platt, 
Canada under the British Crown, Boers under Great Britain. 53 Cong. Rec. 1075 (14 January 1916). 
 202 
those who continued to fear foreign international agreements generally.  To their 
opponents, however, this proposal “asserts that we should continue the policy in the hope 
that it would so far educate [the Filipinos] as to destroy their sense or desire of self-
government and make them so content with their lot that, like Canada, they will prefer 
their subjection to their independence.”517 
F. PROMISE 
The final contentious issue sprang from the wording of the bill’s preamble.  
Specifically, the promise to grant independence, in some form and at some point, to the 
Filipinos was widely debated.  In addition to being the first time since the Teller 
Amendment in 1898 that the United States explicitly stated a plan to grant freedom to one 
of the former Spanish colonies, the preamble was also controversial in that it extended 
such a promise without including an anticipated timeline.  The promise itself, and its lack 
of specificity, fueled the remaining debate in the Senate over the Jones Bill and divided a 
body otherwise amenable to the prospect of an independent Philippines, as demonstrated 
by the statement of Senator Sutherland: 
The difference between the attitude of the Senator from Colorado and my 
attitude is that we are both in favor, when the proper time comes, of letting 
the Philippines go, but the Senator wants to make a declaration about it 
(which) immediately invites them to say they are ready for it now, or 
ready in one year, and that brings on a contest.518 
Again, the senators fell loosely into three groups on this issue.  Some felt the 
wording of the preamble was right and proper.   They cited years of implicit promises—
including Democratic platforms and statements by government officials of both parties—
which the proposed statement would merely codify.519  Furthermore, they stated that the 
                                                 
517 53 Cong. Rec. 1448 (24 January 1916) (statement of Senator Thomas). 
518 53 Cong. Rec. 1558 (26 January 1916). 
519 53 Cong. Rec. 1078 (14 January 1916). 
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lack of a timeline would allow for the transition to be managed smoothly and on 
American terms.520    
A second group advanced the position that it would be better to promise nothing 
than kindle expectations.  They felt that it was foolish to suppose that promise of 
independence would spur the Filipinos to spare no effort in mastering self-government.  
Including such a statement in the bill would only lead to impatience, and the result would 
be a decrement in progress toward governmental competency.  Finally, this group also 
stated that the preamble’s wording did not promise action by the 64th Congress Senate, 
but rather by some future senate and was thus unsupportable.521 
The third group took this latter point to a different extreme.  In their view, if the 
government of the United States intended to grant independence to the Filipinos, why not 
simply do it now?  In practice, they argued, the United States would be obligated to 
protect the Philippines no matter what, in which case, what was to be gained by waiting 
for self-governance skills to mature?  No amount of preparation would guarantee the 
survival of a government in the Philippines, and the element of risk would not be bought 
away by additional decades of American rule.  It was simply time to let go.522 
G. AMENDMENTS TO AND VOTES ON THE JONES BILL 
With the positions and arguments thus framed by both sides several senators 
sought to alter language in the bill that they found objectionable.  Many amendments 
were offered simply to make a statement, and never heard from again.  Additional dozens 
were crafted for individual line items, or to improve clarity in phrasing.  These, for the 
most part, were accepted without debate.  Four amendments and one motion, however, 
sharpened the debate and tested the support in the Senate for the whole enterprise. 
                                                 
520 Senator Hitchcock produced a list of government officials who had made statements during the 
past decade to the Filipinos regarding independence, and Republican senators strove to depict those as 
unofficial comments. 53 Cong. Rec. 865–8 (11 January 1916). Regarding timeline, 53 Cong. Rec. 1260 (19 
January 1916) (statement of Senator Colt). 
521 For a representative sample, see 53 Cong. Rec. 1079 (14 January 1916) (statement of Senator 
Lippitt). 
522 For one instance among many, see 53 Cong. Rec. 607 (6 January 1916) (statement of Senator 
Borah). 
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The first, offered on 11 January by Senator Clarke of Arkansas, stipulated 
independence within two years, followed by an international convention by the leading 
imperial powers to protect the Philippines for five additional years.523  In reply, Senator 
McCumber suggested an amendment to the amendment that made two major changes.  
First, he proposed granting independence only after international agreement had been 
reached.  Secondly, his amendment replaced Clarke’s plan of international protection 
with language that called instead for an international agreement not to interfere with the 
Philippines for five years.524  As an amendment to an amendment it was the first to come 
up for a vote, and was defeated on 31 January by voice vote. 
Representing the portion of the Senate that eschewed international agreements, 
Senator Cummins proposed a replacement for Senator Clarke’s amendment that avoided 
timelines and international conferences altogether.  Instead, his bill empowered the 
president to appoint three commissioners to work with the Philippine Legislature—as 
established by the body of the Jones bill—to craft a constitution subject to approval by 
the Filipinos themselves.  A constitution endorsed by the Philippine people would be 
subject to approval by the Senate and the president, after which independence would be 
immediate, with no protection offered.  The United States would maintain only coaling 
stations and naval bases in the islands.525  This replacement amendment was defeated the 
following day, and Senator Lodge took the opportunity to remind his counterparts of the 
dangers he perceived: 
                                                 
523 The amendment also directed the president to “invite the cooperation of the principal nations 
interested in the affairs of that part of the world in which the Philippines are located, in the form of a treaty 
or other character of binding agreement, whereby the cooperating nations shall mutually pledge themselves 
to recognize and respect the sovereignty and independence of the Philippines…and to maintain…the 
sovereignty of said Philippines for the period of five years.” 53 Cong. Rec. 846 (11 January 1916). 
524 Senator McCumber offered his amendment to counter Senator Clarke’s plan for international 
protection, preferring to extend independence to the Philippines when it is believed “that such 
independence will be permanent and respected by the other powers of the world.” 53 Cong. Rec. 938 (12 
January 1916). 
525 Senator Cummins felt the bases would not impinge on the sovereignty of the newly independent 
nation, as “The retention of a coaling station or a naval base does not involve government over anybody. It 
does not involve the subjection of any part of the Philippine people to the Government of the United 
States…I want them if they would be a source of strength. I do not want them if they would be a source of 
weakness, and I intend in my amendment to leave that discretion to the President.” 53 Cong. Rec. 1934 (1 
February 1916). The Cummins amendment was defeated 16/59/21. Two other variations on this plan, 
offered by Senator Hitchcock and Senator Norris, were also defeated by similar margins. 
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I had a large part in drafting the organic act, which, on the whole, I think 
has worked well as a constitution for these islands.  It seems to me that 
there are only two courses to be pursued with regard to the islands.  One is 
to abandon them entirely…the other is to remain in control of the islands 
as we now are…we ought to avoid putting ourselves in the position where 
we shall be responsible for those islands and yet have no power over 
them…No mistake would be as great as a halfway measure…power 
without responsibility is bad, but responsibility without power is even 
worse.526 
The final effort to modify the Clarke amendment was proposed immediately after 
the Cummins amendment failed.  Senator Kenyon sensed the lack of support for either 
international agreements to protect the Philippines, or for preemptive abandonment, and 
instead sought a middle course.527  His amendment would replace any language calling 
for international agreements with new language promising unilateral protection by the 
United States, but limited to five years.  This combination proved quite appealing.  Read 
through only once, and without the slightest debate, his amendment passed immediately 
by a comfortable margin.528 
Thus altered, the Clarke amendment itself came up for a vote.  Again without 
debate, roll was taken, and votes counted.  The result was a tie.529  As with the defeat of 
the Bacon amendment during the Treaty of Paris debates in 1899, the Vice President 
voted to support his party and by that narrow margin Clarke Amendment passed. 
Sensing the game was nearly up, Republican Senator Lippitt immediately offered 
a motion to stop the process before the Jones bill came up for a vote, and to return the 
                                                 
526 53 Cong. Rec. 1942 (1 February 1916). 
527 Senator Kenyon stated: “I think there are some who would be glad to vote for the Clarke 
amendment were it not for the guaranty that is made…and the time period specified. I should myself.” 53 
Cong. Rec. 1997 (2 February 1916). 
528 The vote on the Kenyon amendment appears on the same transcript page as its introduction, 
separated only by the reading and the roll call. It passed 53/31/12, with the non-voting all pairs, 6/6. Nays 
included all Democrats but three: Senators Nelson of MN (anti-expansionist), Gronna ND, and Catron of 
NM. Yeas included 23 Democrats. Interestingly, except for Senator Catron, all 11 westernmost states were 
unanimous in favor, including 13 Democratic senators. 
529 The vote tally on the Clarke amendment was 41/41/14. Of the 41 votes in favor, five were 
Republicans (LaFollette, Borah, Clapp, Kenyon, Works). Of the 41 against, 12 were Democrats from all 
over the map. Senators not voting were not paired, 6R/8D, and several had changed from the previous 
votes, thus making and intentional tie unlikely. 
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entire bill to committee for reappraisal.530  In this he received support from both fellow 
Republican and Democratic senators, who accepted his argument that, as modified, the 
bill had lost its original coherence, and needed to be completely reconsidered.531  To this 
Senator Clarke responded “I think the matter has been discussed about as fully as it 
would be if it were referred.  I move to lay the motion on the table” and called for the 
yeas and nays.532  50 senators agreed to table the proposal to return the bill to committee, 
effectively buying time in which any further reservations could be fully explored, 
exhausted, and ultimately dispensed with. 
Last minute administrative and clarity amendments consumed the next two days. 
On 4 February, the Jones Bill on the Philippines finally came up for a vote, and passed 
with 52 in favor, 24 against, and 20 not voting.  Immediately after the result was 
announced, Senator Hitchcock withdrew the unpopular preamble, with no discussion.533  
The Philippine question was finally settled, the promise of eventual independence made, 
and only the details on the manner and the time of its achievement left for another day.   
H. 64TH CONGRESS SENATE, SECOND SESSION: PUERTO RICO 
With the Philippines thus dispensed with, Cuba notionally independent under the 
terms of the Platt Amendment and Guam lacking an organized political structure, the 
future of Puerto Rico became the final governance question raised by America’s imperial 
experiment.  By the time that issue was finally brought to the floor of the Senate for 
                                                 
530 In concert with this entreaty to high-minded lawmaking, Senator Lippitt also took the low road and 
appealed to southern senators not to allow “the same situation which occurred in the southern states during 
the reconstruction period, when they had an enormous ignorant colored vote thrust into their affairs.” 53 
Cong. Rec. 1998 (2 February 1916). 
531 Senator Clapp stated: “I am a member of that committee. We framed the bill along only one line of 
thought and purpose, and now that the Senate had definitely settled that some provision of independence 
shall be associated with the bill, I think it very appropriate that the bill should go back to the committee in 
the light of the determination of the Senate.” 53 Cong. Rec. 1997 (2 February 1916). Democratic Senator 
Newlands added: “this committee confined itself entirely to the question of giving the Filipinos a larger 
share in their government, and not to the question as to the preparations that might be made for finally 
cutting loose from those islands.” 53 Cong. Rec. 1629 (27 January 1916). 
532 53 Cong. Rec. 1999 (2 February 1916). 
533 The following is the entire exchange. Mr. Clarke: “We are not through with the bill. The preamble 
has not been disposed of.” Mr. Hitchcock: “I desire to withdraw the preamble, Mr. President.” Mr. Clarke: 
“All right.” The Vice President: “Without objection, the preamble is withdrawn.” 53 Cong. Rec. 2125 (4 
February 1916). 
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debate and decision, the experiment had largely slipped the minds of senators and their 
constituents, who had become increasingly preoccupied with the prospect of American 
involvement in the European war.  The month in which the Senate held the Puerto Rican 
bill under consideration included the formal severing of diplomatic relations with 
Germany and debates on both a neutrality bill and an immigration bill.  In addition, 
President Wilson gave his “Peace Without Victory” address to the Senate on proposed 
peace terms in Europe, in which he stated: 
I thought I owed it to you, as the council associated with me in the final 
determination of our international obligations, to disclose to you without 
reserve the thought and purpose that have been taking form in my mind in 
regard to the duty…to lay afresh and upon a new plan the foundations of 
peace among the nations.534 
Added to these demands for the Senate’s attention were building pressures 
exerted by increasingly voluble agitation in favor of prohibition and women’s suffrage, 
both which would culminate in the next two years.535  As a result, the sponsor of the 
measure regarding government in Puerto Rico faced an uphill struggle to gain the 
attention of his colleagues during the two months of the 64th Congress that remained.  In 
contrast to the early and swift handling of Philippine bill, the Puerto Rican bill languished 
in the shadows of more dramatic and pressing concerns.536 
It was thus at least partly owing to the distraction of greater events that the 
marginally different treatment of Puerto Rico and the Philippines in the Original Acts of 
1900 and 1901 had grown into such starkly divergent policy outcomes 16 years later.  
The debates on the Philippine government act during the first session of the 64th Congress 
                                                 
534 54 Cong. Rec. 1741 (22 February 1917) (President Wilson’s address to the Senate). 
535 As will be shown, these two issues not only increasingly occupied senators’ time, but were also 
inserted into debates on pending measures only tangentially related. The Eighteenth Amendment 
(Prohibition) would pass the Senate in January 1919, and the Nineteenth Amendment (Women’s Suffrage) 
six months later. 
536 Similar issues could be cited for other dates that month, and are all in addition to the traditional 
end-of-Congress crush of appropriations and pensions measures, but on 20 February 1917 the Porto Rico 
bill competed for time primarily against measures dealing with military training, militia, need for naval 
officers, ordnance and fortification, war and preparations for war, severed relations with Germany, and 
hundreds of petitions remonstrating against war. Other topics of note allocated at least some time that day 
included alcohol and alcoholic liquor traffic, purchase of the Danish West Indies, daylight savings time, 
fortification of the Canal Zone, definition and punishment for espionage, and the establishment of Grand 
Canyon and Mount McKinley national parks. 
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Senate were treated as urgent business by both sides, pressed non-stop to conclusion 
months before the session’s end.  The debates on the Puerto Rican government during the 
second session (December 1916-March 1917) were pressed solely by the bill’s sponsor, 
and were treated more like earlier debates on imperialism.  Progress was delayed, 
discussion was blocked or addressed piecemeal for the bulk of the session, followed by a 
frantic push to bring the measure to a vote before the end of the Congress.  The Puerto 
Rican government bill also proved immune to external pressures calling for action.  
Delayed elections, public agitation, and gapped representation all had no purchase in 
bringing the measure before the Senate.537  The only impetus was provided by Senator 
Shafroth’s dogged determination and the collective desire to whittle down the crowded 
Senate calendar as the term drew to a close.   
While the debate on the Jones Bill had been dominated by consideration of 
international relations, the discussion of Puerto Rico’s fate was shaped mainly by 
considerations arising from domestic American politics.  The predominant influences 
were from contemporaneous discourse on citizenship and suffrage, taxation, and 
prohibition.  These contrasting frameworks went a long way to determining the outcome.  
From the start, the discussion over the Philippines can be understood as deciding the best 
way to be rid of the islands.  Conversely, the debate over Puerto Rico was about the 
constitutional and political ramifications of keeping a territory permanently as a quasi-
state. 
I. THE JONES-SHAFROTH BILL ON GOVERNMENT IN PUERTO RICO 
Puerto Rico’s case also began as a bill sponsored by Congressman Jones in the 
House of Representatives.  When it arrived at the Senate it too foundered in  
 
 
                                                 
537 Senator Shafroth pointed out that the Resident Commissioner had died the previous November and 
consideration of this bill would help expedite his replacement. The senator also explained that recent 
elections were delayed in anticipation of this bill’s passage, and were now desperately overdue. 54 Cong. 
Rec. 999 (08 January 1917). 
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committee.538  Early in the second session, following the return from Christmas break, 
Senator Shafroth repeatedly tried to raise issue asking unanimous consent, but met only 
disinterest:   
I have had a bill up here to give civil government to Porto Rico, and I have 
been for six months trying to get a hearing upon it, but it has been 
impossible to do so.  I have asked unanimous consent several times for its 
consideration, and I have moved its consideration several times.  It is an 
important measure, involving the liberties and rights of the people of Porto 
Rico, but I cannot get consideration of it.539 
He finally succeeded on 13 January by calling for a vote to determine if the issue would 
be discussed, and won largely on the strength of the numbers not voting.540   
The bill was then read and explained in detail by its sponsor.  Senator Shafroth 
demonstrated that the Foraker act had been intended to be temporary, included no bill of 
rights, did not properly separate powers, created an unrecognized Puerto Rican 
citizenship, and capriciously limited the franchise.  The Jones-Shafroth Bill proposed to 
remedy those shortcomings by providing for an elected bi-cameral legislature, United 
States citizenship, and suffrage to all males who either paid property tax, could read, or 
had voted in the last election.541  With that, the bill was again set aside in deference to 
more pressing matters, and was discussed as unfinished business only occasionally over 
the next two weeks.542  
                                                 
538 Having undergone extensive revision, the bill was reported out in June 1916 bearing the committee 
chairman’s name as co-author. 
539 Ibid. 
540 The proposal passed 32/25/39, with a large number of those not voting either absent on official 
business or ill. Since this was a simple motion to consider a topic, not a deciding vote that would activate 
standing pairs on an issue, relatively few pairs were announced. 
541 The committee had added the third suffrage condition. The initial qualifications were literacy or 
property, as was the case in the Philippines, but qualification by past voting addressed the unique situation 
Puerto Ricans “had been voting for years, even under Spanish rule, having fully as large a voting 
population in proportion to the total population as the United States has, and therefore its limitation would 
be a great disappointment to them.” 54 Cong. Rec. 1324–29 (13 January 1917). 
542 Referring to the relative unimportance of the Jones-Shafroth Bill, the Vice President stated “We 
wasted three-quarters of an hour yesterday on this subject” before interpreting rules against Shafroth 
trumping unfinished business. Senator Pomerene argued a special night session should deal with the 
overloaded calendar, not just Porto Rico, that there were more pressing bills to deal with of “as much 
interest to the people of the United States as is the Porto Rican bill to some islanders at sea.” 54 Cong. Rec. 
2222 (30 January 1917). 
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The Jones-Shafroth Bill finally surfaced as the main topic of the 30 January 
evening session.  Senators plunged into line-by-line review of the bill, suggesting small 
changes to wording and cleaning up language, primarily in the sections on the bill of 
rights and on taxation.  The tenor of the discussion was not adversarial.  As the bill was 
read and committee amendments brought forth, the interjections from the floor were 
mostly suggestions for increased clarity.  After that spurt of productivity, however, the 
bill languished.  Each day thereafter, discussion was truncated by other unfinished 
business before the Senate.543 
In addition to the split attention of the Senate, Senator Shafroth suffered from split 
allegiance as well.  As a senator from Colorado, Shafroth was particularly interested in a 
water-power bill that was then being considered by the Senate.  As chairman of the 
Committee on Porto Rico and the Pacific Islands, however, and as the lone champion for 
the Puerto Rican governance bill, he found himself trying to divert attention from such 
domestic bills in order to bring the Puerto Rican issue to closure.  This conflict of interest 
ultimately led him to bargain away sections of the Puerto Rican bill in exchange for quick 
passage, in order to return to the water-power bill in which his constituency was deeply 
interested.544 
Further muddying the waters, President Wilson’s speech to the Senate outlining 
the concept that would become the League of Nations had the effect of clogging the floor 
with something senators were passionate about, either for or against.  Speech after speech 
                                                 
543 Alternately, the Puerto Rico government bill was supplanted by the water-power development bill, 
the neutrality bill, or various appropriations acts. The neutrality bills would be significant in these debates 
as the in-depth discussions on citizenship had relevance to both eastern European and Porto Rican 
immigration. The “Development of Water-Power and the Use of Public Lands” bill under debate was vital 
to many western states, and significant here due the resultant split attention of Senator Shafroth.  
544 The water measure bill “is before the Senate now, and out in my part of the country it is regarded 
as the most important measure to us that ever has been presented to the Congress of the United States…a 
landlordship and the seizure of our waters that belong to the States…I want the Porto Rican bill to be 
concluded just as quickly as possible.” 54 Cong. Rec. 2360 (1 February 1917). 
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drained time and energy from continued consideration of the Jones-Shafroth Bill.545  
Motions for evening sessions dedicated to debate the government of Puerto Rico failed, 
and when the issue did come up on the regular calendar the evening session was 
cancelled due to lack of a quorum.546  But during that evening session, two of the three 
major issues emerged that threatened to derail Jones-Shafroth. 
One was the fight over voter qualifications.  Of the three qualifications in the bill 
reported by committee, the first to be bargained away by the bill’s sponsor was that of 
having voted previously.547  The literacy qualification was challenged next, mostly on the 
grounds of likelihood of abuse.548  It survived in part due to the sponsor showing the 
same requirement remained in the recent Philippine legislation.549 
Debate over voter qualification was part and parcel of the second major issue: 
taxation.  The bill’s provision allowing illiterate property owners to vote if they had paid 
property taxes was unpopular.  Some senators painted it as a poll tax, while others felt 
that granting the vote to the unschooled would undermine democratic progress.550  
Senator Shafroth argued that the exception for unlettered property owners was actually 
                                                 
545 The President’s speech birthed several senatorial rebuttals during this period. Senator Lodge 
offered one of the lengthiest, and most emblematic of later Senate resistance to the Treaty of Versailles. His 
role in countering Wilson’s initiatives would dominate the debates of July to November 1919. Interrupting 
the deliberations on the Puerto Rican bill, Senator Lodge’s address on the President’s speech and “League 
to Enforce Peace” began by stating he was loathe to debate issues not pressing before adjournment, but 
then he continued for eight pages. Senator Thomas then added another eight-page speech. 54 Cong. Rec. 
from 2364 (1 February 1917). 
546 After a day spent overriding the president’s veto of the immigration bill, 62/19/15, the evening 
session to debate the Porto Rican bill was cancelled after 15 minutes. “The reason is that there are not 
enough senators interested in the measure to come here at night [offered Senator Shafroth to the 19 senators 
in attendance] it is manifest that we can not get a quorum on such a bitter cold night, and we would only 
torture ourselves by remaining here.” The bill was not discussed again for another week. 54 Cong. Rec. 
2630 (5 February 1917).  
547 Since this third qualification would be applied to an ever-decreasing portion of the population, it 
was felt that a blanket citizenship qualification would suffice. 54 Cong. Rec. 2250 (30 January 1917).  
548 The most forceful opponent commented allowing illiterate voters, “enlarges the possibility of 
suffrage, but it enlarges a thousand times more the possibility of controlling the electorate of Porto Rico” 
by providing tax receipts in exchange for votes. 54 Cong. Rec. 3474 (17 February 1917). 
549 54 Cong. Rec. 3474 (17 February 1917) (statement of Senator Shafroth).  
550 Regarding the lack of “reference to the capacity of the citizen to vote…it is simply impossible to 
tell what will be done down there if every irresponsible man 21 years old has equal voice in the control of 
the island.” 54 Cong. Rec. 3470 (17 February 1917) (statement of Senator Smith). 
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“an extension of the franchise, not a limitation, as it allows illiterate citizens the vote.”551  
In the end, however, he yielded on property qualification in order to attain passage, and 
lost the vote regarding tax payment as a voter qualification. 
The third major issue was much larger.  On 11 February, a small disagreement 
over fairness between bills proposed for Hawaii, Alaska, and Puerto Rico, led to 
discussion of other commonalities among the three territories, which opened the door to 
debate over prohibition.552  In the same way that the topic of slavery in the territories had 
become a proxy for the national problem in the late 1840s, prohibition in the territories 
here served as a placeholder for a national discussion that was soon to erupt.  
Recognizing that this engendered the kind of passion that could stop the whole bill, a 
sympathetic senator delayed further consideration.553 The Puerto Rican bill went 
unmentioned for another week before a compromise was reached by which the decision 
on prohibition would be reserved to future Puerto Rican voters.554 
With only a few days remaining in the 64th Congress, Senator Shafroth again 
brought up the Puerto Rican bill on 20 February.  Stating deliberation could be completed 
in three minutes, the bill’s sponsor pressed for a vote but was nearly derailed by another 
                                                 
551 54 Cong. Rec. 3474 (17 February 1917). Supporters of the bill suggested it would be wrong to 
deny the vote on the basis of wealth: “I insist that the lack of property is a misfortune, and not necessarily a 
crime.” Ibid., 3473 (statement of Senator Martine). 
552 The gist of the fairness debate was over the wages proposed for the governor and cabinet of Puerto 
Rico under Jones-Shafroth. The wages were higher than that granted to governors of Hawaii and Alaska, 
especially given the lack of provided lodging in the former, and the high cost of living in the latter. While it 
was pointed out the population of Puerto Rico was 1.2 million (Hawaii was 300,000, and Alaska smaller 
still), and the Puerto Rico treasury would be paying the governor’s expenses, the wages in Jones-Shafroth 
were eventually reduced to be aligned with the others. 
553 Senator Gronna tried to insert prohibiting language into the bill. Senator Sutherland suggested 
letting the Puerto Ricans decide for themselves. Senator Oberman then called for a vote to shift the debate 
to the neutrality bill, which passed 36/24/36. After that, the Senate took up discussion of the postage bill, 
then unfinished business in evening session, successfully avoiding joining Puerto Rico and prohibition. 54 
Cong. Rec. 3011 (11 February 1917). 
554 Senator Lodge offered an amendment striking prohibiting language for fear if he did not, the 
Senate might allow Senator Gronna’s language into the bill out of exasperation and eagerness to be done 
with Jones-Shafroth. The eventual compromise language allowed the island’s voters to decide within five 
years, to which Senator Gronna stated he preferred his original, “but I understand it would perhaps defeat 
the Porto Rican bill, and I do not wish to do that.” 54 Cong. Rec. 3468 (17 February 1917). 
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domestic issue: female suffrage.  One senator vehemently lobbied for its inclusion, and 
another threated to kill the bill if inclusion was contemplated.555  
Like prohibition, this was an issue that inflamed passions; only now there was not 
enough time remaining to step back and allow tempers to cool.  Time and again, a senator 
would interject his position on female suffrage, the sponsor would deflect the issue as not 
pertinent to the bill, and then shout “Question!” to prompt the Vice President to start the 
voting process.  Repeatedly, the Vice President began “The question before the Senate 
is…” only to be interrupted by another senator determined to make his views on suffrage 
known.556 
After a dozen such iterations, a third senator attempted to sideline further 
consideration of the Puerto Rican bill and instead bring up unfinished business.557  This 
continued until the two senators with opposing views on female suffrage felt the point 
sufficiently made, and the senator desiring to move to unfinished business relented, 
stating “I withdraw the motion I made a few moments ago.  I see the Senator from 
Colorado is about ready to jump.”558  With that, the Vice President was able to complete 
his call for a vote, and the amended bill was passed on a voice vote.559 
Senator Shafroth lead the Senate delegation to the committee of conference.  The 
bill’s co-sponsor, Congressman Jones, was his House counterpart.  The lower house 
agreed to the resulting three pages of proposed alterations on 24 February by a voice vote 
                                                 
555 Republican Senator Jones of Washington wished to include female suffrage, and Democratic 
Senator Martine of New Jersey sought to prevent it. 54 Cong. Rec. 3666–7 (20 February 1917). 
556 By senate rules, once roll call was initiated, no further amendments could be offered, and the only 
interruptions allowed would be on questions of order. 
557 Senator Vardaman stated: “The Senator from Colorado has not kept his promise. He said he would 
finish this bill in three minutes. I move now that the Senate proceed to the consideration of what is known 
as the flood-control bill.” Senator Shafroth rejoined: “We have reached the point where we can vote right 
now, if the senator will just let us do so. Question, Mr. President!” As the VP announced the question, he 
was again cut off by a speech against women suffrage. Senator Shafroth reiterated the question is left 
entirely to the Puerto Ricans, and again shouted: “Question, Mr. President.” Ibid. 
558 54 Cong. Rec. 3667 (20 February 1917) (statement of Senator Vardaman). 
559 The fact that yeas and nays were not called for supports the assumption that senators airing 
concerns over citizenship, taxation, prohibition, and woman’s suffrage were doing to for a forum larger 
than Senate decision on government in Puerto Rico. 
 214 
after little discussion.560  Two days later, Senator Shafroth presented the conference 
report, which the Senate agreed to by voice vote without debate or comment.561  The 
president signed the bill on 2 March 1917. 
The Jones-Shafroth Act would guide governance of Puerto Rico until a 
constitutional convention act more than 30 years later.562  Symbolically and practically, it 
also marked the end of the two-decade long effort by the United States Senate to master 
the questions of constitutional principle, international politics, and practical governance 
raised by America’s acquisition of overseas territories.  The experimental phase of 
American imperialism was thus over, and the long, slow process of extraction well 
underway. 
                                                 
560 Congressman Jones went through the over 100 amendments proposed by the Senate and 
characterized only two as significant: the Gronna amendment that was neutered by putting prohibition to 
popular Puerto Rican vote, and the suffrage requirements for property and taxation stricken by the Senate. 
The bulk of the five pages of transcripts are largely explanatory in nature. 
561 54 Cong. Rec. 4271 (26 February 1917). 
562 The name of the territory was officially changed to Puerto Rico in 1932, direct election of the 
Governor was authorized in 1948, a constitutional convention called in 1950, and the Constitution of Puerto 
Rico passed in 1952.  
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XI. CONCLUSION: THE INTENTIONAL NATURE OF SENATE 
DECISIONS ON AMERICAN IMPERIALISM 
The United States did not blunder into imperialism.  Nor was its hand forced by 
external events.  The capacity to conduct the experiment had roots in western expansion, 
but was not predestined by the closing of the frontier.  Nor was it a systemic product of 
continental growth.  As evidenced by the Senate debates examined in this paper, 
American imperialism was a conscious choice, made in full light of day by intelligent 
men who wrestled with its meaning and potential repercussions.  They were aware, in the 
moment, that the decisions they were making controverted the established procedure for 
incorporating territory and assimilating the people therein.  Forewarned, these senators 
pressed on, and then adapted the rules and the process as they went in order to 
accommodate developments they did not always foresee. 
Other than the early fervor of Cuba Libre—and the fitful anti-expansionist 
campaign against America’s annexation of the Philippines and suppression of native 
resistance that this entailed—American imperialism never dominated the national 
conversation for very long.  Nor have the debates, controversies, and compromises of that 
era stuck in the public mind.  Today many otherwise politically informed Americans 
cannot explain how Guam came to be a part of the United States, while Cuba did not.  
Fewer still can explain why Puerto Rico remains a territory but the Philippines is now an 
independent country.   In Latin America and Asia, on the other hand, the advent of the 
United States as an imperial power remains a living, if inevitably mythologized, memory, 
with potent influences on later relations.  The brief American experiment with 
imperialism faded to obscurity domestically, but resonated internationally.   
The policies developed to administer overseas territories, and the arguments used 
in the Senate to justify those choices a century ago, bear striking resemblance to those 
crafted and deployed in our own day.  In both cases, the defense of American interests at 
home and abroad resulted in actions that would have been inconsistent with America’s 
conception of itself at the time of its founding, and for a century afterwards.  The United 
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States continues to regard its lessons and model as worth spreading even if act of 
transmission itself clashes with the central tenets of the republic’s character. 
Early American forays into overseas expansion paled in comparison to the actual 
period of imperialism from 1898.  While arrangements for coaling stations, desires for an 
isthmian canal, and acquisition of guano islands were byproducts of the same expanding 
naval and commercial might that later powered American imperialism, those early sorties 
beyond continental bounds did not include contemplation of extending the republic 
overseas.  Following a century of westward expansion, these moves marked the United 
States as an emerging world power.  The determination, however, to take and hold the 
former Spanish colonies stands apart.   
It is true that American imperialism owed its feasibility to that earlier pattern of 
growth, but the decision to keep and administer Puerto Rico, Guam, and the Philippines 
was not predestined by other overseas expansion.  Senators nearly chose another path 
several times from 1899–1901, and the issue throughout was hotly contested and closely 
decided.  Thus, there is no better place to search for the meaning of American 
imperialism than in the body that sought to determine the scope and the duration of that 
political control.   
The United States Senate purposefully decided not to extend the promise made to 
Cuba by the Teller Amendment to the other former Spanish colonies.  Instead the Senate 
set out to establish governments dissimilar to those found in the territories on track to 
become states.563  The senators were cognizant of this distinction throughout, and of the 
danger that their sui generis policy solutions might pose for the republic.  The same 
senators who designed the imperial territorial governments for Puerto Rico and the 
Philippines crafted the traditional territorial governments for Hawaii and Alaska.  There 
can be no doubt that in the former case they aimed to exercise political control over 
territories while keeping them separate, but in the latter designed the structure to begin 
incorporation into the republic as states.  This difference was intended, and well 
understood.   
                                                 
563 Specifically, the structures then in place for the Arizona, New Mexico, and Oklahoma 
Territories—and those contemplated for Hawaii and Alaska. 
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A. VIEWING THE DEBATES THROUGH FIVE LENSES 
The Senate debates on imperialism between 1898 and 1917 chronicled the 
changes in domestic political and international relations during that period.  They also 
reflected the changing American view of the world and America’s place in it between the 
Spanish-American and First World Wars.  Before its intervention in Cuba, the United 
States consciously sought to provide the world an example of enlightened democracy 
through its process of governance within its expanding, but continental, borders.  After 
1898 the United States sought not simply to exemplify political virtue, as Americans 
understood it, but to export republican government for the benefit of Spain’s former 
colonies. 
This change of outlook was the product of far-ranging and well-reasoned debates.  
The senators who engaged in this discourse were in turn influenced by diverse and 
sometimes conflicting motivations.  They addressed complex issues from motives both 
base and noble, and often came to compromise positions in order to achieve partial 
victories.   
The process the Senate followed to create or endorse imperial policy can be 
viewed through at least five separate lenses: domestic politics, intra-governmental roles, a 
willful separation of detail from meaning, a balance between national interests and moral 
duty, and the tension between desired outcome and preferred means.  By examining each 
level of inquiry individually, a more thorough understanding of the American legislative 
approach to its imperial experiment can be achieved. 
Using the first lens, it is possible to see how the cycles of domestic politics 
continually trumped the high ideals of international affairs.  Again and again during the 
Senate debates on imperialism, the decision process was disproportionately affected by 
elections, funding deadlines, party infighting, sectionalism, and competition between 
pending legislative bills at the end of session.  Whether in the minority or majority, 
partisans attempted to use these cycles as either a lever or a shield to influence the 
process.   
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As a result, even with hundreds of hours spent discussing imperial topics, 
important facets of relevant decisions often went unexplored and alternate solutions were 
left un-posed.  Similarly, domestic political realities at times left senators who were 
passionately anti-imperial uncomfortably stranded, while others with equal fervor for 
expansion stood alone where their party companions feared to tread.  This pattern can be 
observed both when the two sides were in near perfect division, and when one wielded a 
landslide majority over the other.  The issues raised by the pursuit of empire may have 
been outside the norm, sometimes defying partisan boundaries, sometimes muting them.  
In the end, however, the forces exerted by politics determined the result.  
Reviewing the preceding chapters with particular attention to concern about intra-
governmental roles yields an entirely different understanding of the meaning of these 
debates.  Through this second lens imperialism is merely the catalyst for the latest stage 
of a long running contest over roles between the legislative and executive branches.  In 
this context, the debates on taking and keeping the Spanish colonies were less about 
imperialism than about determining who could decide what.  With the Senate split on 
presidential prerogatives and unsure of the extent of its own power regarding foreign 
policy, inaction and deference to the administration’s plan was the norm.   
Early in the imperial period, President McKinley took advantage of this opening. 
He sought to share any potential blame with the Senate by sending a vaguely worded War 
Message, yet he maneuvered to preserve his options and resisted shared authority.  Two 
years later he went further by establishing and reinforcing civil government in the 
Philippines by executive action during congressional recess.  The president then spelled 
out his scheme in his annual message to Congress, and set his party’s machinery to 
actualize his agenda.  The Senate, for its part, struggled to articulate and advance a 
comparable foreign policy agenda of its own, either as opposition to that of the 
administration, or as an extension of it.  In the end, the Senate usually found itself 
reacting to executive initiative and thus often a step behind. 
For most of the period discussed here, the Republicans held both the White House 
and a majority in the Senate.  After the sweeping Democratic victory in 1912, however, 
Senate Democrats were eager to implement their long-stifled goal of reversing the 
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decisions made pursuant to the war with Spain.  By then, however, the executive branch, 
albeit in Democratic hands, was less a force to be reckoned with regarding imperial 
policy than it was an anchor to be hauled.  President Wilson was distracted 
internationally by the First World War, domestically by challenges such as the bipartisan 
overturn of his veto on and immigration bill, and personally by his vision to ensure future 
world peace through multilateralism.   
Democratic senators might have welcomed an engaged executive asserting his 
role in foreign policy, if only to help the Democratic agenda regarding the Philippines 
advance cleanly, and perhaps inspire a more liberal solution for Puerto Rico.  By 1917, 
however, executive preference in colonial matters was no longer in question, and thus 
imperialism was no longer useful as a ground on which to challenge the balance of intra-
governmental roles. 
The third lens, which takes special note of how the details of policy could become 
separated from its larger meaning, returns the focus to the Senate and its processes.  The 
Senate debates on empire were calculated to strip the issues thus raised of high ideals and 
moral weight, again producing another understanding of the actual meaning of the 
debates.  The sweeping issues associated with a republic transforming itself into an 
empire are lost amidst arguments about calculations of cost versus value, or of advantage 
versus threat—whether military or otherwise.  This was not accidental, but rather a 
necessary condition for legislative action. 
Far from lofty discourse over right and wrong, this approach served to establish a 
pricing menu meant to inform the conversation in the Senate.  It framed the argument in 
ways that avoided the central question at hand, in favor of a close focus on instrumental 
details that were nearly always selected to validate, or to challenge, established political 
positions or previous platform planks.  In this manner, for instance, the original Organic 
Act for Porto Rico was changed from a measure consistent with eventual advancement to 
statehood.  It instead became one that created an unprecedented permanent territory, all in 
order to rationalize a taxation scheme for the island that was added after the organic act 
was drafted.  In this instance, as in others, the Senate allowed great decisions to hinge on 
peripheral issues. 
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It is also through this lens that political maneuvering and parliamentarianism 
employed by senators engaged in the debates can be seen as having ruled the day.  After 
hours of speeches conducted at a higher level, more often than not decisions were sealed 
by influential senators adjusting their position to suit political fortunes, or by a 
convenient reinterpretation of arcane rules calculated to suit the moment.  The former 
was clearly exhibited by Senator Foraker’s conduct as a member of the committee of 
conference on the joint resolution for intervention in Cuba in 1898, and perhaps also a 
factor in Senator Sullivan’s absence, a year later, during the crucial vote on the Treaty of 
Paris, which negated Senator Bacon’s attempt to alter it.   
The creative use of arcane rules was certainly on display during the debates over 
organic acts for Puerto Rico and the Philippines in early 1901, when the long-standing 
Senate prohibition on inserting general legislation into appropriation bills was obviated 
by vote in favor of the majority.  It was evident again, 16 years later, when the modified 
organic act for Puerto Rico was repeatedly stalled by spurious interjections about 
prohibition and woman’s suffrage.  The lens of parliamentary maneuver and procedure 
affords a butcher’s view of sausage making, an important yet sometime disturbing 
vantage. 
The perennial contest between national interest and moral duty, conversely, serves 
to elevate the matter well above tawdry political considerations, intra-governmental 
squabbles, and parliamentarianism.  In this context, senatorial professions of duty bring a 
sense of striving toward greatness, and a willingness to engage in a larger cause that 
would be set back by undue parochialism.   
At the same time through this fourth lens it is apparent that, for the most part, the 
mood of the Senate was far from naïvely idealistic.  Senators seemed resigned to the facts 
at hand as they saw them: if the manly and Christian way was to assume responsibility 
for the Spanish colonies, even if such an act would not serve America’s best interests, 
then to have shirked would be a worse failing.  Yet they always remained conscious of 
the costs, despite a weary awareness that greatness could not be reflected on a balance 
sheet.  It is difficult to find any senator acting from pure altruism, yet such an 
understanding was apparent in the background throughout the debates on imperialism.   
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In 1898, this concept of moral duty formed the underpinning for the impetus to 
stop Spanish depredations in Cuba.  In 1899, it was behind the diametrically opposed 
outcomes that were envisioned for different parts of Spain’s erstwhile empire.  Moral 
duty informed the determination to ensure a free Cuba because the Teller Amendment 
promised that result.  It also informed the determination to hold Guam and the 
Philippines so as to ensure that one despotic European rule was not swapped for another.  
During the debates two years later, over the organic acts for Puerto Rico and the 
Philippines, this mindset supported the institution of republican governments that ensured 
civil rule of law.  And in 1916 and 1917, it influenced liberalization of the Puerto Rican 
territorial government, while codifying the promise of eventual independence for the 
Philippines.   
In each of these cases, strictly objective decisions based on pure national interests 
would likely have resulted in less costly and complex, but more oppressive, imperial 
structures.  While what was best for the Puerto Ricans, Chamorro, Cubans, and Filipinos 
was never foremost in the Senate discussions on empire, neither was what was best for 
the American people.  If it were, the resulting legislation would have simplified imperial 
rule, but would have also further undermined the public understanding of America as 
fundamentally different from Europe, whose example no one wished to emulate. 
Also evident in this viewing is an awareness of how uncertain the future appeared 
from the new vantage point that empire afforded.  Throughout the debates, senators 
remarked that despite their best efforts to establish representative governments in Spain’s 
former colonies, once those territories achieved independence their inhabitants would be 
free to undo those prescriptions.  There was an accompanying understanding that it would 
have been pointless to attempt to force the people of a territory to absorb the lessons the 
United States had learned through 125 years of self-governance.  The new countries 
would simply have to shift for themselves and be allowed the latitude to make mistakes, 
just as America had done.  That this sentiment was not later observed in practice is a 
large part of why the overbearing nature of American actions in this period, and after, set 
in motion a century of disgruntlement in Latin America and decades of resistance in Asia. 
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The fifth, and final, lens is perhaps most useful in that, in considering the 
relationship of ends and means, intention and outcome, it also emphasizes the tension 
between similarity and difference.  Regarding the American experiment with 
imperialism, the objectives advanced by senators differed more with respect to method 
than desired outcomes.  Using this lens, the familiar dividing line between supporters of 
the American imperial endeavors and their anti-imperialism opponents moves to the 
background, and a picture emerges in which a substantive consensus is repeatedly split by 
decisions about implementation.   
Illustrative examples abound throughout the period.  In April 1898, nearly all the 
senators were in favor of war with Spain but differed on how much latitude to grant the 
executive and details regarding whether or not to recognize Cuban independence first.  
Similarly, during the debates over the ratification of the Treaty of Paris nearly all of the 
senators had already accepted some responsibility to “do the right thing” by the former 
Spanish colonies, sharing a sense of noblesse oblige to mitigate the disturbances on the 
islands caused by the Spanish-American War.  Again, this was not an altruistic impulse, 
and the motivations to act were as varied as the senators themselves, but this shared sense 
of responsibility was an undercurrent throughout.  Furthermore, nearly all were in favor 
of the United States acting differently than European empires would in similar 
circumstances, and all strove to find a way to work within the existing parameters of the 
Constitution, though varying greatly in how they interpreted those parameters.   
Later, as organic acts were drafted for the territories, senators agreed that the 
temporary nature of military occupation was untenable and they worked to institute civil 
rule in one form or another.  Although they contested the details, the senators understood 
that stability in the territories benefitted Americans and native populations alike.  A 
decade and a half further on, senators of all stripes acknowledged it was time to let loose 
of the Philippines, but disagreed on details such as whether to guarantee independence 
unilaterally or through multilateral agreements, and on the most appropriate sequence of 
events.  
By the end, however, a short 20-year run managing an empire had produced a 
Senate weary of the experiment, distracted by domestic issues, and increasingly occupied 
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by concerns of the Great War.  During the 1917 debates over the permanent status of 
Puerto Rico, the impetus that forced resolution of the final imperial issue came solely 
from the senator sponsoring the bill, who was eager to expedite settlement of the Puerto 
Rican case in order to move on to consideration of a water-power bill vital to his state.   
As a result of waning interest in things imperial, even the anti-imperialist bloc of 
Democratic Party, then in ascendency, was unwilling to undertake the hard work of 
undoing what had already been done, however much it may have disapproved of the 
endeavor at the time.  There was no stomach for reopening negotiations on the concept of 
American imperialism and considering steps to free Puerto Rico and Guam.  Idealism had 
its limits.  Instead, the 56th Congress Senate settled for a resolution regarding the 
Philippines that included no definite timeline, solidified the status quo elsewhere, and 
then turned to greater issues.  After 20 years of bitterly contesting the idea of America as 
an imperial power, Senate Democrats, finally enjoying a majority, instead aimed low, and 
thereby left a structure in place that endures to this day. 
B. A COMPOSITIONAL VIEW OF AMERICAN IMPERIALISM 
The images viewed through the five lenses combine to depict a body of legislators 
who, while debating empire between 1898 and 1917, sought to balance their conception 
of what was right against what was expedient and kept both sides of the scale in sight 
throughout.  Even when their words advertised full commitment to their chosen position, 
their actions revealed an understanding of the power of reserved options, and the wisdom 
of abandoning a lost cause to fight another day.   
Then as now, senators were expert politicians and parliamentarians, who sought 
loopholes and exploited advantages.  They leveraged these opportunities in order to 
subvert the express will of the majority of their peers or to create a fractured opposition 
unable to coalesce around the issue at hand.  During the early portion of the period, they 
used the splintered nature of the major parties and multiple minor parties to divide issues 
into component parts and force consideration piecemeal.  At the end of the period, this 
piecemeal approach is displaced by a growing tendency to use imperial matters as a 
sounding board to trumpet domestic and international issues of greater import.  
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Throughout, senators on both sides of the question of empire alternated between strict 
interpretation of the Senate rules, in order to deny an opening to the opposition, and 
liberal interpretation (or willful misinterpretation) of the same rules in order to advance 
their own agenda. 
Amidst the skullduggery, however, a surprising number of senators extolled a 
higher purpose and a moral compass that was ever present during the debates. It was at 
this level that something like consensus often reigned, without foreclosing the 
possibilities for fierce disagreement on matter of detail and implementation.  The senators 
were well aware that the American national narrative was challenged by the nation’s 
foray into imperialism, and this awareness fueled both the strongest denunciations and 
the most heartfelt justifications for the actions contemplated.   
Also revealed is a legislature that considered the domestic implications of every 
decision on imperialism.  From the initial consideration of President McKinley’s War 
Message through the debates over the final disposition of Puerto Rico, the issue of 
imperialism was never isolated.  Central to every discussion, and often pivotal in its 
resolution, was the repercussions a pending decision would have on such subjects as 
army reorganization, revenue generation, and constitutional limitations.  Thus the Senate 
continually brought the stakes of the imperial debate home by displaying the potential 
impacts on the metropole of the issues that it raised. 
Another display of variation was the way the Senate eventually developed 
individual solutions to suit the four Spanish colonies.  Neither a monolithic process nor a 
uniform result was sought.  Differentiation of the territories grew from the Treaty of Paris 
negotiations on.  First Cuba was culled from the rest for special treatment, then the 
Philippines, and finally Puerto Rico.   
In the end, senators crafted unique sets of freedoms and restrictions for each of 
the former colonies, and over time determined a unique final status for each.  These 
disparate results were partly the product of the characteristics of the islands themselves, 
and of the changed environment as the period wore on.  They were also, however, the 
result of senators acting with intent and agency, for reason often remote from the issues 
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directly at hand.  They knew that this experiment was unprecedented, fraught with peril, 
and morally questionable, yet they pressed on.  
American imperialism lacked a grand design but was no accident.  It arose from a 
string of conscious, deliberate choices, each considered on the merits of the moment.  
The senators who took part in these debates displayed awareness of the stakes at hand 
and exhibited agency throughout, even when in the minority.  Some acted to expand the 
power of the Senate, others to further their own political careers, to assist their party in 
gaining or maintaining power, or to advance American diplomatic or strategic 
advantages; but they engaged willingly and energetically.  The United States Senate, like 
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